THE  ECONOMIC 
CAUSES  OF  WAR 


BY 


ACHILLE  LORIA 


THE  ECONOMIC 

CAUSES  OF 

WAR 


By  ACHILLE  LORIA 

of  the  University  of  Turin 
Translated  by  JOHN  LESLIE  GARNER 


CHICAGO 
CHARLES  H.  KERR  &  COMPANY 

1918 


Copyright  1917 
By  CHARLES  H.  KERB  &  COMPANY 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   I 
Economic  relations  give  rise  to  an  international 

jural   organization    i 7 

CHAPTER  II 
Economic    relations    destroy    the    international 

jural  organization    48 

CHAPTER  III 

Economic    relations    restore    the    international 

jural  organization  in  part 73 

CHAPTER  IV 
Economic    relations    restore    the    international 

jural  organization  in  its  entirety 87 

CHAPTER  V 
Later  tendencies  126 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  lessons  of  the  great  war 163 

Bibliography 183 


THE  ECONOMIC  CAUSES  OF  WAR 
CHAPTER  I. 

ECONOMIC   RELATIONS    GIVE   RISE    TO   AN    INTER- 
NATIONAL JURAL  ORGANIZATION.* 

According  to  economists  there  existed  at  one 
time  a  primitive,  idyllic  stage  of  society  when 
the  labors  of  isolated  producers  sufficed  to  sup- 
ply their  needs.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  such  a  condition  of  affairs  actually  did  ob- 
tain, although  no  traces  of  it  now  remain  to  us. 
In  any  event,  however,  this  condition  could  have 
prevailed  only  during  the  early  infancy  of  hu- 
manity, and  at  a  time  when  population  was  ex- 
tremely sparse.  For,  as  soon  as  the  increasing 
population,  finding  itself  compelled  to  use  lands 
of  comparatively  limited  fertility,  extended  the 

*In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  present  conflict  has 
so  generally  confirmed  Professor  Loria's  theories 
regarding  the  economic  causes  and  aspects  of  war 
as  laid  down  in  his  striking  work:  Les  Bases  Eco- 
nomiques  de  la  Justice  Internationale  [the  title  of 
which  has  been  changed  in  the  translation  to  The 
Economic  Causes  of  War],  which  was  published  by 
the  Nobel  Institute  in  1912,  his  views  cannot  fail 
to  impress  the  reader  as  prophetic.  In  a  supple- 
mental chapter  (Chapter  VI),  written  in  the  fall  of 
1916,  the  author  calls  attention  to  certain  phases 
in  the  war's  development  which  obviously  confirm 
his  theories,  and  also  to  other  details  which  seem 
to  refute  them — a  refutation,  it  should  be  noted, 
which  is  only  one  in  appearance. — Translator. 


8  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

cultivation  of  the  soil  beyond  the  most  product- 
ive zone,  the  labors  of  the  isolated  workers  were 
found  to  be  incapable  of  satisfying  their  needs, 
and  it  became  necessary  to  organize  an  asso- 
ciation of  labor,  or,  in  other  words,  to  co-ordi- 
nate the  efforts  of  a  number  of  producers,  for  a 
common  purpose,  and  this  necessity  soon  be- 
came absolutely  imperative. 

A  striking  fact  now  presents  itself.  The 
workers,  thus  forced  to  associate  in  the  labor  of 
production,  did  not  necessarily  belong  to  one 
and  the  same  political  and  social  group ;  on  the 
contrary,  the  very  composition  of  primitive  so- 
cieties compelled  men,  originally  belonging  to 
different  tribes,  to  unite  for  the  purpose  of  a 
common  production.  This  peculiar  circumstance 
was  due  to  two  fundamental  institutions  of 
primitive  humanity,  the  matnarchate  and 
exogamy,  the  former  of  which  made  the  woman 
the  nucleus  of  the  family  as  well  as  its  governor, 
while  the  second  compelled  her  to  take  her  mate 
from  without  her  own  tribe.  It  therefore  fol- 
lows that  the  family  group,  within  which  the 
association  of  labor  first  arose,  was  composed,  on 
the  one  hand,  of  a  number  of  women  belonging 
to  the  same  tribe,  or  to  the  same  matriarchal 
nucleus,  and,  on  the  other,  of  a  number  of  men — 
their  husbands — who  were  members  originally, 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  ARISES  9 

of  one  or  several,  matriarchal  nuclei  necessarily 
different  from  that  of  their  mates.  Thus  pre- 
historic social  and  domestic  institutions  brought 
together  in  one  field,  or  within  the  confines  of  a 
comparatively  limited  territory,  a  number  of 
men  and  women  who  belonged  to  several  dif- 
ferent family  groups  and  who,  consequently, 
thenceforth  constituted  so  many  distinct  polit- 
ical entities.  Thereupon  the  individuals  com- 
posing these  political  groups,  working  together 
in  a  restricted  territory,  were  compelled  to  es- 
tablish numerous  and  very  complex  relations 
among  themselves;  and,  as  none  of  the  co-pro- 
ducers could  impose  his  own  family,  tribal  or 
national  law  upon  the  others,  they  were  forced 
to  create  a  body  of  higher  laws  to  regulate  those 
relations,  which  were  beyond  the  control  of  the 
laws  of  the  separate  groups.  The  laws  thus 
originated  constitute  the  embryo  of  interna- 
tional law,  which,  therefore,  is  a  corollary  of  the 
association  of  labor,  or,  in  other  words,  an  ef- 
fect of  the  organic  conditions  of  production,  that 
is,  of  economics. 

This  state  of  affairs,  however,  came  to  an  end 
when  the  paternal  family  form  appeared.  For, 
rendering  the  man  the  nucleus  of  the  family,  as 
well  as  the  chief  producer,  and  compelling  the 
absorption  of  the  womaji  in  the  family  of  the 


10  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

man,  it  created  for  the  first  time  a  political  and 
jural  entity  composed  of  the  mass  of  associated 
workers  and  thereby  eliminated  at  once  the 
need  of  any  body  of  laws  superior  to  those  of 
the  several  national  groups.  During  this  stage 
of  humanity  the  nucleus  of  associated  workers 
was  composed,  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  brothers 
and  their  children,  all  belonging  to  the  same 
paternal  family  and  political  group,  and  on  the 
other,  of  their  wives,  who  had  been  received  into 
the  same  body.  Consequently  the  national  law, 
or  law  of  the  group,  sufficed  to  regulate  the  mu- 
tual relations  of  the  associated  producers,  or, 
in  other  words,  to  assure  among  them  the  reign 
of  perfect  equity ;  while  the  relations  among  the 
several  distinct  groups  were  either  independent 
of  all  regulation,  or  were  dominated  by  vio- 
lence and  warfare.  Even  under  these  condi- 
tions, however,  several  co-existing  family  groups 
may  have  united  in  a  community  of  labor;  and 
in  this  event  it  must  have  been  necessary  to  pro- 
tect the  co-workers  by  special  agreements;  and 
here  we  discover  another  manifestation  of  primi- 
tive international  law,  due,  likewise,  to  eco- 
nomic relations.  Thus,  with  the  American  In- 
dians of  the  eighteenth  century,  when  a  murder 
was  committed  among  men  belonging  to  the 
same  family  group,  the  community  refused  td 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  ARISES  11 

concern  itself  with  it  at  all;  but  if  it  occurred 
between  men  belonging  to  different  family 
groups  each  one  of  them  became  vitally  inter- 
ested, and  if  the  crime  were  very  grave,  the 
council,  on  its  own  authority,  ordered  the  guilty 
one  to  be  published  (1).*  However,  even  if  the 
exigencies  of  production  at  this  juncture  no 
longer  require  a  body  of  laws  to  regulate  the 
relations  of  the  different  family  and  political 
groups,  the  interchange  of  commodities  among 
tribes  demands,  no  less  imperatively,  the  crea- 
tion of  a  congeries  of  legal  restrictions ;  in  other 
words,  a  jura]  sanction  is  again  imposed  by  eco- 
nomic necessity.  In  fact  the  constant  growth 
in  population,  rendering  necessary  an  ever  in- 
creasing production,  sooner  or  later  requires  the 
productive  powers  of  labor  to  be  augmented  by 
combining  the  compound  association  of  labor 
with  the  simple  association ;  in  other  words  com- 
merce, or  the  exchange  of  commodities,  now 
arises.  No  longer  does  it  suffice  to  supplant  the 
isolated  labor  of  the  primitive  epoch,  in  itself 
of  slight  productivity,  with  associated  labor ;  but 
in  addition  each  group  of  associated  workers 
must  confine  itself  to  the  production  of  a  limi- 
ted number  of  commodities;  hence  arises  the 

*The  figures  refer  to  the  work  given  in  the  bib- 
liography with  the  corresponding  number. 


12  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

territorial  division  of  labor,  by  virtue  of  which 
each  group  devotes  itself  to  the  production  of 
the  wares  to  which  its  domestic  conditions  are 
best  adapted,  while  it  secures  the  other  commod- 
ities it  requires  by  means  of  exchange,  or  com- 
merce. There  is  no  doubt  that  commerce  first 
arose  under  the  form  of  international  trade,  be- 
cause it  alone  was  able  to  furnish  the  consumer 
with  new  products  or  commodities  different  from 
those  to  which  he  was  accustomed ;  domestic  trade 
did  not  appear  until  later,  since  it,  at  best,  could 
provide  the  consumer  only  with  wares  differing 
but  slightly  from  those  he  himself  produced. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  commerce  was  original- 
ly confined  to  the  exchange  of  commodities 
which  each  group  could  procure  only  from  with- 
out, international  trade  at  first  was  absolutely 
free  and  untrammelled  by  any  protective  law. 
Under  these  conditions  imports  did  not  consti- 
tute a  menace  to  domestic  production.  By  this 
I  do  not  mean  to  intimate  that  slavery  did  not, 
for  a  long  time,  contribute  to  the  increase  in 
freedom  of  trade,  since,  under  this  economic 
regime,  the  value  of  commodities  may  diminish 
to  any  extent  below  the  cost  price  without  re- 
tarding their  production,  the  competition  of  low 
priced  foreign  products  not  constituting  a  seri- 
ous menace  to  the  national  industries. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  ARISES  13 

Foreign  commerce,  born  in  this  manner  and 
free  from  all  restrictions,  creates  new  and  order- 
ly relations  between  persons  belonging  to  differ- 
ent political  collectivities.  It  should  be  noted 
also  that  at  first  the  merchant  himself  accom- 
panied his  wares  to  the  importing  country  and 
that  he,  therefore,  came  in  contact  with  its  in- 
habitants, a  circumstance  which  was  the  source 
of  frequent  disputes  or  quarrels  between  indi- 
viduals of  different  nationalities.  Moreover  it 
is  a  well-known  fact  that  trade  was  at  first  car- 
ried on  by  strangers;  for  example  at  Rome  the 
first  shop-keepers  were  the  peregrini.  Owing  to 
this  state  of  affairs  a  congeries  of  jural  relations 
between  the  natives  and  the  foreigners  arose  and 
a  law  superior  to  the  law  of  the  various  political 
entities  to  which  they  belonged  was  found  to  be 
necessary  for  the  regulation  of  these  relations. 
In  brief,  an  international  jural  institution  again 
was  found  to  be  necessary.  While,  during  the 
preceding  phase  of  humanity,  international  law 
was  needed  for  the  control  of  the  jural  relations 
among  individuals  belonging  to  different  polit- 
ical groups,  but  dwelling  and  working  together 
in  the  same  territory,  during  the  phase  which  we 
have  just  considered  this  law  was  required  for 
the  purpose  of  regulating  the  juridic  relations 


14  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

of  individuals  belonging  to  various  political 
groups,  who  occupied  either  the  same,  or  differ- 
ent territories,  and  who  were  engaged  in  trading 
with  each  other.  Consequently,  while  interna- 
tional co-operation  gave  rise  to  the  first  phase 
of  international  law,  international  trade  pro- 
duced the  second,  which,  by  its  very  nature,  was 
an  advance  over  the  former. 

However,  as  commerce  at  first  is  confined  to 
the  exchange  of  commodities,  which  a  nation 
can  not  obtain  directly  (for  example,  the  ex- 
change of  the  bananas  of  the  tropics  for  the  furs 
of  the  polar  regions),  there  is  no  possibility  of 
international  commerce  compromising  the 
domestic  industries  of  the  country,  or  of  caus- 
ing foreign  industry  to  compete  with  the  na- 
tional. It  is  not  difficult  to  understand  that 
when  these  conditions  prevailed,  commerce  was 
not  likely  to  engender  any  strife  among  nations. 

A  period  followed,  however,  when  nations  no 
longer  confined  themselves  to  importing  commod- 
ities which  they  themselves  were  unable  to 
produce;  they  began  to  import,  in  addition, 
wares  which  they  could  produce  but  at  a  cost 
somewhat  higher  than  that  of  the  foreign  maker, 
and  they  even  imported  some  articles  which 
could  be  produced  abroad  only  at  a  higher  price 
than  that  for  which  they  could  be  made  at  home. 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  ARISES  15 

However,  as  a  rule,  they  confined  themselves  to 
the  production  of  commodities  in  which  the  su- 
periority of  their  powers  of  production,  in  com- 
parison with  those  of  their  foreign  competitor, 
was  most  marked.  Under  these  conditions,  for- 
eign commerce,  while  stimulating  the  importa- 
tion of  wares  which  may  be,  and  eventually  are, 
produced  at  home,  clearly  gives  rise  to  a  com- 
petition often  disastrous  to  the  native  industries, 
and  consequently  it  inevitably  occasions  bitter 
contests  between  its  own  citizens  and  those  of 
other  countries.  Whence  arises  an  even  more 
urgent  need  of  legal  sanctions  for  the  regulation 
of  these  commercial  and  economic  relations, 
which  constantly  tend  to  become  more  and  more 
complex.  In  other  words  there  is  immediately 
felt  the  necessity  of  a  further  refinement  in  the 
international  jural  organization. 

The  more  highly  developed  the  economic  situ- 
ation becomes,  the  more  acutely  is  this  need  felt. 
In  fact  when  population  increases  in  unequal 
ratios  among  the  various  peoples,  differences  in 
the  cost  prices  of  commodities  may  be  observed ; 
consequently  products  which  had  hitherto  been 
obtained  at  home,  may,  under  these  conditions, 
be  secured  more  economically  by  means  of  in- 
ternational trade  (2).  It,  therefore,  widens  the 
scope  of  foreign  commerce.  Further,  the  pro- 


16  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF  WAR 

gressive  decrease  in  the  productivity  of  the  new 
lands  brought  under  cultivation  makes  it  more 
advantageous  for  each  country,  when  its  pop- 
ulation reaches  a  certain  stage  in  its  growth,  to 
import,  rather  than  produce,  the  wheat  it  re- 
quires; it  therefore  creates,  or  accentuates,  the 
territorial  division  of  labor  as  exhibited  by  the 
separation  of  countries  into  manufacturing  and 
agricultural.  Therefore,  increase  in  population 
constantly  tends,  in  spite  of  innumerable  ob- 
stacles, to  develop  international  commerce.  Fur- 
thermore, technical  improvements  always  have 
the  effect  of  accentuating  the  disparities  in  the 
cost  prices  of  commodities  produced  by  differ- 
ent countries ;  and  by  reason  of  this,  the  greater 
the  economic  development,  the  greater  the  num- 
ber and  the  quantity  of  the  wares  that  a  nation 
acquires  by  means  of  foreign  commerce,  al- 
though it  might,  indeed,  produce  them  at  home ; 
consequently  the  competition  which  the  national 
industry  suffers,  owing  to  foreign  commerce,  is 
all  the  more  general  and  intense,  and  the  con- 
flicts which  it  engenders  are  so  much  the  more 
numerous  and  acute.  Simultaneously  with  the 
development  of  economic  conditions  and  the 
growth  of  population,  there  is  a  proportionate 
decrease  in  the  rate  of  profits,  which  is  inevi- 
tably followed  by  a  decline  in  the  value  of  those 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   ARISES  17 

wares  which  contain,  comparatively,  a  greater 
proportion  of  technical  capital  than  of  labor, 
and  which,  consequently,  may  be  readily  export- 
ed. Hence  there  is  still  further  expansion  in 
foreign  trade,  in  the  competition  which  it  causes, 
and  in  the  conflicts  which  it  engenders.  Finally, 
the  rate  of  increase  of  population  and  of  produc- 
tion in  the  several  states  affects  in  various  de- 
grees the  value  of  the  circulating  medium,  while 
the  unequal  modification  thereby  occasioned  in 
the  average  of  the  national  prices  sets  up  new 
currents  in  exports  and  imports. 

The  increase,  owing  to  these  influences,  in  the 
totality  of  commodities  exported,  which  con- 
stantly became  more  perceptible,  rendered  neces- 
sary the  establishment  of  warehouses  abroad. 
In  ancient  times  the  Egyptians  and  the  Romans, 
and  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  Florentines,  were 
accustomed  to  make  business  trips  lasting  a 
year,  but  as  commerce  reached  out  into  new 
countries  this  became  more  and  more  difficult, 
and  merchants  were  compelled  at  the  end  of 
their  trips  to  store  their  wares  in  some  place, 
and  they  frequently  chose  Flanders,  as  it  was 
especially  favorably  situated  for  this  purpose, 
with  respect  to  both  Italy  and  Germany.  Fland- 
ers, therefore,  became  the  warehouse  for  all  the 
commerce  of  Tuscany,  and  its  fairs  soon  came  to 


18  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

be  regarded  as  the  meeting  place  for  the  mer- 
chants of  all  the  world.  At  a  very  early  date 
connections  were  established  between  Flanders 
and  Germany,  which  immediately  engendered 
new  and  more  complex  international  relations 
(3).  In  this  place  we  must  add  that  whenever 
a  nation  becomes  indifferent  to  its  commerce — 
that  is,  when  it  allows  another  country  to  use 
its  capital  in,  and  direct,  the  importing  business 
(such  is  the  inevitable  lot  of  every  young,  as 
well  as  of  every  decadent  nation — for  example, 
Cologne  after  the  Thirty  Years  War,  and  Rus- 
sia in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries) 
still  more  complicated  international  relations 
are  established — relations  arising,  not  only  from 
trade  and  the  balancing  of  debts,  but  also  those 
springing  from  questions  of  sovereignty  and  of 
economic  vassalage.  Owing  to  these  causes,  in 
proportion  as  economic  conditions  develop  and 
international  commerce  expands,  the  relations 
between  the  merchants  of  the  various  nationali- 
ties necessarily  multiply,  as  do  also  the  conflicts 
occasioned  by  them :  hence  the  need  of  interna- 
tional regulations  becomes  still  more  imperative. 
The  first  sanctions  imposed  for  the  control  of 
international  relations  were  of  an  essentially 
religious  character.  Religious  liberty  was  at  first 
proclaimed  solely  for  the  purpose  of  attracting 


INTERNATIONAL    LAW   ARISES  19 

foreign  merchants  to  a  country  and  inducing 
them  to  remain,  thereby  enhancing  trade.  Wil- 
liam Petty  long  ago  observed  that  the  trade  of  a 
country  is  preferably  conducted  by  the  heter- 
odox portion  of  the  population,  in  India  by  the 
Mohammedans,  in  Turkey  by  the  Jews  and  the 
Christians,  in  the  Italian  cities  of  the  Middle 
Ages  by  the  Jews  and  non-catholic  foreign  mer- 
chants, and  in  France  by  the  Huguenots.  Owing 
to  this  fact,  the  development  of  commerce 
demands  great  tolerance  in  religious  mat- 
ters (4).  Religion,  however,  does  not  con- 
fine itself  to  assuring  freedom  of  trade  to 
foreigners;  in  addition  it  takes  them  under 
its  special  protection.  In  very  ancient  times 
when  international  trade  first  appeared  and 
foreign  merchants  came  to  establish  them- 
selves in  Greece,  altars  were  raised  to  Zeus 
Xenios,  the  God  of  Hospitality  and  protector  of 
strangers.  The  Amphictyonic  councils,  the 
Olympian  games,  the  temple  of  Delphi,  were 
simply  so  many  religious  institutions  whose  pur- 
pose was  to  favor  commerce  and  protect  the  per- 
son and  the  goods  of  merchants  in  foreign  coun- 
tries. Roman  fetial  law  was  itself  simply  a  re- 
ligious institution  created  to  preserve  peace 
among  the  nations.  In  commercial  Holland, 
likewise,  religious  liberty  was  regarded  as  the 


20  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

most  efficacious  means  for  attracting  and  hold- 
ing foreigners  and  it  was  precisely  for  this  rea- 
son that  it  was  warmly  advocated  by  the  patriot 
De  Witt  (5).  In  America,  also,  religious  tolera- 
tion was  born  of  commerce;  the  old  puritans, 
who  at  first  displayed  great  hostility  toward  new 
colonists  and  refused  to  allow  them  to  take  any 
part  in  their  business  affairs,  ended  by  permit- 
ting them  to  do  so,  impelled  to  this  change  in 
policy  by  their  own  interests  (6). 

For  the  attainment  of  this  end,  there  is,  how- 
ever, a  means  much  more  effectual  than  religion, 
and  that  is,  law.  It  is  true  Roman  law  in  the 
earliest  age  was  hostile  to  foreigners,  and  the 
law  of  the  Twelve  Tables  (III,  7)  also  was  some- 
what unfavorable  to  them,  but  very  early  the 
thinkers  of  antiquity  began  to  ask  for  more  fa- 
vorable dispensations.  Thus  Xenophon  wrote: 
' '  The  revenues  of  the  Republic  might  be  greatly 
increased  if  the  laws  protected  foreigners.  This 
source  of  income  strongly  appeals  to  me  because, 
not  only  would  the  foreigners  themselves  pro- 
vide for  their  own  wants  and  receive  no  wages, 
but  in  addition  they  would  be  of  assistance  to 
the  state  in  many  ways  and  would  pay  the  tax 
imposed  upon  them  in  their  character  of  for- 
eigners. Therefore  it  would  be  to  our  interest 
to  do  away  with  everything  which,  without  being 


INTERNATIONAL    LAW   ARISES  21 

of  direct  assistance  to  the  Republic,  tends  to  de- 
preciate foreigners;  they  should  be  exempted 
from  serving  in  the  infantry ;  they  should  be  al- 
lowed to  become  members  of  the  Order  of 
Knights;  they  should  be  permitted  to  construct 
houses  and  to  own  land;  a  magistrate  should  be 
appointed  to  protect  foreigners,  and  prizes 
should  be  offered  for  those  who  induce  strangers 
in  any  considerable  number  to  establish  their 
domicile  in  Athens"  (7). 

Institutions  and  laws  respond  to  the  recom- 
mendations of  thinkers.  Thus  at  Athens  was  es- 
tablished the  Tribunal  of  Maritime  Judges,  who, 
to  obviate  the  loss  of  time,  sat  only  during  the 
bad  season — from  September  to  April — and 
whose  function  it  was  to  settle  disputes  between 
sea-faring  men  and  the  merchants  engaged  in 
enterprises  undertaken  by  and  for  Athens. 

At  Athens  the  function  of  the  proxenes-  was 
the  same  as  that  performed  at  Rome  by  the 
patroni,  who  were  citizens  appointed  to  protect 
persons  of  foreign  states  domiciled  in  those 
cities. 

In  Rome  an  even  more  significant  improve- 
ment in  the  hitherto  ex  lege  status  of  the  for- 
eigner was  brought  about  by  the  institution  of 
hospitality.  A  hostis  was  an  individual  without 
the  community,  one  to  whom  the  law  of  the  na- 


22  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

tion  did  not  apply.  When  jural  relations  began 
to  be  established  with  the  hostis,  these  relations 
constituted  the  law,  or  the  institution,  of  hos- 
pitality, whose  principal  function  consisted  in 
the  mutual  recognition  of  a  portion,  if  not  of 
all,  of  the  rights  constituting  the  commercium, 
or  in  the  related  institution  of  recuperatores, 
through  whom  foreigners  were  enabled  to  plead 
their  causes  before  special  judges.  It  was  con- 
sidered perfectly  legitimate  to  rob  an  individual 
foreign  to  the  gens,  provided  he  was  not  a  hostis* 
Consequently  the  f&dus  hospitale  implicitly  rec- 
ognized that  the  gens  was  free  for  the  admission 
and  assimilation  of  foreign  elements.  Later  in- 
ternational relations  which  made  themselves  felt 
in  Roman  society  under  the  pressure  of  com- 
merce gave  rise  to  an  exceedingly  powerful  lay 
institution,  the  jus  gentium. 

During  the  following  mediseval  period,  com- 
munication by  land  was  greatly  hindered  by  the 
barbarous  conditions  which  everywhere  pre- 
vailed. Foreigners,  who  of  course  were  rivals 
of  the  native  merchants,  were  looked  upon 
askance  by  a  considerable  portion  of  the  statu- 
tory legislation ;  for  example  the  laws  of  inherit- 
ance denied  them  the  right  of  devising  either 
their  personal  or  their  real  property,  and  any 
that  was  situated  on  the  frontier ;  moreover  emi- 


INTERNATIONAL,    LAW   ARISES  23 

grants  and  women  married  to  foreigners  were 
regarded  as  aliens.  However,  the  laws  which 
specially  concerned  foreigners  were  very  soon 
rendered  less  onerous  in  various  ways.  In  fact 
with  the  expansion  of  the  economic  life  the  rela- 
tions betwen  citizens  and  persons  from  abroad 
rapidly  changed  for  the  better;  the  latter  no 
longer  were  regarded,  a  priori,  as  enemies,  but, 
with  the  development  of  commerce,  having  be- 
come capable  of  entering  into  contracts,  their 
rights  in  this  respect  gradually  came  to  be  ac- 
knowledged, and  with  the  further  extension  of 
the  division  of  labor,  which  results  from  coloni- 
zation, they  came  to  be  recognizeed  as  purveyors 
or  clients.  People  then  began  to  respect  the 
property,  the  laws  and  customs,  and  the  testa- 
mentary dispositions  of  aliens.  This  was  the 
first  effort  made  to  attract  them,  and  from  it 
sprang  many  others;  it  was  an  excellent  prece- 
dent, which  gave  reason  to  expect  greater  securi- 
ty outside  of  the  cities.  We  find,  for  example, 
that,  beginning  with  the  first  half  of  the  thir- 
teenth century,  the  statutes  of  Venice  recognized 
this  necessity  by  modifying  the  law  of  escheat  in 
such  a  way  as  to  protect  the  property  of  for- 
eigners who  died  in  Venetian  territory  and  per- 
mitting its  sale  and  bequest  according  to  neces- 
sity (8). 


24  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

Further,  the  development  of  trade  rendered  a 
body  of  laws  for  the  protection  of  foreign  mer- 
chants absolutely  necessary.  In  Germany  dur- 
ing the  period  of  the  Carlovingian  dynasty  there 
were  no  independent  merchants.  Usually  at  this 
time,  foreigners — as  such — were  the  ones  who 
required  the  protection  of  the  government; 
hence  arose  the  institution  known  as  the  law 
of  the  market.  This  law  may  have  been  special- 
ly enacted  when  the  government  sold  the  feudal 
lords  the  right  to  collect  the  market  taxes,  since 
it  apparently  was  able  to  impose  the  conditions 
under  which  the  privilege  was  granted;  among 
others,  there  was  a  special  law  favoring  mer- 
chants, which  was  necessary  to  cause  the  market 
to  be  frequented  and  thereby  maintain  the 
amount  produced  by  this  tax  at  a  high  level  (9). 

The  co-existence  in  the  same  territory  of  a 
number  of  persons  of  various  nationalities,  a 
necessary  consequence  of  commercial  relations, 
gives  rise  also  to  the  establishment  of  a  personal 
law  for  regulating  the  relations  among  citizens 
of  different  nationalities.  So  long  as  the  po- 
litical groups  are  ethnically  homogeneous,  or 
when  the  foreigners  among  them  are  few  in 
number  and  widely  scattered,  it  is  neither  neces- 
sary, nor  advisable,  that  this  law  be  created; 
we,  therefore,  need  not  be  surprised  to  find  no 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  ARISES  25 

traces  of  a  system  of  personal  law  among  the 
earliest  Germanic  tribes.  The  need  and  possibil- 
ity of  such  an  institution  does  not  manifest  it- 
self until  nations  become  more  mixed,  because 
it  is  only  then  that  the  state  finds  it  advan- 
tageous. Thus  it  was  that  the  Romans  and  the 
barbarians,  dwelling  together  in  the  same  terri- 
tory, maintained  distinct  customs  and  laws,  a 
condition  which  gave  birth  to  that  form  of  civil 
law  which  is  known  as  the  law  of  the  person. 
Even  at  the  present  time,  Christian  nations  of 
the  white  race  reserve  the  right  of  extra-terri- 
toriality  for  their  compatriots  domiciled  among 
non-Christian  or  colored  races ;  by  virtue  of  this 
law  the  Christian  subjects  are  not  answerable  to 
the  local  laws,  but  are  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
their  respective  consuls.  Not  until  a  later  period 
does  the  passage  from  several  codes  of  law  of  the 
person  to  a  territorial  law  occur.  When  the 
people,  to  whom  the  personal  laws  apply,  disap- 
pear and,  by  intermingling,  give  rise  to  a  new 
nationality,  the  personal  laws  of  the  old  peoples 
must  necessarily  vanish.  Thereupon  the  feudal 
system  fuses  together  the  various  tribes  and 
makes  of  them  a  new  nation  composed  of  vassals 
and  serfs.  Feudal  law,  it  is  true,  derives  the 
greater  part  of  its  provisions  from  the  old  laws 
of  the  person  which  it  supplants,  but  the  origi- 


26  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

nal  loses  all  its  effect  when  each  person  at 
birth  becomes  the  vassal  of  a  lord  and  a  mem- 
ber of  the  nation,  because  the  law  then  acquires 
a  basis  and  a  character  essentially  territorial 
(10). 

The  relations,  however,  of  people  of  different 
nationalities  give  rise  also  to  the  establishment 
of  certain  international  conventions  in  addition 
to  the  legal  sanctions.  At  a  very  early  date 
men  began  to  enter  into  trade  agreements;  the 
treaty  following  the  surrender  of  Granada  in 
1492  allowed  the  Moors  to  engage  in  commerce 
along  the  Barbary  coast,  as  well  as  in  the  vari- 
ous markets  of  Castile  and  Andalusia,  without 
paying  the  taxes  imposed  by  the  Spaniards ;  and 
it  was  this  very  privilege  which,  exciting  the 
jealousy  of  the  Christian  merchants,  intensified, 
if  it  did  not  actually  start,  the  persecution  of  the 
Moors  and  which  finally  led  to  their  expulsion 
from  Spain  (11). 

Even  the  Crusades,  themselves,  as  we  shall  see, 
the  product  of  economic  factors,  by  uniting  the 
European  nations  against  the  Turks,  con- 
tributed to  the  jural  organization  of  the  States 
of  Europe  and  to  the  adoption  of  common  inter- 
national regulations. 

About  this  time,  commerce,  finding  the  land 
routes  barred  to  it,  took  to  the  sea  with  irre- 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  ARISES  27 

sistiblc  energy,  and  the  ocean,  so  often  the  agent 
of  liberty,  offering-  a  means  of  free  communica- 
tion betwen  all  the  peoples  of  the  earth,  became 
the  great  trade  highway  of  the  world.  This  es- 
sentially maritime  development  of  commerce  en- 
gendered a  new  and  specific  form  of  interna- 
tional law,  devoted  to  those  relations  which 
arise  among  sea-faring  nations.  Then  it  was 
that  international  maritime  law  made  its  ap- 
pearance, giving  birth  to  several  remarkable  in- 
stitutions: the  Consulate  of  the  Sea  at  Barce- 
lona, later  voluntarily  adopted  by  the  majority 
of  the  nations  of  the  Mediterranean ;  the  Code  of 
Oleron,  the  Ordinances  of  Wisby,  the  Table  of 
Amalfi,  the  Codes  of  Liibeck,  of  Hamburg  and 
of  Bremen,  and  the  Laws  of  Venice.  All  these 
codes  proscribe  the  detention  of  merchants  and 
owners  of  ships,  of  pilots  and  sailors,  and  also 
the  confiscation  of  their  vessels  and  cargoes 
(12). 

However,  so  long  as  commercial  relations  are 
essentially  maritime,  they  are  sporadic,  ephem- 
eral and  vacillating  in  character;  consequently 
the  prescriptions  of  the  international  jural  or- 
ganization arising  from  them  are  also  uncertain 
and  transitory.  It  was  quite  otherwise  at  the 
end  of  the  Middle  Ages  when  the  advance  in 
land  communication  and  the  abatement  in  the 


28  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

spirit  of  exclusiveness  finally  opened  the  great 
land  trade  routes  to  commerce;  from  that  time 
forth  the  commercial  relations  of  the  several 
nations  no  longer  present  an  instable  or  abnor- 
mal character,  as  is  the  case  with  maritime  traf- 
fic, but,  on  the  contrary,  a  normal  and  stable 
one.  The  relations  between  the  merchants  of 
the  divers  states  also  became  more  frequent  and 
a.s  a  corollary,  the  conflicts  between  the  citizens 
of  the  various  states  also  became  more  frequent, 
whence  arose  the  necessity  of  a  jural  organiza- 
tion not  sporadic  and  vacillating  as  it  had  been, 
but  one  exact  and  rigorous. 

It  is  a  fact,  now  clearly  recognized,  that  the 
discovery  of  America  was  due  to  economic 
causes,  the  chief  of  which  was  the  need  which 
confronted  European  commerce  of  securing  a 
maritime  route  to  Asia  to  escape  the  annoyance 
and  the  payment  of  the  tribute  which  the  Mus- 
sulman states  imposed  on  it.  This  great  historic 
event,  due  to  economic  conditions,  has  had  an 
enormous  influence  on  the  expansion  of  inter- 
national relations  and,  consequently,  on  the  crea- 
tion of  new  and  extremely  complex  ties  among 
the  nations. 

We  have  now  reached  the  beginnings  of  mod- 
ern times;  commerce  expands  and  embraces  the 
entire  world;  the  relations  and,  consequently, 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   ARISES  29 

the  conflicts  between  the  citizens  of  the  various 
states  have  become  more  normal  and  more  in- 
tense. It  was  at  this  moment  and  in  Holland, 
the  very  country  which  was  then  the  center  of 
international  commerce,  that  Grote's  great  work 
appeared,  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  estab- 
lish the  principles  which  ought  to  regulate  the 
relations  between  countries,  that  is  the  forma- 
tion of  the  first  theoretic  code  of  inter- 
national la.w.  Institutions  respond  to  theo- 
ries. In  fact  the  evolution  and  the  in- 
tensive increase  in  commercial  relations  require 
that  not  only  commerce,  but  also  the  person  of 
the  merchant  who  enters  a  foreign  country  in 
pursuit  of  his  calling,  shall  be  fully  protected. 
We  therefore  have  not  only  institutions  and 
sanctions  for  the  protection  of  caravans,  but  also 
special  international  conventions  to  safeguard 
the  traffic  itself.  Thus  the  states  of  Europe  and 
Turkey  entered  into  a  series  of  capitulations 
which  assured  Europeans  in  Mussulman  coun- 
tries all  sorts  of  legal  immunities  and  adminis- 
trative exemptions  which  rapidly  increased ;  the 
idea  of  ' '  the  most  favored  nation ' '  clause  sprang 
from  these  capitulations.  In  fact  it  is  the  rival- 
ries of  the  powers  at  the  present  time  which  im- 
pels diplomatists  to  endeavor  to  secure  for  their 
countries,  by  means  of  special  conventions,  any 


30  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OP  WAR 

advantages  other  nations  have  or  may  obtain. 
Consequently  in  all  the  older  capitulations,  for 
example,  those  entered  into  by  France  and 
Austria,  it  was  stipulated  that  all  the  conces- 
sions which  other  nations  should  obtain  from  the 
Sublime  Porte  should  ipso  jure  be  extended  also 
to  these  two  countries.  Although  possessing  a 
more  general  character,  the  establishment  and 
the  diffusion  of  consulates,  as  well  as  the  crea- 
tion of  special  privileges  for  diplomatic  agents, 
were  always  directed  to  the  same  end.  Of  even 
greater  importance  were  the  stipulations,  ever 
becoming  more  numerous,  for  guaranteeing  the 
liberty  of  merchants  and  of  their  wares,  freedom 
of  the  conscience  (which,  as  we  have  seen,  al- 
ways favors  freedom  of  trade),  and  exemption 
from  the  law  of  escheat.  However,  the  constant 
expansion  of  commerce  by  land  did  not  prevent 
the  other  form,  maritime  trade,  from  developing 
and  becoming  more  refined;  by  the  opening  of 
the  ports  of  Japan  to  the  United  States  in  1854 
and  to  Europeans  in  1855-1868,  it  reached  the 
extreme  ends  of  the  world,  and,  in  consequence, 
maritime  law  became  more  systematic  and  more 
comprehensive.  International  commerce  re- 
quires, moreover,  certain  international  sanctions 
regarding  money  and  the  acceptance  of  foreign 
mediums  of  exchange.  During  the  early  stages 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW    ARISES  31 

of  foreign  commerce  all  kinds  of  coins  circulated 
freely  in  the  countries  engaged  in  it;  but  when 
foreign  trade  became  more  extensive,  the  great 
•variety  of  exotic  coins  became  a  source  of  in- 
tolerable annoyance,  and  restrictions  on  their 
circulation  were  found  necessary.  It  was  owing 
to  this  condition  of  affairs  that  the  United  Prov- 
inces in  1622  passed  a  law  making  foreign  coins 
current  only  by  weight,  a  restriction  introduced 
in  France  during  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII. 

Increasing  commerce  imposes  the  necessity  of 
concluding  commercial  treaties  with  ever  great- 
er frequency.  The  treaty  between  England  and 
Portugal  in  1642,  that  of  the  Pyrenees  between 
France  and  Spain  (1659),  of  Methuen  between 
England  and  Portugal  (1703),  that  of  the  As- 
siento  between  England  and  Spain  (1713)  con- 
tain clauses  facilitating  commerce  between  the 
contracting  nations. 

In  this  respect  the  treaty  of  1860  between 
France  and  England  is  even  more  remarkable 
because  it  was  followed  by  a  series  of  commer- 
cial treaties,  the  majority  of  which  contained 
the  "most  favored  nation"  clause.  Even  Bis- 
marck's fall  was  largely  due  to  the  exigencies  of 
German  trade,  which  demanded  certain  commer- 
cial treaties,  to  which  the  prince  was  opposed, 


32  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

and  which  were  promptly  concluded  by  his 
successor. 

Economic  development,  however,  gives  rise  to 
certain  international  relations,  equally  complex 
a.nd  profound,  but  of  a  different  order  from  those 
of  a  commercial  character.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  greater  the  increase  in  population  the 
greater  the  decline  in  the  rate  of  profit;  hence 
the  rate  of  profit  in  old  and  densely  populated 
countries,  in  comparison  with  that  in  younger 
ones,  is  necessarily  lower.  Now  a.  higher  rate  of 
profit  in  a  foreign  country,  in  comparison  with 
the  domestic  rate,  causes  capital  to  flow  into 
that  country.  This  transference  of  capital  is 
manifested  under  three  fundamental  forms — 
credit,  the  direct  employment  of  capital,  and 
colonization.  Any  one  of  these  forms  suffices  to 
establish  between  the  citizens  of  the  various 
nations  close  and  lasting  bonds  which  must  be 
regulated  by  a  body  of  higher  laws. 

Above  all  else,  the  law  must  protect  foreign 
creditors;  it  must  furnish  guarantees  that  they 
will  recover  the  amounts  due  them;  it  must  as- 
sure the  promptness  of  their  debtors,  whether 
they  be  individuals  or  the  state  itself.  If  the 
latter  is  negligent,  or  refuses  to  pay  the  interest 
due  its  foreign  creditors,  the  matter  becomes 
more  complicated  and  it  may  engender  interna- 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  ARISES  33 

tional  institutions  of  a  character  more  formal 
and  more  imperious  for  the  purpose  of  forcing 
the  offending  state  to  fulfill  its  obligations. 
Among  these  institutions  we  must  mention  the 
joint  commissions,  which  are  appointed  by  cred- 
itor countries,  to  compel  debtor  states  to  pay 
the  interest  on  the  public  debt,  and  which  only 
too  often  are  the  prelude  to  the  establishment  of 
protectorates  and  military  occupations,  or  to 
the  most  brutal  annexations  of  territory. 

All  that  has  been  said  regarding  credit  may 
be  applied  with  equal  force  to  the  two  other 
forms  of  the  international  employment  of  cap- 
ital. When  the  capital  of  a  state,  where  the  rate 
of  interest  is  very  low,  is  used  for  the  purchase 
of  landed  properties  or  to  establish  industrial 
enterprises  in  foreign  countries,  where  the  rate 
of  interest  is  high,  the  legal  protection  accorded 
by  the  latter  to  such  of  its  own  citizens  as  are 
owners  of  land  or  industrial  establishments, 
must  be  extended  also  to  foreigners,  and  this 
can  be  accomplished  only  by  the  imposition  of 
international  sanctions. 

Moreover,  if  the  transfer  of  capital  causes — 
as  sometimes  happens — the  colonization  of  the 
importing  country,  there  is  established  between 
the  colonists  and  the  indigenous  population  a 
series  of  relations  which  require  special  laws  for 


34  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

their  regulation.  It  is  precisely  with  this  end  in 
view  that  joint  tribunals,  charged  with  the  regu- 
lation of  the  relations  between  the  Europeans 
and  the  natives  in  colonial  lands  are  created. 
We  have  here  another  subject  for  international 
conventions — for  example,  the  Franco-British 
agreement  of  April,  1904,  which  was  intended  to 
put  an  end  to  the  colonial  litigation  between 
the  two  nations. 

The  conditions  prevailing  in  densely  popu- 
lated countries  give  rise,  not  only  to  the  export 
of  capital,  but  also  to  the  export  of  men,  that 
is — to  emigration.  For  a  long  time  the  countries 
into  which  immigration  was  flowing  passed  laws 
hostile  to  the  new-comers.  Thus  in  England 
Henry  VIII  blamed  the  large  number  of  alien 
artisans  in  London  for  the  increase  in  the  cost 
of  living  from  which  the  city  suffered,  and  they 
were  accordingly  forbidden  to  keep  more  than 
two  foreign  boys,  or  apprentices,  in  their  homes, 
and  all  foreigners  were  required  to  pay  a  poll 
tax  (13).  In  1547  the  number  of  foreign  arti- 
sans in  London  was  so  great  that  15,000  Flem- 
ings were  required,  by  order  of  the  council,  to 
leave  the  city;  and  as  late  as  27th  June,  1815, 
the  King  of  Piedmont  ordered  all  the  French, 
who  had  settled  in  his  state,  following  1792,  to 
leave  within  twenty  days. 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   ARISES  35 

Finally,  however,  the  hostility  towards  immi- 
grants began  to  diminish  and  give  place  to  more 
favorable  sanctions.  Immigration  establishes 
more  constant  relations  between  peeople  of  dif- 
ferent nationalities  dwelling  in  the  same  coun- 
try— hence  the  necessity  arises  of  new  institu- 
tions and  new  dispositions  in  the  sphere  of  in- 
ternational law. 

In  this  respect  the  progress  made  in  France 
in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  in 
the  regulations  regarding  the  legal  status  of 
aliens,  is  especially  noteworthy.  A  decree  of 
6th  August,  1790,  annulled  the  law  of  escheat 
and  that  of  detraction;  the  law  of  14th  July, 
1819,  did  away  with  its  last  traces,  found  in 
Articles  726  and  912  of  the  code  of  Napoleon, 
and  abolished  all  restrictions  from  which  for- 
eigners suffered  in  the  matters  of  donation,  of 
inheritance  and  of  testament;  the  law  of  5th 
July,  1844,  conceded  to  foreigners  the  right  of 
taking  out  patents;  the  law  of  23rd  July,  1857, 
guaranteed  their  rights  to  trade-marks  for  the 
products  of  their  factories  in  France.  In  fine, 
the  French  law  accords  unusual  privileges  to 
all  foreign  merchants  and  industrials  (14). 

And  this  is  not  all;  earnest  efforts  have  also 
been  made  to  create  a  workingman's  law  which 
shall  afford  the  same  protection  to  foreign  labor- 


36  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

ers  that  it  does  to  native.  This  law  especially 
concerns  itself  with  two  fundamental  subjects — 
that  of  unions  and  that  of  the  insurance  of  for- 
eign workmen. 

Regarding  labor  unions  two  questions  present 
themselves : 

I.  Shall  foreign  workmen  residing  in  a  coun- 
try have  the  right  to  form  independent  groups? 
In  France  this  question  was  decided  affirma- 
tively but  with  two  restrictions ;  first,  the  admin- 
istration of  these  groups  must  be  French ;  second, 
in    the     colonies    the     coolies,     Indians,     etc., 
cannot  become  members  of  a  union.     The  first 
restriction  is  a  last  survival  of  the  old  anti- 
international  exclusiveness,  while  the  second  is 
merely  a  specific  case  of  the  law  of  social  retro- 
gression of  colonies  by  virtue  of  which  institu- 
tions that  obtained  during  an  earlier  period  in 
the  mother  country  spring  up  in  the  colony. 

II.  The  second  question  that  presents  itself 
is  the  following:      What    rights    should    labor 
unions  composed  of  alien  workers  have  in  a 
country?    This  query  is  connected  with  a  broad- 
er and  more  general  question:    Shall  foreign 
individuals,  simply  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that 
they  have  taken  up  their  abode  in  a  country 
other  than  their  own,  have  the  right  to  entire 
freedom  of  action  there?    Regarding  this  ques- 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   ARISES  37 

tion  there  are  two  diametrically  opposed 
opinions.  Some  maintain  that  the  effects  of  the 
personality — which  is  a  mere  legal  fiction — in  a 
territory  depend  solely  upon  the  laws  in  force 
and  that,  consequently,  foreign  personalities 
have  no  rights  in  a  country  until  the  state  has 
recognized  them.  According  to  this  theory, 
therefore,  no  alien  group  has  any  right  to  appear 
in  court — as  plaintiff  it  should  be  understood; 
although,  of  course,  no  individual  who  has  a 
claim  against  a  foreign  group  shall  be  denied 
the  right  to  cause  its  appearance  before  the 
proper  tribunal.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
a  more  liberal  opinion  according  to  which  in 
every  country,  regularly  constituted  societies,  no 
matter  who  their  members  are,  may  freely  act 
as  such,  and  that,  as  the  foreign  individual  has 
a  perfect  right  to  exercise  his  functions,  the 
same  right  must  be  allowed  groups  of  aliens. 
Undoubtedly  this  second  opinion,  which  is  the 
more  liberal,  will  prevail. 

The  question  of  the  insurance  of  foreign  work- 
men and  of  the  indemnities  to  be  paid  them  in 
case  of  accident,  is  a  more  difficult  one  to  re- 
solve. Regarding  insurance  against  sickness  and 
old  age,  some  maintain  that  this  must  be  consid- 
ered simply  as  a  matter  of  public  policy  and 
that,  therefore,  it  affects  only  citizens  and  should 


38  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

not,  in  the  absence  of  any  international  agree- 
ment, apply  to  aliens.  However,  if  we  grant 
that  this  insurance  ought  to  be  extended  to  for- 
eign laborers  by  international  conventions,  diffi- 
culties may  arise  if  the  amounts  contributed  by 
the  government  vary  in  the  two  countries. 
Moreover,  others  insist  that  the  part  paid  by 
the  state  should  go  only  to  the  native  workers; 
it  is  admitted,  however,  that  the  state  to  which 
the  foreign  laborers  belong  should  pay  the  state 
in  which  they  are  employed,  so  that  the  amount 
of  the  pensions  may  reach  those  of  its  citizens 
who  are  engaged  abroad. 

In  the  matter  of  indemnity  in  case  of  acci- 
dent, some  hold  that,  in  the  absence  of  treaties, 
a  workman  injured  while  abroad  should  be 
treated  exactly  as  he  would  be  treated  by  his 
own  government,  or  that  the  state  to  which  he 
belongs  should  indemnify  him  for  the  accident. 
Others  ask  whether  the  law  of  the  country  where 
the  accident  occurred,  or  that  of  the  place  where 
the  contract  was  made,  should  apply.  The  for- 
mer seems  to  be  the  more  generally  accepted 
view.  Again,  others  insist  that  damages  for 
accidents  to  contract  laborers  come  under  the 
domain  of  private  law,  and  that,  therefore, 
foreign,  as  well  as  native,  workers  are  affected  by 
its  provisions.  Thus  Feigenwinter  maintains  that 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   ARISES  39 

foreigners  ought  to  have  the  same  rights  as  na- 
tives, and  that  the  German  theory  to  the  con- 
trary is  inadmissible.  The  ideal  view  would  be 
to  regard  the  employment  of  foreign  workmen  in 
a  state  as  constituting  a  reciprocal  responsibility, 
and  in  case  of  accident  that  the  indemnities 
should  be  borne  by  the  employing  state — an  obli- 
gation which  could  be  covered  by  treaty,  al- 
though the  principle  ought  to  prevail  regardless 
of  any  convention  (15). 

Here,  as  everywhere  else,  theory  only  follows 
facts.  For  a  long  time — it  is  true — laws  for 
the  protection  of  labor  were  exclusively  national 
in  character.  The  proposed  French  law  of  1900 
regarding  workingmen's  pensions,  by  which  na- 
tive laborers  alone  were  to  benefit,  was  inspired 
by  this  idea.  Moreover,  it  also  imposed  a  sup- 
plementary premium  to  be  paid  by  those  who 
employed  foreign  laborers.  At  present,  how- 
ever, there  is  a  tendency  to  reject  these  narrow 
views,  and  two  other  plans  have  been  suggested : 
Either  the  state  shall  grant  indemnities  in  case 
of  accident  to  all  laborers,  without  distinction, 
working  in  its  domain,  or  it  shall  grant  them 
only  to  those  foreign  workers  whose  own  govern- 
ment treats  the  obligation  as  reciprocal.  Some 
countries  pay  damages  in  case  of  accident  to 
all  laborers  without  regard  to  their  nationality 


40  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

(England,  Italy,  Spain,  Russia,  Belgium) ; 
others  (Austria,  Denmark,  Norway  Greece)  in 
the  case  of  foreign  laborers  limit  themselves  to 
the  payment  of  a  fixed  sum;  others  (Germany, 
France,  Sweden)  pay  the  foreigner  an  indemnity 
only  in  case  his  own  government  reciprocates; 
the  Dutch  law  of  2nd  January,  1901,  considers 
only  two  contingencies :  In  case  the  industry  in 
which  the  accident  occurred  has  its  administra- 
tive office  in  Holland,  in  which  case  the  law  ap- 
plies only  in  case  of  reciprocity;  and  when  the 
enterprise  has  its  seat  abroad  the  law  embraces 
the  foreign  laborer  if  he  is  domiciled  in  Hol- 
land; otherwise  it  applies  only  in  case  there  is 
reciprocity. 

In  recent  years  governments  have  entered  into 
numerous  agreements  for  the  purpose  of  assur- 
ing perfect  legal  equality  to  the  workmen  of  the 
contracting  nations  in  matters  of  insurance. 
Thus  the  Franco-Italian  convention  of  15th 
April,  1904,  established  the  right  (16)  of  Ital- 
ians residing  in  France  to  deposit  in  the  Italian 
postal  savings  banks  and  vice  versa,  a  similar 
convention  having  been  entered  into  by  Belgium 
and  France  as  early  as  31st  March,  1882;  and 
what  is  of  even  greater  importance,  the  two 
governments  agreed  to  facilitate  the  payments 
of  Italians  residing  in  France  into  the  Caisse 


INTERNATIONAL.   LAW  ARISES  41 

Nationale  de  Prevoyance  and  vice  versa;  as  well 
as  the  payment  in  France  of  pensions  granted, 
either  to  the  Italians,  or  to  the  French,  by  the 
Caisse  Nationale  Italienne  and  vice  versa. 

Finally — and  this  is  very  important — it  was 
stipulated  that  Italian  laborers  who  were  the 
victims  of  accidents  while  at  work  in  France,  and 
their  representatives,  should  have  the  right  to 
the  same  indemnities  as  the  French,  and  vice 
versa.  Italian  beneficiaries  of  pensions  who  give 
up  their  residence  in  France,  as  well  as  the  rep- 
resentatives of  victims  of  accidents,  who  did  not 
reside  in  Frarice  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
have  a  right  to  an  indemnity  to  be  determined 
by  the  nature  of  the  case. 

Following  the  Franco-Italian  convention  of 
1904  a  further  advance  is  to  be  noted  in  the 
French  law  of  31st  March,  1905,  which  sanctions 
the  principle  of  diplomatic  reciprocity;  follow- 
ing this,  France  and  Italy  entered  into  the  con- 
vention of  9th  September,  1906,  which,  for  the 
period  of  five  years,  provides  pensions  for  the 
representatives  of  Italian  workmen  who  have 
been  the  victims  of  accidents  in  France  and  of 
French  laborers  in  Italy,  equal  to  those  granted 
native  workers. 

Mutual  treaties  for  the  protection  of  laboring 
men  in  case  of  accident  have  also  been  drawn  up 


42  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

between  Italy  and  Germany  (April,  1909)  and 
between  Italy  and  Hungary  (September,  1909). 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  number  of  French 
immigrants  in  Italy  in  1901  was  only  8,768, 
while  there  were  230,000  Italian  laborers  in 
France,  the  convention  of  1904  seems  to  accord 
more  to  Italy  than  it  actually  does  grant,  be- 
cause the  disparity  is  offset  by  Italy's  formal 
agreement  to  undertake  the  supervision  of  labor 
within  her  boundaries,  and  to  reduce  the  hours 
of  work  for  women.  As  the  absence  of  any  pro- 
tection and  the  excessive  exploitation  of  Italian 
labor  caused  the  competition  of  the  manufac- 
turers of  Lombardy  to  be  a  constant  menace 
to  French  industry,  it  is  easy  to  understand  how 
great  wajs  the  advantage  which  inured  to  French 
economy  by  reason  of  this  assurance  on  the  part 
of  Italy. 

These  recent  legislative  manifestations  consti- 
tute a  convincing  demonstration  of  the  powerful 
influence  which  economic  relations  have  in  the 
creation  of  international  law.  In  fact,  when  we 
examine  the  Franco-Italian  convention  of  1904 
more  closely,  we  discover  that  it  was  entirely  due 
to  an  essentially  economic  fact:  the  inferiority 
in  the  economic  conditions  of  Italian  laborers 
when  compared  with  those  of  their  fellows  in 
France.  It  was  the  lower  wages  in  Italy,  in 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   ARISES  43 

comparison  with  those  in  France,  which  caused 
the  heavy  migration  of  Italian  laborers  to  the 
latter  country,  and  subsequently  the  urgent  need 
they  experienced  of  some  arrangement  to  pro- 
tect their  savings,  and  to  insure  them  in  case  of 
accident  in  their  new  a.sylum ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  excessive  length  of  the  working  day  in  Italy 
was  the  cause  of  competition  dangerous  to 
French  industry  from  which  it  sought  to  defend 
itself  by  inducing  Italy  to  appoint  a  board  of 
industrial  inspectors  to  secure  the  observance 
of  the  law  limiting  the  hours  of  labor.  It  was 
from  this  double  economic  necessity  that  was 
bom  the  Franco-Italian  convention,  establish- 
ing this  do  ut  des,  or  the  protection  of  the 
Italian  workmen  in  France  in  exchange  for  the 
protection  given  French  industry  against  Italian 
competition. 

The  Franco-Italian  convention  of  1904  for- 
tunately found  many  imitators  later.  Thus  the 
treaty  of  commerce  between  Italy  and  Switzer- 
land of  13th  July,  1904,  says  in  Article  17 :  the 
contracting  parties  agree  to  investigate  the  ques- 
tion of  workingmen  's  insurance  in  the  two  coun- 
tries for  the  purpose  of  assuring,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, equally  favorable  treatment  to  the  laborers 
of  both. 

The  treaty  of  3rd  December,  1904,  supple- 


44  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

mental  to  the  treaty  of  commerce  of  6th  Decem- 
ber, 1901,  between  the  German  Empire  and 
Italy,  reproduces  in  its  fourth  article  the  article 
quoted  above,  which  also  forms  Article  6  of 
the  treaty  of  19th  January,  1905,  supplemental 
to  the  treaty  of  commerce  of  6th  December,  1891, 
between  the  German  Empire  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary. The  Italo-German  treaty  of  3rd  Decem- 
ber, 1904,  and  the  Austro-German  treaty  of  19th 
January,  1905,  contain  an  article  by  which  the 
two  powers  contract  to  establish  an  agreement 
regarding  workingmen  's  insurance. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  creation  and  the 
progressive  expansion  of  the  world-markets  ur- 
gently demands  the  internationalization  of  the 
laws  regarding  labor  in  order  that  the  compe- 
tition of  those  countries  where  there  are  no  re- 
strictions shall  not  ruin  those  where  it  is  pro- 
tected. In  the  Reichstag,  as  early  as  10th 
February,  1905,  Minister  PosadowsM  stated  that 
it  was  to  Germany's  interest  to  conclude  inter- 
national treaties  regarding  labor  legislation,  to 
avoid  the  disastrous  competition  of  those  coun- 
tries where  it  was  unprotected.  With  this  end 
in  view  Germany  assumed  the  initiative  in  nego- 
tiations with  Italy,  Switzerland,  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Belgium,  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
in  these  several  countries  a  decrease  in  the  hours 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  ARISES  45 

of  labor  for  women  in  factories,  which  was  fixed 
at  ten  hours  for  workers  over  sixteen  years  of 
age. 

Finally,  the  Franco-Italian  convention  ren- 
dered easier  the  labors  of  the  Berne  Conference 
of  the  Association  for  the  Legal  Protection  of 
Laborers  (May,  1905),  which  forbade  the  em- 
ployment of  women  in  night  work,  and  also 
prohibited  the  manufacture  of  matches  contain- 
ing white  phosphorus  after  January,  1911. 
The  internationalization  of  laws  regarding  labor 
doubtless  will  encounter  difficulties  arising  from 
the  question  of  international  control;  it  would, 
however,  be  the  height  of  folly  to  regard  these 
difficulties  as  insuperable. 

However,  the  constantly  increasing  points  of 
contact  between  individuals  belonging1  to  differ- 
ent nations,  or  rather  to  different  states,  gives 
rise  to  more  numerous  and  more  complex  inter- 
national or,  as  the  Americans  say,  more  correct- 
ly, interstate  jural  relations.  We  are  daily  be- 
coming more  accustomed  to  the  idea  that  the 
foreign  law,  and  not  the  domestic,  must  be 
applied  to  the  legal  relations  which  are  being 
established  abroad;  and  this,  no  longer,  as  was 
formerly  believed,  by  courtesy,  but  owing  to 
actual  legal  obligations.  The  codes  of  several 
states  contain  special  dispositions  on  this  sub- 


46  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

ject.  And  this  is  not  all.  International  agree- 
ments are  now  being  made  for  the  granting  of 
divorce  to  aliens ;  the  treaties  of  Brussels  and  of 
Berlin  protect  the  natives  of  colonies,  proscribe 
the  slave  trade,  and  assure  to  all  nations  freedom 
of  commerce,  equal  rights  and  the  unrestricted 
navigation  of  the  great  rivers.  An  entirely  new 
form  of  law  is  in  course  of  evolution — inter- 
national administrative  law — which  endeavors  to 
protect  the  development  of  the  international 
economic  complex  by  co-ordinating  the  adminis- 
trative functions  of  the  various  states,  and  where 
this  is  impossible,  by  establishing  special  insti- 
tutions. To  protect  the  common  interests,  inter- 
national conferences  are  held,  which  lead  to  the 
establishment  of  postal,  telegraphic  and  sub- 
marine-cable unions.  There  are  also  agreements 
for  the  protection  of  literary,  artistic  and 
industrial  property;  for  the  standardization  of 
weights  and  measure,  etc.,  as  well  as  railway, 
monetary,  sanitary  unions,  etc. 

Thus  the  development  of  the  revenue,  in  its 
ascending  phase,  exercises  a  threefold  influence 
in  rendering  international  institutions  necessary : 

1.  By  its  effect  on  production,  that  is  to  say, 
by  compelling,  at  a  certain  stage  in  its  develop- 
ment, the  co-operation  of  individuals  belonging 
to  heterogeneous  social  and  political  groups. 


INTERN ATIONAL   LAW    ARISES  47 

2.  By  its  effect  on  the  circulation  of  com- 
modities, that  is,  by  favoring  commerce  among 
nations. 

3.  By  its  effect  on  distribution,  that  is,  by 
causing  the  migration  of  capital  and  men,  thus 
engendering  those  international  relations  which 
arise  from  credit,  from  the  employment  of  capi- 
tal, from  colonization  and  from  emigration. 


CHAPTER  H. 

ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  DESTROY  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
JURAL  ORGANIZATION. 

Association  of  labor,  exchange  of  commodi- 
ties, and  the  international  employment  of  cap- 
ital and  labor,  which  constitute  the  physiological 
means  for  increasing  the  productivity  of  human 
efforts  and,  consequently,  the  total  amount  of 
the  world's  revenue,  tend,  as  we  have  just  seen, 
to  establish  jural  relations  between  states,  or, 
in  other  words,  they  engender  a  congeries  of 
international  legal  institutions.  There  comes  a 
time,  however,  when  these  means,  carried  to  their 
limit,  fail  to  prevent  a  decrease  in  the  revenue, 
which,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  constantly  becomes 
progressively  more  marked.  In  fact,  the  revenue 
is  a  concomitant  of  the  forced  association  of 
labor,  which  contains  in  itself,  and  develops  in 
its  progress,  a  series  of  checks  to  the  expansion 
of  the  productive  forces,  which  continue  to  mul- 
tiply in  proportion  as  each  form  of  the  economic 
complex  develops.  Now  these  increasing  re- 
straints finally  become  so  numerous  and  so  pow- 
erful that  they  render  impossible  any  increase 
in  the  productivity  of  labor,  which,  otherwise, 
would  attend  the  advance  in  technique ;  then  fol- 
lows a  positive  retrogression  in  the  efficiency  of 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  49 

the  productive  forces  and,  consequently,  in  the 
sum  of  the  products  and  in  the  revenue.  This 
is  the  reason  that  each  of  the  historical  forms 
which  the  revenue  assumes  in  the  course  of  its 
long  evolution  follows  the  exact  curve  of  a  parab- 
ola, presenting  a  period  of  ascension,  succeeded 
by  one  of  progressive  decline;  precisely  because 
this  decline  takes  place,  in  spite  of  the  increas- 
ing development  in  technical  methods,  owing  to 
causes  inherent  in  the  economic  organism,  it  is 
by  its  very  nature  irremediable,  that  is  to  say, 
it  cannot  be  prevented  by  any  means  devised 
for  increasing  production.  Arrived  at  this  point, 
the  revenue,  which  is  unable  to  retard  its  own 
decline  by  any  physiological  methods  devised 
to  increase  production,  is  compelled  to  have  re- 
course to  pathological  means — the  violent  appro- 
priation of  the  revenues  of  others. 

Now,  when  the  appropriation  takes  place  at 
the  expense  of  the  revenue  of  another  citizen,  it, 
of  course,  cannot  violate  the  law  of  the  nation, 
which  is  supported  by  rigorous  sanctions.  When, 
however,  the  appropriation  takes  place  at  the 
expense  of  a  foreign  revenue,  its  first  effect  is 
to  destroy  the  entire  international  jural  organi- 
zation, which  had  been  timidly  asserting  itself 
during  the  ascending  phase  of  the  revenue,  and 
which  was  to  a  certain  extent  an  obstacle  to 


50  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

these  new  and  questionable  proceedings.  There- 
fore the  international  legal  organization  which 
had  grown  up  during  the  rising  period  of  the 
revenue  rapidly  disappears  when  profits  begin 
to  decline. 

One  of  the  first  remedies  applied  to  increase 
the  national  revenue  at  the  expense  of  the  for- 
eign is  protection,  to  which  recourse  is  always 
freely  had  whenever  the  revenue  is  found  to  be 
declining.  Thus  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  more 
the  revenue  dropped,  the  more  duties  were  mul- 
tiplied and  the  more  numerous  became  the  re- 
strictions on  international  trade — devices  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  were  unknown  in  ancient  times 
— while  foreign  merchants  were  overwhelmed 
with  vexatious  restraints  of  every  sort;  traders 
were  required  to  spend  all  they  had  obtained  by 
the  sale  of  their  own  wares  for  products  of  the 
country  where  they  were  sojourning,  and  they 
were  harassed  with  all  sorts  of  exactions.  This 
violent  annexation  of  foreign  revenues  not  only 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  all  traces  of  the 
jus  gentium,  which  flourished  during  the  Koman 
epoch,  but  it  gave  birth,  moreover,  to  a  series  of 
anti-international  institutions  directed  to  the  vio- 
lent destruction  of  all  rights  of  aliens,  and  to 
the  impairment  of  their  property ;  such  were  the 
confiscations,  the  law  of  escheat,  the  reprisals — 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW   BREAKS  DOWN  51 

in  brief,  all  the  various  means  offered  by  a  state 
to  its  citizens  for  avoiding  payment  of  their 
debts  to  the  inhabitants  of  another  state,  when 
some  of  the  latter  happen  to  be  insolvent  debtors 
of  the  citizens  of  the  former.  These  institutions 
constitute  the  absolute  negation  of  international 
law. 

To  the  same  order  of  phenomena  belong  the 
laws  against  foreigners  which,  as  a  rule,  become 
more  severe  during  those  years  when  the  revenue 
is  declining.  Thus,  in  the  United  States  and  in 
Australia  it  was  at  the  exact  moment  when  the 
revenues  commenced  to  decline  that  laws  began 
to  be  passed  restricting  immigration — especially 
against  the  Italians,  Chinese  and  Japanese.  The 
French  law  of  8th  August,  1891,  concerning  the 
protection  of  the  national  labor  and  the  sojourn 
of  foreigners,  obliges  them  to  register;  that  of 
9th  April,  1898,  limits  the  rights  of  alien  labor- 
ers who  are  victims  of  accidents  and  who  subse- 
quently cease  to  reside  in  French  territory,  to  an 
indemnity  equal  to  three  times  the  annual  pen- 
sion given  them,  and  refuses  all  damages  to  the 
representatives  of  any  foreign  workmen  if  at  the 
time  of  the  accident  they  did  not  reside  in 
France.  This  disposition,  in  so  far  as  Italy  was 
concerned,  was  annulled  by  the  Franco-Italian 
convention  of  1904,  quoted  above. 


52  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

When  these  restrictive  methods,  however, 
reach  their  maximum  of  efficacy,  or  when  it  is 
no  longer  possible  to  apply  them,  a  more  drastic 
method,  war,  must  be  employed  to  arrest  the  de- 
cline in  revenue.  War  increases  the  income  of 
belligerent  nations  in  two  ways — either  by  re- 
lieving them  of  the  idle  and  turbulent  elements 
who  are  always  a  charge  on  the  revenue,  or  by 
increasing  the  income  of  the  victorious  nation  at 
the  expense  of  that  of  the  vanquished.  Regard- 
ing the  former  method  Montchretien  long  ago 
observed:  "Nothing  has  contributed  so  much  to 
prevent  civil  strife  in  Spain  as  the  great  diver- 
sion which  her  kings  created  by  means  of  the 
Indes  and  the  countries  they  owned  in  Europe, 
whither  they  sent  their  hot-headed  subjects" 
(17) .  The  second  method  likewise  has  long  been 
recognized  by  the  more  astute  thinkers.  Thus 
Plato  (18)  observes  that  a  marked  increase  in 
population  leads  to  struggles,  because  it  compels 
a  people  to  make  war  on  its  neighbors  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  a  portion  of  their  pasturage. 
Malthas  makes  the  same  statement  (19).  There 
is  no  doubt  that  the  earliest  migrations  of  peo- 
ples, which  was  the  first  form  of  war,  often  were 
caused  by  increasing  density  of  population. 
Thus  Paul  Warnefride  (20)  relates  that  the 
Lombards,  having  multiplied  too  fast  in  Scandi- 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  53 

navia,  their  fatherland,  divided  themselves  into 
three  groups  and  drew  lots  to  determine  which 
should  set  forth  in  quest  of  new  territory — an 
imitation  of  the  ver  sacrum  of  Italy.  It  is  none 
the  less  true,  however,  that  often  the  migrations, 
and  the  wars  to  which  they  led,  were  not  pre- 
ceded by  any  increase  in  population.  Moreover, 
there  is  little  likelihood  that  there  ever  was  an 
excessive  population  in  remote  ages.  Caesar 
states  that  when  the  Germanic  tribes  migrated 
they  still  possessed  vast  uncultivated  tracts  of 
land  (21)  ;  and  Gibbon  remarks:  "For  my 
part  I  have  not  been  able  to  discover  any  proof 
that  their  (the  barbarians')  migrations  ever  pro- 
ceeded from  want  of  room  at  home." 

It  is  not  because  all  the  lands  of  the  Germans 
were  already  under  cultivation,  or  that  they  were 
inadequate  for  their  support,  says  an  illustrious 
historian,  but  owing  to  a  desire  for  booty  and 
adventures,  that  the  Teutons  descended  upon 
Italy;  often  they  left  their  own  country  depop- 
ulated (22).  It  would  therefore  be  incorrect  to 
say  that  wars  are  always  the  effect  of  excessive 
population ;  at  the  same  time  we  must  not  infer 
from  this  fact  that  increase  in  population  is 
never  a  factor  in  causing  war.  Malthus  very 
correctly  observes  that  in  countries  where  mili- 
tary service  is  not  obligatory  recruiting  officers 


54  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OP   WAR 

always  pray  for  poor  harvests  and  lack  of  work, 
for  these  factors,  causing  an  excess  among  the 
idle,  render  the  work  of  recruiting  much  easier. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  too  rapid  growth 
in  population,  by  increasing  the  number  of  sol- 
diers who  offer  themselves,  may  bring  about  war. 
An  American  writer,  Robinson,  maintains  that 
the  fundamental  cause  of  war  is  to  be  found 
in  the  decreasing  productivity  of  the  soil,  which, 
causing  a  scarcity  of  food  produced  within  the 
national  domain,  leads  to  the  violent  annexa- 
tion of  the  fertile  lands  belonging  to  others 
(23).  There  certainly  is  some  truth  in  this 
statement,  for  often  the  poorest  peoples,  inhab- 
iting wooded  countries,  or  lands  which  have  be- 
come impoverished,  invade  the  fertile  fields  of 
their  more  fortunate  neighbors  (24).  Thus  in 
the  basin  of  the  Bundemir  and  the  Oxus,  the 
land  having  become  unproductive  owing  to  the 
drying  up  of  these  streams,  the  Iranians  mi- 
grated to  Persia  and  Afghanistan  (25) ;  and  it 
is  well  known  that  the  Germans  who  overran  the 
Roman  province  had  suffered  severely  from  lack 
of  food  (22).  However,  as  I  have  had  occasion 
to  observe  elsewhere  (26),  to  obviate  the  effects 
of  the  decreasing  productivity  of  the  soil,  it  is 
not  absolutely  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  war, 
because  large  areas  of  fertile  land  which  may  be 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  55 

acquired  peaceably  are  always  available,  and,  if 
necessary,  grain  may  be  imported  from  abroad. 
The  real  cause  of  war,  on  the  contrary,  is  seen 
most  clearly  when  it  is  studied  in  correlation 
with  the  decrease  in  profits,  which,  of  course, 
may  itself  be  due  to  the  increase  in  population 
and  to  the  diminishing  productivity  of  the  soil, 
but  which  may  also  manifest  itself  independ- 
ently of  these  two  phenomena  as  a  direct  effect 
of  the  diminishing  productivity  of  labor 
brought  about  by  each  of  the  successive  histor- 
ical phases  of  the  forced  association  of  labor.  In 
other  words,  as  Proudhon  remarks,  war  is  al- 
ways the  result  of  an  economic  strain  (27)  which 
cannot  be  remedied  by  less  costly  and  less  com- 
plicated means,  such  as  commerce  or  a  commer- 
cial monopoly.  Benjamin  Constant  also  truth- 
fully observes :  ' '  Men  have  recourse  to  war  only 
when  they  feel  that  commerce  is  unable  to  secure 
for  them  what  they  seek  to  obtain  by  force" 
(28). 

At  first  war  and  commerce  did  not  differ  mate- 
rially from  each  other;  the  la.tter  was  simply 
a  sort  of  transformation  of  the  former — that  is, 
commerce  was  supported  by  warfare.  Mephis- 
topheles'  remark,  "Either  I  know  nothing  about 
navigation,  or  war,  commerce  and  piracy  con- 
stitute an  indissoluble  trinity, ' '  certainly  is  true 


56  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OP  WAR 

of  the  earliest  times.  "You  call  me  a  robber," 
said  a  pirate  to  Alexander,  ' '  because  I  own  only 
a  single  vessel;  you  would  call  me  king  if  I, 
like  you,  possessed  two  hundred."  "The  spirit 
of  commerce,"  remarks  Genovesi,  "is  simply  that 
of  conquest."  Among  barbarians,  persons  and 
lands  were  conquered,  among  commercial  peo- 
ples it  is  wealth  that  is  the  object  of  conquest 
(29).  The  earliest  commerce  was  simply  a 
change  from  the  raids  barbarians  made  on  each 
other,  and  in  its  first  manifestations  numerous 
traces  of  its  origin  are  found ;  in  fact,  primitive 
trade  was  always  carried  on  by  men  bearing 
arms,  who  laid  them  aside  only  while  the  com- 
modities were  actually  being  exchanged.  Barter, 
the  earliest  form  of  commerce,  took  place  not 
between  individuals,  but  between  different  tribes, 
and  the  formalities  by  which  it  was  accomplished 
possessed  a  certain  character  of  hostility  and 
distrust.  Moreover,  Etruscan  commerce  devel- 
oped under  the  protection  of  piracy,  and  even 
in  the  Corpus  Juris  mention  is  made  of  a  law  of 
Solon  which  regarded  the  Association  of  Pirates 
as  perfectly  legitimate.  However,  even  when 
war  is  sharply  differentiated  from  commerce  and 
is  itself  a  specific  method  for  securing  riches, 
commerce  is  frequently  the  motive  which  under- 
lies and  causes  it  to  break  out  (30). 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  BREAKS  DOWN  57 

Whenever  war  occurs,  it  is  always  as  a  re- 
action against  a  decrease  in  profits.  In  coun- 
tries possessing  large  tracts  of  unoccupied,  fer- 
tile lands  and  where  the  revenue,  consequently, 
remains  at  a  high  point,  war  is  merely  a  diver- 
sion. Thus  the  American  tribe  of  Texcocos  every 
twenty  days  embarked  upon  a  little  war  against 
some  one  of  the  neighboring  tribes,  care  being 
had  to  select  a  different  enemy  each  time  (31). 
Of  course,  under  conditions  which  prevailed 
then,  defeated  tribes  could  avoid  conquest  by 
removing  to  more  distant  lands.  However,  even 
among  these  primitive  peoples  the  decrease  in 
revenue  sometimes  was  severely  felt;  for  ex- 
ample, owing  to  the  scarcity  of  food  within  their 
own  territory,  the  Apaches  were  hunters  and 
robbers  (32).  The  Mexicans  likewise  were  con- 
stantly engaged  in  warfare  with  their  neigh- 
bors, ostensibly  inspired  by  some  sort  of  religious 
feeling,  but  in  reality  to  provide  themselves  with 
human  flesh  (31).  Not  until  culture  reaches  a 
higher  stage  does  the  development  of  militarism 
enable  agricultural  peoples  to  subjugate  their 
weaker  neighbors,  while  the  increase  in  the  pop- 
ulation, and  the  disappearance  of  free  lands,  pre- 
vent the  latter  from  retiring  to  other  territories 
(33).  It  may  be  stated  as  a  general  truth  that 
whenever  an  indigenous  community  establishes 


58  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

itself  on  the  frontiers  of  a  state  composed  of 
natives  of  the  same  tribe,  and  comparatively  well 
ordered  and  controlled  by  formal,  systematic  in- 
stitutions, intolerable  to  the  former,  the  less 
strictly  organized  body  will  become  a  band  of 
plunderers,  and  eventually,  conquerors.  Thus, 
according  to  the  legend,  Rome  was  founded  by 
a  tribe  of  brigands  (34).  However,  it  is  always 
the  insufficiency  of  production  and  of  profits 
which  impels  these  robbers  to  war  and  conquest. 
The  fact  that  war  is  caused  by  a  lowering  of 
the  revenue  becomes  still  more  apparent  when 
humanity  has  emerged  from  the  tribal  stage  and 
established  a  more  stable  and  a  more  complex 
political  organization.  In  ancient  Persia,  when 
the  revenue  derived  from  its  archaic  natural 
economy  declined,  the  most  savage  wars  broke 
out  and  continued  until  that  decrepit  empire  was 
completely  overthrown  by  Alexander  the  Great. 
The  wars  of  Greece,  according  to  Thucydides, 
were  caused  by  the  inequality  of  wealth,  and 
he  adds,  Agamemnon's  ability  to  gather  a  fleet 
was  entirely  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  the 
wealthiest  Greek  of  his  day,  and  not  because 
the  lovers  of  Helen,  his  followers,  had  sworn  to 
make  an  alliance  with  Tyndareus.  Most  of  the 
wars  of  Athens  were  caused  by  the  necessity  of 
securing  additional  lands,  its  own  territory  be- 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  59 

ing  insufficient.  By  conquest  she  sought  to  ob- 
tain lands  for  the  poor  (35).  The  war  between 
Athens  and  Sparta  was  the  result  of  a  conflict 
between  the  monetary  economy  and  the  natural 
economy.  The  Peloponnesian  war  was  brought 
about  by  the  excess  in  the  population  of  Athens 
and  by  the  poverty  of  its  soil,  which  caused  it 
to  engage  in  commerce,  and  subsequently  to  an- 
nex Megara  for  the  purpose  of  securing  control 
of  the  Mediterranean;  by  this  step  she  came 
into  violent  conflict  with  her  rival,  Corinth,  who 
immediately  entered  into  an  alliance  with 
Sparta,  dragging  her  into  an  ever-widening  con- 
flict (23).  Those,  however,  who  have  the  chief 
interest  in  war  are  always  the  great  capitalists, 
who  find  in  them  a  means  for  increasing  their 
revenues.  Thus,  in  the  Greek  cities  the  poor 
were  always  in  favor  of  peace,  while  the  rich 
wanted  wars,  consequently  the  direction  of  for- 
eign politics  always  depended  upon  the  eternal 
conflict  between  those  who  have  and  those  who 
have  not.  Similarly,  in  Rome  the  Third  Punic 
War  was  merely  a  revolt  of  Latin  property,  de- 
termined to  repair  its  diminished  revenues,  at 
the  expense  of  the  powerful  Queen  of  the  Seas. 
In  Rome,  also,  war  was  specially  advocated  and 
desired  by  the  rich  because  it  increased  the  cost 
of  food  and  permitted  them  to  fleece  the  poor 


60  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

(35,  36).  If  the  wealth  of  Tyre,  of  Sidon,  of 
Carthage,  was  a  product  of  industry,  that  of 
Babylon,  of  Persia,  of  Greece  and  of  Rome  was 
due  to  robbery  (37). 

Although  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  costs  of  war 
fell  principally  upon  the  great  property-owners 
and  not  upon  the  small  ones  (38),  it  furnished 
the  former  with  a  powerful  means  for  checking 
the  decline  in  their  revenues.  In  reality,  the 
sole  purpose  of  the  Crusades  was  to  increase  the 
income  of  European  feudal  lords  at  the  expense 
of  the  Syrian  or  oriental  revenue;  and  it  was 
for  the  same  purpose  that  the  Japanese  expedi- 
tion of  1592-1598  was  directed  against  Corea  and 
China;  this  was  simply  an  Asiatic  repetition  of 
the  Crusades.  Later,  when  the  feudal  and  chi- 
valric  element  lost  its  ancient  authority  and  the 
bourgeoisie  assumed  the  ascendency,  the  change 
was  immediately  followed  by  a  metamorphosis 
in  the  military  art.  In  fact,  as  early  as  the 
fourteenth  century  the  shield  was  discarded, 
while  the  non-chivalrous  elements  constantly 
tended  to  assume  a  greater  and  greater  part  in 
battle;  somewhat  later,  in  1420, Ziska,  who  armed 
the  peasants  of  Bohemia,  created  the  first  army 
of  infantry,  thereby  introducing  a  new  military 
system.  The  representatives  of  decadent  chivalry 
were  then  compelled  to  fight  their  last  fight 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  BREAKS  DOWN  61 

against  the  new  forces  which  were  appearing 
on  the  economic  and  the  military  horizon.  The 
wars  between  France  and  England,  which  filled 
the  Middle  Ages  with  their  brilliant  achieve- 
ments and  their  disasters  and  which  are  immor- 
talized in  Shakespeare's  Histories,  were  merely 
the  last  efforts  of  declining  feudal  income  to 
retard  its  fall  by  waging  a  war  on  the  nascent 
bourgeois  revenue,  efforts,  however,  which  led 
to  its  destruction.  The  French  cavaliers  who 
covered  one  eye  with  a  red  bandage  and  swore 
never  to  remove  it  until  they  had  destroyed  Eng- 
land, were,  in  fact,  merely  the  last  champions  of 
an  uncertain  and  decrepit  form  of  revenue ;  they 
sought  its  salvation  only  to  find  its  ruin  in  war. 
The  old  blind  king,  John  of  Luxemburg,  showed 
that  he  was  fully  conscious  of  this  tragic  destiny 
when,  at  the  battle  of  Crecy,  he  tied  his  horse 
to  that  of  a  young  cavalier  whom  he  ordered  to 
conduct  him  into  the  thick  of  the  battle  in  order 
that  he  might  fight  the  last  fight  with  the  arms 
of  the  noble. 

Further,  the  struggles  of  Pisa  and  Florence, 
the  Italian  wars  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries,  and  the  Seven  Years'  War  (1756-1763) 
were  due  to  economic  causes.  The  only  war 
undertaken  by  England  during  the  ministry  of 
Walpole,  that  with  Spain,  was  caused  by  her 


62  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

opposition  to  the  smuggling  carried  on  by  Eng- 
lish ships  in  Spanish  America  and  by  England 's 
desire  to  deprive  Spain  of  her  commerce  with  her 
own  colonies.  Holland's  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence against  Spain  was  in  reality  simply  a 
privateering  war  on  the  Spanish  merchant  mar- 
ine, and  the  Hispano-American  colonial  trade. 
The  war  of  England  against  Napoleon  was 
merely  a  reaction  against  the  Napoleonic  con- 
quests which  threatened  Britain 's  commerce.  In 
cases  like  these  war  admirably  fulfills  its  func- 
tion of  increasing  the  revenues  of  the  wealthy 
and  especially  of  the  great  English  proprietors. 

"The  peace  has  made  one  general  malcontent 
Of  these  high-market  patriots ;  war  was  rent. ' ' 
— Byron,  Don  Juan. 

The  invasion  of  Algiers  was  the  effect  of  eco- 
nomic causes.  The  Crimean  war  was  brought 
about  by  England's  determination  to  defend  the 
route  to  India,  which  was  of  the  first  importance 
to  her  commerce.  Field  Marshal  von  Moltke,  in 
the  preface  of  the  popular  edition  of  his  Franco- 
Prussian  War,  says :  ' '  The  great  wars  of  recent 
times  have  broken  out  against  the  will  of  the 
governments.  The  bourse  has  now  acquired  an 
influence  which  can  mobilize  armies  for  the 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  63 

protection  of  its  interests.  Mexico  and  Egypt 
were  occupied  by  European  armies  to  secure  the 
payment  of  debts  due  high  finance."  The  wealth 
of  the  mining  region  of  Lorraine  caused  its  an- 
nexation to  Germany  in  1870.  The  Chinese  war 
was  undertaken  to  impede  the  progress  of  the 
United  States.  The  Spanish  war  was  merely 
the  result  of  the  decline  in  the  profits  of  the 
American  sugar  manufacturers.  The  war  in  the 
Transvaal  was  the  work  of  financiers  and  specu- 
lators in  gold  mines,  who  expected  to  reap  great 
profits  from  a.  military  adventure  in  South  Af- 
rica. These  hopes  on  the  part  of  British  finan- 
ciers were  in  their  turn  aroused  by  the  disquiet- 
ing decline  in  the  English  revenue.  The  Russo- 
Japanese  war  was  the  result  of  the  unfavorable 
economic  situation  of  Russia,  which  had  caused 
a  decrease  in  her  revenue  that  induced  her  to 
endeavor  to  repair  the  loss  by  enlarging  her 
trade  by  means  of  forcible  annexations  in  Asia; 
while  at  the  same  time,  Japan's  revenue  was 
rigidly  limited  by  her  restricted  territorial 
boundaries,  and  she,  therefore,  was  determined, 
regardless  of  the  cost,  to  expand  by  means  of 
exportation  and  by  the  colonization  of  Corea, 
which  lay  close  at  her  door,  and  of  Manchuria. 
The  present  war  of  France  with  Morocco  was 
begun  simply  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  the  lat- 


64  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

ter  country  to  undergo  expenses  which  she  could 
not  support  without  having  recourse  to  a  loan 
which  would  feather  the  nests  of  the  French 
bankers.  What  more  need  I  say?  The  present 
economic  rivalry  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
contains  the  seeds  of  a  future  war.  England 
never  announced  the  new  imperialism  of  Cham- 
berlain until  she  found  that  Germany  was 
threatening  her  supremacy  in  the  textile  and 
metal  industries;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
world  politics  of  William  II  shows  that  the  sole 
aim  of  Teutonic  activity  was  the  reduction  of 
the  commercial  power  of  England.  The  poli- 
ticians of  the  two  countries,  who  represent  the 
mercantile  classes,  and  who  everywhere  now  hold 
the  balance  of  power,  are  convinced  that  their 
nations  will  inevitably  retrograde  if  they  do 
not  crush  their  rivals.  The  English  Unionists, 
like  the  liberals  or  the  radical  partisans  of  ex- 
pansion who  support  Asquith,  are  merely  the 
spokesmen  of  those  merchants  who  are  looking 
for  new  markets  and  additional  customers.  In 
the  same  way  the  German  Liberal  Nationalists 
and  Liberal  Democrats,  with  the  National  Zei- 
tung  at  their  head,  are  simply  the  political  rep- 
resentatives of  the  manufacturers  of  Rhenish 
Prussia  and  Westphalia.  As  Paul  Leroy- 
Beaulieu  well  says,  they  all  hate  each  other  like 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  65 

shop  keepers  on  opposite  sides  of  the  street, 
standing  in  their  doors  waiting  for  customers, 
each  praying  for  the  failure  of  his  rival  (39). 
Finally,  the  whole  modern  imperialistic  move- 
ment, that  is  to  say,  the  efforts  of  all  the  Euro- 
pean states  and  of  America  to  secure  additional 
colonies  is  merely  the  result  of  the  decline  in 
revenue  and  of  the  desire  to  find  a  remedy  for 
it;  in  other  words,  it  is  a  derivative  of  the  eco- 
nomic situation.  An  Italian  writer,  Biasutti, 
clearly  demonstrates  that  geographic  expansion 
has  never  had  any  other  purpose  than  the  annex- 
ation of  territory  ajid  the  concomitant  economic 
growth.  The  work  of  private  explorers,  although 
apparently  inspired  by  scientific  aims,  is,  in  fact, 
merely  an  extension  of  the  supreme  interests  of 
capital;  and  it  is  always  carried  on  in  those 
countries  whose  annexation  is  demanded  by  cap- 
italistic interests.  When  the  various  nations  of 
Europe  began  the  colonization  of  Africa  there 
was  a  brief  time  when  it  was  supposed  that  the 
work  was  being  prosecuted  with  a  scientific  end 
in  view;  and  it  was  suggested  that  the  nations 
join  in  the  work  of  exploring  the  Dark  Conti- 
nent, and  thereby  enlarge  the  knowledge  of  Afri- 
can geography  exclusively  in  the  interests  of 
science.  The  international  exploration  scheme, 
however,  was  short  lived,  each  of  the  nations 


66 

hurriedly  withdrawing  from  the  work,  in  order 
that  it  might  proceed  independently  and  for  its 
own  gain  (40). 

Not  only  does  the  economic  factor  cause  wars, 
but  it  also  determines  their  outcome,  for  all  wars 
end  with  the  triumph  of  the  nation  economically 
the  strongest.  Frederick  II  remarked:  "With 
bayonets  victories  may  be  won,  but  it  is  economic 
conditions  that  decide  the  issue  of  wars."  The 
final  victory  of  England  over  Napoleon  was  due 
to  her  great  technical  inventions  which  had  given 
such  an  impetus  to  her  industries  that  she  had 
become  indispensable  as  a  purveyor  of  manufac- 
tured goods  to  her  colonies,  which  had  become 
independent,  as  well  as  to  all  of  Europe,  indus- 
tries also  which  forced  Napoleon  to  permit  the 
smuggling  of  English  wares.  The  fact  that  vic- 
torious Japan  was  compelled  to  be  satisfied  with 
an  absurdly  small  war  indemnity  from  Russia, 
whom  she  had  utterly  defeated,  was  due  chiefly 
to  the  exhausted  economic  conditions  of  the  Em- 
pire of  the  Rising  Sun.  Of  course,  there  were 
other  circumstances  which  contributed  to  this 
result,  but  they  all  were  essentially  economic  in 
character ;  for  example,  the  pressure  of  the  Eng- 
lish bankers  who  had  lent  vast  sums  to  Japan  at 
the  advantageous  rate  of  8.4  per  cent,  guaran- 
teed by  the  receipts  of  the  tobacco  monopoly, 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  BREAKS   DOWN  67 

and  who  were  anxious  that  their  debtor  should 
not  grow  too  rich  and  thereby  be  able  to  repay 
their  loans.  This  debt  itself,  with  its  excessively 
burdensome  terms,  was  due  to  the  embarrassed 
conditions  of  Japanese  finances.  It  should  be 
added  also  that  high  finance  of  Europe  and 
America  felt  itself  threatened  by  the  Russian 
revolution,  and  consequently  did  not  want  Czar- 
ism  to  be  completely  overthrown.  In  every  case 
the  forces  that  dictate  the  conditions  of  peace 
are  wholly  economic  in  character. 

Commercial  restrictions  and  wars  are  not  the 
sole  means  for  repairing  declining  domestic  rev- 
enues at  the  expense  of  the  foreign.  This  can 
be  accomplished  also  by  inciting  a  revolution  in 
a  foreign  country  and  then  exploiting  it  for 
selfish  purposes.  Thus,  in  Palestine  and  in 
Greece,  the  Romans  incited  conflicts  between  the 
rich  and  the  poor,  aiding  the  former  to  secure 
the  victory,  and  thereby  rendering  the  conquest 
of  these  countries  easy  for  themselves.  Coming 
down  to  more  modern  times,  the  frequent  revolu- 
tions that  occur  in  Saint  Domingo  and  Haiti  are 
merely  commercial  enterprises  organized,  until 
recently,  by  English  houses  and,  at  present,  by 
German  commercial  firms  who  have  in  their  offi- 
ces special  agents  whose  sole  function  is  to  incite 
revolutionary  movements,  and  who  pay  good  sal- 


68  THE  ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OP   WAR 

aries  to  politico-commercial  travelling  men  for 
this  purpose.  The  intervention  of  the  United 
States  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  was  due  to  the 
machinations  of  American  business  houses  es- 
tablished on  the  island  and  they  greatly  profit- 
ed by  the  change  in  status.  Need  I  add  any- 
thing further?  The  United  States  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  incite  the  province  of  Panama  to  rebellion 
against  Colombia,  and  to  use  its  fleet  to  prevent 
the  landing  of  the  army  dispatched  to  put  down 
the  insurrection  and  to  protect  and  sanction  the 
establishment  of  the  rebellious  province  as  an 
independent  republic,  and  all  for  the  purpose 
of  acquiring  sovereign  property  rights — a  legal 
phrase  coined  expressly  for  the  occasion — to  that 
portion  of  the  territory  of  the  new  republic 
which  it  required  for  the  interoceanic  canal. 

Further,  a  country  where  profits  are  declin- 
ing may  succeed  in  restoring  them  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  alien  revenue  by  taking  possession 
of  the  foreign  country.  Thus,  in  1901, 
France  sent  Admiral  Caillard  to  Mytilene  to 
collect  the  Tubini  and  Lorando  claims.  The 
annexations  of  Madagascar  and  of  Tunisia  by 
France,  like  the  English  seizure  of  Egypt  and 
Cyprus,  are  merely  other  examples  of  this  mode 
of  procedure. 

However,    further   illustrations   of   a   truth, 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  69 

which  may  be  said  to  be  now  universally  recog- 
nized, are  unnecessary.  What  we  have  still  to 
demonstrate  is  that  wars,  revolutions  incited 
abroad,  annexations  of  territory,  protectorates, 
in  a  word,  all  the  pathological  means  devised 
for  raising  the  revenues,  cannot  be  employed 
without  shattering  every  rule  of  international 
law,  and  •  shamefully  disregarding  all  its  sanc- 
tions. In  fact,  no  state  can  enrich  itself  at  the 
expense  of  another  without  trampling  inter- 
national law  under  foot,  although  it  may  not  pro- 
ceed as  far  as  war.  At  no  period  of  history  have 
states  hesitated  to  tear  up  any  international 
treaty  that  hampered  their  movements.  Thus 
Russia,  in  1871,  completely  disregarding  the 
treaty  of  Paris  of  1856,  asserted  her  right  to 
send  her  fleet  into  the  Black  Sea;  Austria,  in 
1908,  tore  up  the  treaty  of  Berlin  and  annexed 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  This  proceeding  is  so 
common  that  John  Stuart  Mill  long  ago  sug- 
gested that  international  treaties  should  be  bind- 
ing for  only  a  limited  period,  the  indemnities  or 
annexations  made  under  them,  however,  not  to 
be  surrendered  with  the  lapse  of  the  treaty. 

During  a  war  between  nations  what  actually 
becomes  of  international  law?  Its  role  is  re- 
duced to  that  of  the  two  cannons  which  guard 
the  gates  of  Pekin,  and  which  are  said  to  be  maer- 


70         "     THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

nificent,  although  they  have  one  defect — they  are 
made  of  paper  which,  while  rendering  them  very 
easy  to  handle  in  time  of  peace,  makes  them  quite 
worthless  in  time  of  war.  Professor  Hamacker 
doubtless  was  convinced  of  the  slight  value  of 
international  law  when,  in  addressing  the  stu- 
dents of  the  University  of  Utrecht  in  his  closing 
lecture  of  1902,  he  remarked :  ' '  I  have  hitherto 
conscientiously  instructed  you  in  international 
law  but,  in  view  of  the  war  in  the  Transvaal,  I 
am  forced  to  impart  a  truth  to  you  which  is  ex- 
tremely painful,  namely:  I  have  been  teaching 
you  something  which  does  not  exist. ' '  The  truth 
is  that  when  a  nation,  whether  it  be  a  monarchy 
or  a  republic,  has  recourse  to  war,  the  relations 
between  the  states  necessarily  become  anarchi- 
cal, and  the  entire  edifice  of  international  sanc- 
tions, which  jurists  have  erected  with  such  pains, 
tumbles  like  a  house  of  cards,  or,  more  correctly, 
vanishes  like  a  castle  in  Spain,  into  the  air, 
leaving  no  traces. 

It  has  been  estimated  that  from  the  year  1496 
B.  C.,  the  date  of  the  Amphictyonic  treaty,  to 
1861,  the  world  has  enjoyed  only  257  years 
of  peace,  as  against  3130  years  of  war, 
that  is,  one  year  of  the  former  to  twelve 
of  the  latter.  This  is  equivalent  to  say- 
ing that  in  the  entire  history  of  humanity 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   BREAKS   DOWN  71 

the  violation  of  international  law  has  been  the 
rule,  while  its  observance  has  been  the  excep- 
tion. There  is  slight  consolation  in  the  thought 
that  international  law,  while  denied  in  fact,  has 
continued  to  exist  as  an  abstract  and  theoretical 
rule  for  the  conduct  of  nations.  For  of  what 
use  is  a.  rule  if  it  has  no  practical  effect,  and  if 
it  is  constantly  violated  in  the  most  shameless 
manner?  Von  Ihering  says  a  law  without  sanc- 
tion is  a  flame  without  heat.  The  comparison, 
however,  is  not  altogether  a  happy  one,  since  a 
flame  without  heat,  instead  of  being  useless  or 
disadvantageous,  is  the  supreme  desideratum  of 
technical  science ;  therefore  it  seems  to  be  nearer 
the  truth  to  say,  using  a  similai  analogy,  that  a 
law  without  sanction  is  like  those  ultra-red  or 
ultra-violet  rays  which  are  absolutely  imper- 
ceptible to  our  senses  and  which  only  the  most 
delicate  scientific  instruments  can  detect  and  ex- 
amine. It  is,  therefore,  reduced  to  an  abstract 
and  fleeting  conception,  of  interest  only  to  the 
scholar,  and  one  which  finds  no  application  in 
the  field  of  reality. 

Thus,  the  revenue,  which  in  the  ascending 
period  of  its  evolution  creates  international  law, 
engenders,  when  it  reaches  the  unavoidable  phase 
of  decline,  dissensions  and  wars,  which  result 
in  the  destruction  of  this  jural  institution.  Eco- 


72  THE  ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

nomic  relations,  having  given  birth  to  an  inter- 
national legal  organization,  in  one  stage  of  their 
development,  blindly  bring  about  its  utter  nega- 
tion in  tHe  following  phase,  or,  in  other  words, 
destroy  their  own  issue,  converting  it  into  a  mere 
phantom,  powerless  and  lifeless. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  RESTORE  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
JURAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  PART. 

Even  when  war  is  successful  in  securing  an 
advantage  for  the  national  revenue  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  foreign,  it  always  occasions  a  great 
loss  by  the  destruction  of  men  and  capital ;  and 
with  economic  and  technical  progress  this  loss 
ever  tends  to  become  greater  and  greater.  The 
development  of  the  instruments  of  war  alone  is 
sufficient  to  bring  about  this  result  because  their 
powers  of  destruction  are  proportionately  in- 
creased. Disregarding  this  purely  technical 
influence  in  order  that  we  may  direct  our  atten- 
tion exclusively  to  the  economic  phase,  it  is  evi- 
dent, in  the  first  place,  that  the  more  war 
develops  and  the  more  frequently  conquered 
states  are  annexed,  the  more  the  number  of  war- 
ring nations  diminishes  and,  by  so  much,  the 
power  of  each  one  increases.  Now,  so  long  as 
the  warring  states  are  of  slight  territorial  extent 
the  sum  of  the  wealth  destroyed  in  the  conflict 
is  itself  of  small  importance ;  when,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  rivals  are  great  and  powerful  the  loss 
and  destruction  of  wealth  which  follows  their 


74  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

clash  is  all  the  more  considerable,  and  this,  un- 
fortunately, is  not  the  only  evil. 

The  greater  the  economic  development,  the 
greater  the  loss  occasioned  the  national  economy 
by  the  destruction  of  a  given  number  of  men; 
either  because  the  cost  of  educating  a  man  has 
increased  and  as  a  corollary,  his  economic  value ; 
or,  because  his  co-efficient  of  procreation  has 
diminished,  thereby  making  it  more  difficult  to 
replace  the  dead.  While,  considered  in  this 
manner,  the  destruction  of  men  by  war  works 
to  the  disadvantage  of  the  capitalistic  class,  it 
causes  an  even  greater  loss  to  the  workers,  whom 
it  decimates. 

To  the  increasing  losses  inflicted  by  war 
through  its  effects  on  the  human  element  con- 
cerned with  production,  we  must  add  the  dam- 
ages, likewise  increasing,  which  are  caused  the 
inanimate  element  in  industry.  In  fact,  with 
the  development  of  the  latter  the  total  mass  of 
technical  capital  increases  ajs  does  also  that  of 
machinery  and  also  the  number  of  edifices  de- 
voted to  pleasure,  etc.,  which  every  people  has 
at  its  disposal;  it  follows,  therefore,  that  the 
capital  swallowed  up,  or  destroyed,  by  war  is 
so  much  the  more  considerable.  This  is  proved 
by  the  experience  of  the  recent  war  in  the 
Transvaal,  which  caused  such  damage  to  the 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW    PARTLY    RESTORED        75 

gold  mines  of  the  country  that  it  inflicted  a  loss 
on  the  English  financiers  equal  to  the  entire 
profits  they  had  hoped  to  obtain.  Consequently, 
by  the  development  of  civilization  and  wealth 
certain  methods  of  destruction,  of  resistance  and 
of  offensive  become  for  the  most  part  impos- 
sible. Thus,  while  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
with  the  Persians,  the  Athenians  abandoned  the 
country  and  the  capital,  Pericles  had  great  dif- 
ficulty at  the  opening  of  the  Peloponnesian  war 
in  persuading  them  to  leave  their  domain  (41). 
This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  when  fixed  capital 
has  become  considerable,  men  display  great  re- 
luctance to  abandoning  their  own  territories  to 
the  enemy.  In  this  connection  it  should  be  noted 
that  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russians  in  1812  was 
rendered  possible  by  the  fact  that  the  amount 
of  fixed  capital  in  the  country  at  that  time  was 
small;  under  present  economic  conditions  in 
Russia,  this  mode  of  warfare  could  not  be 
adopted.  On  the  other  hand,  the  greater  the 
economic  development  the  more  wealth  tends  to 
assume  a  mobile  form.  Liquid  property  can 
develop  only  in  a.  peaceful  environment ;  it  finds 
itself  hampered  and  choked  when  war  breaks 
out.  Moreover,  the  greater  the  economic  develop- 
ment the  more  extensive  is  international  trade, 
and,  consequently,  the  greater  the  probability 


76  THE  ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OP  WAR 

that  a  nation  has  need  of  other  countries  either 
as  markets  for  its  products,  or  as  purveyors  of 
the  commodities  it  requires  for  its  own  consump- 
tion. Consequently,  by  cutting  off  trade  either 
between  the  belligerents,  or  between  them  and 
neutrals,  war  may  occasion  great  damage  to  the 
economic  situation  of  all  peoples  (42). 

In  view  of  the  great  losses  occasioned  by  war 
it  is  easy  to  understand  why  the  nations,  instead 
of  resigning  themselves  to  inactivity,  are  con- 
stantly exerting  themselves  to  lessen  the  destruc- 
tion of  wealth  and  of  lives  caused  by  conflict. 
This  is  what  they  are  endeavoring  to  accomplish 
by  means  of  mutual  agreements  for  limiting  the 
work  of  destruction  on  the  part  of  the  belliger- 
ents, and  for  safeguarding  persons  and  property 
in  time  of  war. 

As  capital  during  the  property  regime  is  es- 
teemed much  more  highly  than  human  life,  it  is 
not  surprising  that  international  law  seeks 
chiefly  to  lessen  the  destruction  of  capital  by 
war  before  it  gives  any  thought  to  the  massacre 
of  men  by  which  it  is  attended.  Conventions 
looking  towards  limiting  the  damages  resulting 
from  war  to  commerce  and  property  are  com- 
paratively ancient.  At  a  very  early  date  it  was 
agreed  that  in  case  of  rupture  of  two  states, 
foreign  merchants  should  be  allowed  six  months 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   PARTLY    RESTORED        77 

in  which  to  sell  their  merchandise  or  take  it  else- 
where. The  17th  March,  1693,  Sweden  and 
Denmark  protested  against  the  clause  in  the 
treaty  of  Whitehall  (22nd  August,  1689),  by 
which  England  and  the  United  Provinces  agreed 
to  notify  the  states,  which  were  not  at  war  with 
France,  that  they  would  attack  and  seize  as  a 
prize  any  vessel  bound  for,  or  leaving,  a  port 
belonging  to  that  country,  and  the  protesting 
nations  secured  the  annulment  of  the  clause 
to  which  they  objected  (12).  To  protect  their 
interpretation  of  the  theory  of  contraband 
against  the  arbitrary  action  of  belligerents,  neu- 
tral states,  at  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
adopted  the  plan  of  having  their  merchantmen 
escorted  by  war  vessels  whose  officers,  in  case 
an  enemy  was  encountered,  were  to  give  their 
word  that  the  merchantman  carried  no  contra- 
band— this  was  the  origin  of  the  convoy.  Eng- 
land, whose  right  of  search  and  capture  was  lim- 
ited by  this  mode  of  procedure,  immediately 
contested  its  legality,  but  she  finally  yielded.  In 
1659  and  1713,  the  treaties  of  the  Pyrenees  and 
of  Utrecht  reduced  the  number  of  articles  com- 
prised under  the  term  contraband  of  war,  while 
the  influence  of  England  and  France  caused  the 
acceptance  of  the  doctrine  that  in  time  of  war 
the  flag  covers  the  merchandise.  This  arrange- 


78  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

ment  guarantees  the  freedom  of  neutral  trade 
with  belligerents  also,  when  the  vessel  carries 
no  contraband  of  war. 

In  March,  1780,  Catherine  of  Russia  sent  the 
other  monarchs  of  Europe  a.  declaration  in  which 
were  laid  down  the  principles  of  the  neutrality 
of  non-belligerent  nations,  which  were  accepted 
by  all  the  powers,  except  England,  who  main- 
tained her  right  of  capture  against  neutral  coun- 
tries in  order  that  she  might  indirectly  strike 
a  blow  at  France.  All  the  other  powers  hostile 
to  France  did  the  same.  The  treaty  of  17th 
June,  1801,  between  England  and  Russia  re- 
established the  principle  of  respect  for  neutral 
countries,  denying,  however,  the  doctrine  that 
the  flag  covers  the  merchandise,  thus  allowing 
the  confiscation  of  property  belonging  to  the 
enemy  even  when  carried  by  neutral  vessels. 
The  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856  prohibited  the  use 
of  privateers,  an  agreement  to  which  the  United 
States  became  a  party ;  in  addition  it  established 
the  'principle  that  a  neutral  flag  covers  merchan- 
dise belonging  to  the  enemy;  that  neutral  mer- 
chandise, excepting  contraband  of  war,  is  not 
subject  to  capture,  even  when  in  an  enemy's 
vessel;  and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  observe 
a  blockade  unless  it  is  actually  effective.  The 
Italian  Marine  Code  of  1865,  Article  211,  for- 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  PARTLY  RESTORED       79 

bids  its  war  vessels  to  capture  and  hold  mer- 
chantmen of  a  hostile  nation  provided  the  enemy 
grants  the  same  immunity  (43). 

However,  in  this  field,  also,  the  progress  of 
civilization  is  discouragingly  slow,  encountering, 
as  it  does,  innumerable  obstacles,  and  suffering 
frequent  relapses.  In  fact,  while,  in  case  of  war, 
the  seizure  of  private  property  on  land  is  for- 
bidden, it  is  permissible  to  pillage  a  beleaguered 
city,  to  requisition  supplies,  and  to  capture  pri- 
vate property  of  every  description  on  the  seas. 
In  justification  of  this  singular  difference  in 
treatment  it  is  maintained  that  the  purpose  of 
sea  warfare  is  to  destroy  the  commerce  and  the 
navy  of  the  enemy  and  that  this  cannot  be  ac- 
complished if  private  property  is  exempted  from 
capture.  The  Treaty  of  1856  permits  its  seizure 
by  war  vessels.  On  the  other  hand,  England,  the 
country  that  has  always  profited  most  by  pri- 
vateering, refused  to  agree  to  its  suppression; 
privateering,  even  as  late  as  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  ajid  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
centuries,  seemed  to  be  regarded  as  a  form  of 
the  right  of  capture  held  by  belligerents.  Its 
final  abolition  was  due,  not  to  international  con- 
ventions, but  to  the  development  of  great  steam- 
ships, which  rendered  it  impossible.  At  the  first 
Hague  Convention  the  United  States  advocated 


80  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

the  inviolability  of  private  property  of  the  ene- 
my on  the  seas,  but  the  suggestion  was  not  even 
debated;  while  at  the  second  Convention  Eng- 
land rejected  the  proposal  of  Germany  and  the 
United  States  that  captures  at  sea  in  time  of 
war  be  forbidden.  It  should  be  noted  further 
that  commodities  declared  to  be  contraband  of 
war  constantly  tend  to  increase  in  number ;  some 
states  even  go  so  far  as  to  insist  that  provisions 
be  regarded  as  such,  because  when  imported  by 
a  belligerent  nation  they  aid  it  in  its  struggle. 
Thus,  in  1885,  when  France  was  at  war  with 
China,  she  declared  rice  to  be  contraband  of 
war.  It  is  established,  moreover,  that  a  belliger- 
ent ship  shall  not  take  on  more  coal  in  a  neutral 
port  than  is  necessary  to  enable  her  to  reach 
the  next  port.  The  United  States,  having  de- 
veloped the  imperialistic  policy,  has  ceased  to 
advocate,  as  it  did  in  1856  and  1899,  the  aboli- 
tion of  contraband;  while  England  wants  to  do 
away  with  it — in  order  that  her  supply  of  pro- 
visions may  not  be  cut  off  in  time  of  war — but 
desires  to  preserve  the  right  of  blockade. 

Undoubtedly  great  advances  have  been  made 
in  these  lines,  thanks  to  the  establishment  of  the 
International  Prize  Court  by  the  Second  Hague 
Convention.  Hitherto  when  two  powers  were 
at  war  and  one  of  them  captured  a  vessel,  even 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   PARTLY   RESTORED       81 

one  belonging  to  a  neutral  nation,  the  owner  of 
the  captured  vessel  was  obliged  to  present  his 
claim,  to  the  court  of  the  country  making  the 
capture,  who  applied  its  own  laws  to  the  case. 
But  henceforth,  instead  of  being  compelled  to 
have  recourse  to  a  court,  whose  impartiality 
would  always  be  doubtful,  there  is  to  be  an  inter- 
national court  sitting  at  the  Hague  to  which 
those  interested  may  submit  their  claims.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  England  also  will  subscribe  to 
this  convention ;  hitherto  she  has  been  extremely 
cautious  regarding  this  important  point. 

At  the  same  conference  the  powers  agreed  not 
to  have  recourse  to  force,  in  future,  to  compel 
the  payment  of  debts  due  under  contract  unless 
the  debtor  state  refuses  offers  to  arbitrate. 

In  the  meantime,  under  the  pressure  of  com- 
merce by  navigable  streams,  the  great  waterways 
have  been  proclaimed  neutral.  The  treaty  of 
Munster  of  1684,  Article  86,  and  that  of  Vienna 
of  1738,  Article  17,  declared  the  navigation  of 
the  Rhine  to  be  free  to  the  subjects  of  the  Em- 
pire and  to  those  of  the  French  Crown.  The 
treaty  of  Paris  of  30th  May,  1814,  sanctioned  the 
freedom  of  international  navigation  of  the 
Rhine,  while  the  Congress  of  Vienna  extended 
the  principle  to  all  the  great  rivers.  Later  the 
Danube,  as  far  as  the  Iron  Gate,  the  Congo,  the 


82  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OP   WAR 

Niger,  the  Suez  Canal — whose  free  navigation 
was  guaranteed  by  the  Conference  of  Paris  of 
1888,  even  in  time  of  war — were  neutralized. 
Belgium,  Switzerland,  Luxembourg  have  now 
been  neutralized,  and  by  means  of  these  various 
expedients,  the  ruin  left  by  war  in  its  course 
is  being  reduced  in  extent*  (43). 

These  conventions  intended  to  limit  the  loss 
of  material  wealth  occasioned  by  war,  were  fol- 
lowed, but  not  until  some  time  later,  by  other 
agreements  whose  purpose  was  the  reduction  of 
the  loss  in  men  suffered  by  the  belligerents.  To 
this  class  of  institutions  belong  the  conventions 
of  Geneva  of  1864  and  1906  for  the  protection 
of  the  wounded  and  of  the  sick  in  time  of  war, 
agreements  which  were  broadened  in  1899  to 
include  naval  warfare;  the  convention  of  Saint 
Petersburg  prohibiting  the  use  of  explosive  pro- 
jectiles of  less  than  a  certain  specified  calibre; 
and  the  convention  of  Brussels  of  1874,  and  of 
the  Hague  of  1899,  limiting  the  use  of  weapons 
causing  cruel  and  needlessly  painful  wounds. 
As  early  as  1859,  the  Times  denounced  the 
French  to  the  world  for  using  in  the  war  with 
Italy  certain  bullets  with  a  pyramidal  hollow  in 


*In  view  of  the  devastation  of  Belgium  the  author 
would  probably  revise  this  statement. — Tr. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW   PARTLY   RESTORED       83 

the  base  which  caused  them  to  spread  out  when 
a  bone  was  hit,  inflicting  a  terrible  wound.  The 
first  conference  at  the  Hague  forbade  (England, 
the  United  States  and  Portugal,  however,  refus- 
ing to  subscribe)  the  use  of  bullets  which  ex- 
pand, or  contract,  in  the  body  of  the  wounded, 
or  which  give  forth  asphyxiating  or  deleterious 
gases,  and  also — for  five  years — the  dropping  of 
bombs  from  balloons.  It  should  be  noted  that 
the  projectiles  of  small  calibre  now  in  almost 
universal  use  inflict  much  less  painful  and  dan- 
gerous wounds  than  the  large  bullets  of  former 
days.  The  smallness  of  the  holes  of  entrance 
and  of  exit  made  by  the  projectiles  almost  al- 
ways precludes  infection,  and,  consequently,  re- 
covery is  much  more  probable.  During  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  we  even  heard  of  lujgienic 
bombs,  which  put  the  wounded  out  of  the  fight, 
but  caused  him  neither  suffering  nor  permanent 
injury. 

Finally  other  agreements  were  entered  into 
regarding  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  laws  and 
the  customs  of  war  on  land,  and  the  duties  of 
neutral  powers  in  time  of  war.  At  the  second 
Hague  Convention,  Holland  suggested  that  for 
the  purpose  of  giving  friendly  states  an  oppor- 
tunity to  endeavor  to  effect  a  reconciliation  and 
prevent  bloodshed,  belligerent  nations  be  re- 


84  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OP   WAR 

quired  to  wait  twenty-four  hours  after  the 
declaration  of  war  before  beginning  hostilities. 
This  proposal  was  rejected  by  England,  and  it 
would  certainly  have  been  opposed  by  Russia, 
to  whose  interest  it  would  be  to  begin  hostilities 
immediately  after  a  declaration  of  war,  in  order 
to  prevent  her  enemy  from  having  any  time  to 
lay  up  a  store  of  provisions  by  importing  them 
(44). 

In  this  manner,  international  law,  temporarily 
submerged  in  the  sea  of  blood  shed  by  the  sever- 
al belligerents,  again  arises  to  lessen  the  destruc- 
tion occasioned  by  war. 

The  international  law  which  is  born  again  in 
this  manner,  however,  differs  materially  from 
that  which  we  have  been  examining.  The  earlier 
form  was  a  law  which  presupposed  a  state  of 
peace,  or  of  international  tranquillity,  it  was, 
therefore,  a  law  essentially  normal  and  universal 
in  so  far  as  it  embraced  the  totality  of  interna- 
tional relations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  law, 
which  now  appears,  merely  seeks  to  lessen  or 
prevent  the  disasters  arising  from  a  presupposed 
state  of  war;  it  therefore  possesses  a  character 
at  once  abnormal  and  partial  insomuch  as  it 
merely  proposes  to  regulate  a  part  of  the  inter- 
national relations,  and  that  part  which  is  always 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   PARTLY   RESTORED        85 

dominated  by  the  illegitimate  forces  of  violence 
and  warfare. 

It  does  not,  however,  express  the  whole  truth 
when  we  say  that  these  two  forms  of  interna- 
tional law  are  different  from  each  other,  since 
they  are  diametrically  opposed.  In  fact,  it  is 
perfectly  clear  that  international  law  conceived 
as  a  whole  would  exclude  this  partial  form,  be- 
cause, if  the  former  could  effectively  assert  it- 
self, peace  would  reign,  and,  consequently,  the 
second  or  partial  form  of  this  law  could  never 
arise.  Inversely  the  evolution  of  a  partial  inter- 
national law  defers,  or  even  renders  impossible, 
the  appearance  of  a  fully  comprehensive  inter- 
national law.  We  should  not  deceive  ourselves 
on  this  score.  The  more  we  multiply  agreements 
intended  to  mitigate  the  evils  of  war,  the  more 
we  endeavor  to  prohibit  the  use  of  expanding 
or  contracting  bullets,  that  is,  to  impose  a  re- 
spect for  property  and  persons  in  time  of  war, 
the  more  the  horror  of  war  will  diminish,  and, 
consequently,  the  more  frequent  it  will  become, 
and  the  more  often  will  comprehensive  inter- 
national law  be  trodden  under  foot.  Therefore, 
Fawcett  was  right  in  opposing  all  international 
conventions  for  protecting  property  in  time  of 
war,  holding,  as  he  did,  that  it  is  precisely  the 
damage  occasioned  to  property  by  wars,  which 


86  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

renders  them  more  infrequent.  More  recently, 
Captain  Mahan  observed  that  it  was  proper  to 
allow  a,  belligerent  to  destroy  an  enemy's  com- 
merce because  this  procedure  exhausts  without 
killing.  It  certainly  is  unjust  to  deprive  the 
non-combatant  population  of  its  means  of  sub- 
sistence, but  it  is  a  fact,  nevertheless,  that  this 
renders  wars  all  the  more  terrible  and  that,  con- 
sequently, the  efforts  made  to  prevent  them  will 
become  more  and  more  energetic  and  much  more 
likely  to  succeed. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ECONOMIC      RELATIONS      RESTORE      THE      INTERNA- 
TIONAL JURAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  ITS  ENTIRETY. 

Wars,  as  we  have  just  seen,  being  the  inevi- 
table effect  of  the  decrease  in  the  social  revenue, 
clearly  ought  to  become  more  and  more  infre- 
quent with  the  increase  in  the  productivity  of 
labor,  because  this  enhanced  productivity  itself 
postpones  the  moment  when  the  decrease  in  the 
revenue  becomes  manifest.  Germany  furnishes 
us  with  a  typical  example.  In  fact,  as  early  as 
the  eleventh  century,  when  the  new  trade  routes 
were  opened  and  the  importation  of  the  precious 
metals — owing  to  them — excited  universal  cupid- 
ity and  an  attendant  economic  awakening,  waj 
was  relegated  to  the  second  place,  giving  way 
to  administrative  labors  and  industrial  pursuits. 
But  whenever  the  revenue  is  increased  by  im- 
provements in  the  physiological  methods  of  pro- 
duction, the  less  necessary  it  is  to  have  recourse 
to  pathological  means  for  appropriating  the 
revenues  of  others;  consequently,  the  rarer  war 
becomes.  Every  chimney  that  sends  forth  smoke 
represents  an  extinguished  fuse.  Now,  the  suc- 
cessive historical  phases  through  which  the  eco- 
nomic complex  has  passed,  exhibiting  an  in- 
creased productivity  of  labor,  the  periods  of 


88  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

diminishing  revenue  being  progressively  re- 
tarded thereby,  there  should  also  be  a  corre- 
sponding retardation  in  the  periodicity  of 
international  wars. 

It  should  be  added  that  in  each  successive 
social  phase,  the  association  of  labor,  in  exact 
proportion  to  its  development,  constitutes  a 
foundation  for  economic  and  political  aggregates 
ever  becoming  greater  and  greater.  In  the 
twelfth  century,  Italy  comprised  fifty  states  and 
the  whole  world  thousands ;  at  the  present  time, 
however,  the  states  of  the  world  number  only 
sixty-five,  including  the  Principality  of  Monaco. 
In  Europe  there  are  actually  only  eighteen  states 
— only  six  of  the  first  rank — and  three  great 
political  groups  (Great  Britain,  the  Dual  and 
the  Triple  Alliance).  In  Asia  there  are  only 
China  and  Japan.  In  America  there  is  only  the 
United  States.  Omitting  China,  the  world  is 
reduced  to  a  pentarchy  (45).  The  division  of 
humanity  into  a  small  number  of  large  states 
is  distinctly  favorable  to  peace,  because  it  en- 
larges more  and  more  the  zones  in  which  the 
relations  are  pacific,  at  the  same  time  confining 
war  entirely  to  the  territory  which  separates 
these  great  areas  from  each  other.  In  other 
words,  advance  in  the  association  of  labor  leads 
to  the  progressive  aggregation  of  political  and 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY    RESTORED         89 

economic  units  and  thus  prevents  war  among 
them,  allowing  it  to  take  place  only  between 
the  great  groups.  During  the  period  of  primi- 
tive isolation  men  were  simply  wolves  preying 
on  each  other ;  then,  with  the  first  family  aggre- 
gations, conflicts  occurred  only  between  families, 
subsequently  between  tribes,  between  cities,  and 
finally  between  states ;  and  now  wars  break  out, 
not  between  the  states  of  one  continent,  but 
between  two  continents. 

There  is  no  doubt  that,  owing  to  the  growing 
inf  requency  of  wars — and  as  a  corollary — inter- 
national law  is  less  often  trodden  under  foot,  or, 
in  other  words,  the  periods  in  which  it  is  ren- 
dered nugatory  are  exceptions.  Economic  rela- 
tions, however,  do  not  confine  themselves  merely 
to  reducing  the  frequency  of  wars,  they  directly 
tend,  moreover,  to  forestall  and  prevent  them. 
We  have  already  stated  that  the  protective  sys- 
tem is  a  first  step  towards  war.  The  economic 
disasters  to  which  this  system  inevitably  leads 
end  by  discrediting  it  altogether  and  preparing 
the  way  for  free  trade  among  nations ;  free  trade, 
by  multiplying  commercial  relations  among  peo- 
ples and  thereby  increasing  their  economic  and 
social  solidarity,  is  an  exceedingly  powerful 
factor  for  peace.  ' '  The  genuine  Universal  Peace 
Society  is  the  Anti-Corn  Law  League"  (46). 


90  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

Economic  relations,  moreover,  prevent  wars  in 
other  and  more  direct  ways ;  first :  by  increasing 
their  cost;  second:  by  diminishing  their  advan- 
tages; third:  by  increasing  their  destructive- 
ness;  and  fourth:  by  modifying  the  economic 
and  social  situation  in  a  manner  favorable  to 
peace. 

First.  Increase  in  the  cost  of  war.  Ferrara 
states  that  war  is  always  the  result  of  a  utili- 
tarian calculation;  to  which  we  may  add:  it  is 
a  commercial  speculation  to  which  a  predeter- 
mined amount  of  capital  is  devoted,  that  is, 
certain  expenses  are  borne  in  the  hope  of  secur- 
ing a  gain,  more  or  less  considerable,  but  in 
every  case  doubtful.  With  the  progress  of  eco- 
nomic evolution  it  is  certain  that  the  costs  of 
war  increase  more  and  more,  both  because  the 
value  of  the  capital,  destroyed  by  war,  increases 
more  and  more  and  because  the  expense  of  arma- 
ments, of  munitions  and  of  revictualling,  ever 
becomes  greater  and  greater.  As  these  expenses 
must  be  borne,  at  least  in  part,  by  the  revenue, 
men  are  becoming  more  and  more  convinced  of 
the  absurdity  of  war,  which,  although  under- 
taken for  the  purpose  of  enlarging  the  revenue, 
begins  by  reducing  it  in  a  constantly  increasing 
degree. 

There  is  another  fact  to  be  considered.    Paine 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY    RESTORED         91 

long  ago  remarked  that  in  proportion  to  the 
population,  the  armies  of  the  ancients  were  more 
numerous  than  those  of  today,  because  now  men 
are,  for  the  most  part,  absorbed  in  business 
(47).  Among  primitive  peoples,  when  all  the 
men  were  warriors,  and  when  owing  to  the  nar- 
rowness of  their  domain,  wars  broke  out  sud- 
denly, larger  forces  could  be  mobilized  than  are 
available  among  civilized  and  industrial  peo- 
ples; it  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the 
Romans  could  place  10  per  cent  of  the  national 
population  on  a  war  footing,  while  Prussia  in 
1870  was  able  to  arm  only  S1/^  per  cent  of  her 
people.  Further,  the  more  highly  organized  are 
the  industries,  the  more  difficult  and  costly  is 
recruiting.  It  is1  observed  in  England  the  diffi- 
culties in  recruiting  are  constantly  becoming 
greater  and  greater  and  the  desertions  more  and 
more  numerous.  In  France,  desertions  from  the 
army  numbered  6,054  in  1898  and  14,067  in 
1907;  in  the  French  navy  they  tripled  during 
the  same  period.  Again,  in  England,  where 
military  service  is  not  compulsory,  the  high 
wages  that  prevail  have  made  it  necessary  to 
increase  the  soldier's  pay  two  pence  per  day, 
while  that  of  the  marines  has  also  been  increased 
(48).  Finally,  economic  development  places  a 
check  upon  population,  causing  a  constantly  en- 


92  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

hanced  decrease  in  the  number  of  births  annu- 
ally; it,  therefore,  in  this  manner  also  tends  to 
reduce  the  number  of  the  forces  which  may  be 
armed. 

There  are  still  other  reasons  why  the  costs 
of  wars  constantly  tend  to  increase.  Let  us 
simply  consider  how  enormous  is  the  number 
of  men  sometimes  called  upon  at  the  present  day 
to  bear  arms.  In  1890  the  total  military  strength 
of  the  European  states  in  time  of  peace  was 
4,000,000  men — in  other  words,  2.2  per  cent  of 
the  entire  population,  or  4.6  per  cent  of  the  male 
workers;  in  Germany  it  was  5.4  per  cent;  in 
Austria  4.3  per  cent;  in  Italy  4.2  per  cent;  in 
England  4.2  per  cent,  and  in  Russia  3.9  per 
cent.  In  1908  the  number  of  men  under  arms 
in  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Great  Britain  was  3,027,500  entailing 
a  total  annual  expenditure  of  about  $750,000,- 
000  (49).  Military  service  undoubtedly  caused 
great  losses  even  in  ancient  times  when  human- 
ity was  chiefly  agricultural;  long  ago,  Azarius, 
the  chronicler  of  Milan,  observed  that  during 
those  years  when  the  kings  made  war  on  each 
other,  the  people  were  forced  to  leave  their  work 
and  were  ruined,  especially  if  this  occurred  at 
the  time  of  the  vkitage  and  harvest  (50). 
War,  however,  is  infinitely  more  prejudicial 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY    RESTORED         93 

to  industrial  than  it  is  to  agricultural 
nations,  because  when  the  head  of  the  family  is 
called  upon,  to  bear  arms,  if  he  is  a  farmer,  he 
may  be  replaced  in  the  labor  of  production  by 
other  members  of  his  family,  which  is  impossible 
if  he  is  an  industrial.  It  should  be  added  also 
that  it  is  becoming  more  and  more  difficult  and 
costly  to  prosecute  a  war  by  means  of  either 
taxes  or  loans,  and  that  colonies,  which  have 
apparently  become  a  necessity  to  all  civilized 
states,  are,  in  the  last  analysis,  an  incumbrance 
to  warring  nations. 

It  often  happens  that  the  high  cost  of  war  is 
greater  than  a  nation  can  meet  and  that,  con- 
sequently, it  causes  the  suspension  of  hostilities, 
and  in  some  cases  prevents  them  altogether.  As 
far  back  as  1338  the  King  of  England  was 
forced  by  lack  of  money  to  raise  the  siege  of 
Tournay,  and  so  incensed  was  he  that  when  he 
returned  to  his  country  he  had  a  number  of  his 
treasurers  and  other  officials  imprisoned  and 
their  property  confiscated  (51).  In  the 
eighteenth  century,  Ripperda,  the  Spanish  min- 
ister who  succeeded  Alberoni,  advocated  a  com- 
mercial war  against  England  for  the  purpose  of 
wresting  her  supremacy  from  her.  With  this  end 
in  view,  he  asked  for  a  Spanish  fleet  to  stop  the 
contraband  trade  with  the  West  Indies,  to  put 


94  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF  WAR 

an  end  to  the  slave  trade  in  which  the  English 
were  engaged,  and  to  prevent  the  South  Sea 
Company  from  maintaining  any  warehouses  on 
the  Atlantic.  To  further  his  project  he  went  to 
Vienna  and  by  lavishly  bribing  princes  and 
ministers,  succeeded,  in  1725,  in  concluding  a 
Hispano-Austrian  treaty  of  alliance,  which  was 
followed  by  a  treaty  of  commerce,  to  which  Rus- 
sia  also  subscribed.  England  answered  by  ally- 
ing herself  with  Prussia,  Holland,  Sweden  and 
Denmark  by  means  of  the  treaty  of  Hanover 
(1725).  The  vast  expenditures,  however,  en- 
tailed by  the  building  of  fleets  and  the  creation 
of  armies,  in  pursuance  of  the  Spanish  policy, 
compelled  Ripperda  to  make  such  demands  upon 
the  treasury  that  the  greatest  discontent  was 
aroused  throughout  the  country  and  he  was 
forced  to  resign  (52).  Thus  an  international 
conflagration  was  prevented  by  the  economic 
factor.  At  the  present  time,  owing  to  the  enor- 
mous cost  of  modern  wars,  this  influence  is  felt 
much  more  strongly. 

Second.  Enhanced  destructiveness  of  war. 
Not  only  do  wars  cost  more  than  they  formerly 
did,  but,  in  addition,  they  inflict  constantly  in- 
creasing damages  upon  the  economic  conditions 
of  the  belligerents.  War,  for  example,  always 
causes  a  harmful  loss  in  population,  whence  fol- 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY   RESTORED         95 

lows  economic  retrogression.  The  Thirty  Years 
War  had  the  same  effect  upon  Germany  that  the 
plague  of  1348  had  upon  England;  by  destroy- 
ing a  portion  of  the  population  it  caused  eco- 
nomic conditions  to  revert  to  obsolete  and  bar- 
barous forms  (53).  The  great  losses  inflicted  on 
the  maritime  trade  of  France  by  war  from  1793 
to  1813  were  reflected  in  the  economic  conditions 
of  the  country  as  late  as  the  end  of  the  First 
Empire ;  Rogers,  and  also  Mahan,  goes  so  far  as 
to  attribute  the  present  superiority  of  England 
with  regard  to  France,  to  the  baleful  effect  of 
these  wars  on  the  maritime  commerce  of  the 
latter.  It  should  be  added  that  England,  pro- 
tected by  her  insular  position  from  war  in  her 
own  territory,  can  always  carry  on  her  industries 
while  other  nations  when  engaged  in  fighting 
cannot  do  so.  This  fact  also  tends  to  render  the 
situation  of  continental  powers  inferior  in  com- 
parison with  that  of  England.  One  of  the  chief 
causes  of  Britain's  great  prosperity  during  the 
past  century  consisted  in  the  fact  that  Germany 
and  the  other  nations  of  the  continent  were 
forced  by  war  to  abandon  manufacturing  indus- 
tries and  were  compelled  to  purchase  the 
manufactured  products,  which  they  re- 
quired, of  Great  Britain.  In  the  mean- 
time Russia,  owing  to  the  constant  ware 


96  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

she  was  forced  to  wage  with  the  Asiatic  tribes, 
remained  in  a  state  of  semi-barbarism,  which 
prevented  her  from  entering  into  close  relations 
with  Europe.  So,  too,  the  great  development 
of  the  maritime  trade  of  the  United  States,  be- 
tween 1789  and  1807,  was  due  to  her  extremely 
favorable  position  as  a  neutral  nation,  which 
enabled  her  to  transport  British  products  in  her 
own  vessels  without  fear  of  capture  by  French 
cruisers.  In  1807,  when  Napoleon  decided  no 
longer  to  recognize  neutral  nations,  the  United 
States  lost  this  remunerative  traffic,  and  her 
maritime  trade  suddenly  became  almost  negli- 
gible. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  nations  which  are 
compelled  to  import  a  considerable  portion  of 
their  provisions  will  be  reduced  to  a  state  of 
famine  by  any  war  which  interrupts  their  sea 
communications.  Mr.  I.  K.  Dodge,  the  Ameri- 
caji  statistician,  has  calculated  that  if  Italy  de- 
pended solely  upon  the  wheat  raised  in  her  own 
territory,  she  would  fast  thirty-six  days  in  the 
year ;  France,  thirty-seven ;  Germany,  fifty-four, 
and  England,  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven. 
This  is  the  reason  that  the  chief  function  of  a 
fleet  in  time  of  war,  at  present,  is  to  maintain 
maritime  communications ;  to  this  fact  is  due  the 
great  increase  in  the  number  of  fast  cruisers,  of 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW  FULLY   RESTORED        97 

which  England  now  has  290  of  the  second  class, 
France  255,  and  Italy  50  (44). 

Further — the  more  the  public  finances  depend 
upon  customs  duties,  the  more  fatal  a  war  is  to 
the  budget,  because,  foreign  trade  destroyed,  the 
fiscal  receipts  rapidly  diminish.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  United  States,  at  the  time  of 
their  formation,  were  unwilling  to  base  their 
economic  structure  on  customs  receipts  (54). 

Further — with  the  extension  of  international 
credit,  which  is  a  correlative  of  the  economic  de- 
velopment, every  country  finds  its  interests 
closely  bound  up  with  those  of  all  the  other 
nations  to  whom  it  sells  its  securities,  or  whose 
bonds  it  purchases.  Under  these  conditions 
every  country  is  likely  to  suffer  through  war, 
whether  or  not  it  takes  part  in  it.  In  fact,  a 
war  may  cause  countries  owning  the  bonds  of 
belligerent  states  to  get  rid  of  them  and  thereby 
impair  the  credit  of  these  states;  inversely,  bel- 
ligerent states  may,  on  account  of  war,  be  unable 
to  pay  the  interest  on  their  debts,  and  thereby 
cause  a  loss  to  creditor  countries.  There  is  still 
another  feature — insurance  has  an  essentially 
international  character ;  for  example,  33  per  cent 
of  the  Italian  insurance  policies  are  in  Austrian 
companies;  finally,  capital  is  constantly  seeking 
investment  abroad  in  industrial  and  agricultural 


98  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OP   WAR 

enterprises.  Consequently,  the  economic  solidar- 
ity among  nations  is  gradually  becoming  so  inti- 
mate that  an  injury  inflicted  upon  one  of  them 
by  war  is  felt  by  all ;  the  harmful  effects,  there- 
fore, are  constantly  becoming  more  general. 
During  the  national  awakening  in  Italy,  Napo- 
leon III  at  one  time  gave  up  his  plan  to  help 
Italy  expel  the  Austrians,  because  the  mere  re- 
port of  his  intention  caused  a  panic  on  the  ex- 
changes of  Europe.  Some  years  later  France 
swallowed  the  resentment  which  she  felt  on  a.c- 
count  of  the  occupation  of  Egypt  by  England, 
because  it  occasioned  a  sharp  rise  in  Egyptian 
securities,  of  which  France  held  a  large  amount. 
In  case  of  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  the  Americans,  who  have  a  hundred  mil- 
lion dollars  in  Japanese  securities,  would  suffer 
an  enormous  loss  (55). 

The  destruction  of  capital  caused  by  war  pro- 
duces much  discomfort  in  the  middle  classes  and 
acute  suffering  among  the  poor.  In  England, 
the  Norman  conquest  brought  about  the  degra- 
dation of  the  liberi  tenentes  and  today  the  bane- 
ful effects  are  more  frequent  and  more  general. 
The  Napoleonic  wars  were  followed  by  extreme 
poverty  in  England  among  the  middle  classes, 
who  demanded  relief  of  parliament,  but  in  vain, 
because  that  body  was  and  always  has  been 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY    RESTORED         99 

composed  of  the  wealthy.  Disappointed  in  their 
endeavors,  the  middle  classes  concluded  that 
there  must  be  some  organic  defect  in  the  Consti- 
tution, and  they  began  an  agitation  to  secure  a 
radical  reform.  In  1879,  following  the  annexa- 
tion of  Cyprus,  revolution  broke  out  in  Ireland ; 
and  Great  Britain  is  still  suffering  from  the  ef- 
fects of  the  war  in  South  Africa.  The  income 
tax,  which  is  always  very  high  in  England,  being 
a  shilling  in  the  pound,  is  sufficient  evidence  of 
the  disordered  condition  of  her  finances,  which  is 
revealed  still  more  clearly  by  the  fall  in  her 
securities  which  persists  in  spite  of  numerous 
redemptions  by  the  treasury,  and  it  is  with  a 
view  to  providing  against  this  decline  that  many 
financiers  go  so  far  as  to  suggest  a  refunding  of 
the  debt  at  the  former  rate  of  3  per  cent — an 
increase  in  interest.  The  "War  of  1870  cost  Ger- 
many 3,000,000,000  dollars  above  the  amount 
offset  by  the  indemnity.  The  German  budget 
of  1903-1906  was  charged  with  125,000,000  dol- 
lars on  account  of  the  revolts  in  West  Africa 
and  the  campaign  in  East  Africa.  Finally,  the 
disasters  of  war  ever  tend  to  fall  more  and  more 
heavily  upon  the  laboring  classes,  for  when  its 
costs  are  covered  by  indirect  taxes,  there  is  an 
increase  in  the  expenses  of  living  which  is  felt 
most  keenly  by  the  workers;  while  if  they  are 


100  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

covered  by  direct  taxes,  there  is  a  decrease  in 
productive  accumulation  and  a  lessened  demand 
for  labor.  The  increasing  destructiveness  of  war 
is  a,  potent  agent  for  its  prevention. 

Third.  Decrease  in  the  profits  of  war.  Not 
only  do  modern  wars  occasion  much  greater  ex- 
penses and  losses  than  did  those  of  former  days, 
but  at  the  same  time  the  profits  which  states  may 
expect  to  derive  from  them  are  becoming  smaller 
and  smaller  and  more  uncertain.  The  increase 
in  the  necessary  expenses  of  war  renders  the 
gains  doubtful,  because  it  raises  the  rate  of  gross 
returns  which  it  must  secure  if  there  is  to  be 
any  net  profit,  since  it  is  evident  that  any  enter- 
prise whose  expenses  are  represented  by  10  will 
be  unprofitable  unless  its  income  amounts  to 
10  -J-  d,  while  if  the  cost  is  100,  there  will  be 
no  profit  unless  the  income  amounts  to  100  -j-  d. 
There  is,  therefore,  a  series  of  possible  gross 
receipts  between  10  and  100  which  would  give 
a  profit  if  the  cost  is  10,  but  would  cease  to  yield 
any  return  if  the  costs  of  the  undertaking  were 
100 ;  therefore,  the  chance  of  any  profit  accruing 
is  much  less  when  the  costs  of  the  undertaking 
are  high.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  great  expenses 
occasioned  by  war,  the  victor,  on  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  finds  himself  in  a  condition  of  economic 
and  financial  exhaustion,  which  often  makes  it 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  FULLY   RESTORED      101 

impossible  for  him  to  impose  very  burdensome 
terms  on  the  vanquished;  this  was  shown  re- 
cently on  the  termination  of  the  war  between 
Japan  and  Russia. 

Further — the  more  concentrated  is  social 
wealth,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  the  profits 
derived  from  war  will  be  absorbed  by  a  small 
number  of  persons,  and  that  the  proportion  fall- 
ing to  the  lot  of  the  great  majority  of  the  popu- 
lation will  be  slight.  While  it  is  conceivable 
that  formerly,  during  the  period  of  absolute 
governments,  there  were  wars  whose  entire 
profits  went  to  swell  the  exchequer  of  the  prince, 
and  whose  entire  costs  fell  upon  the  people,  who 
enjoyed  no  political  power,  it  is  now  highly 
improbable  that  the  workers  and  the  small  tax- 
able proprietors,  who  have  some  part  in  the  gov- 
ernment, would,  as  a  whole,  engage  in  a  war 
which,  inflicting  a  loss  upon  themselves,  would 
greatly  benefit  the  large  capitalists. 

Thus  while  on  the  one  hand  the  costs  of  war 
increase,  on  the  other  the  advantages  that  accrue 
from  it  to  the  directing  classes  diminish;  and 
the  advantages,  whatever  they  were,  which  wars 
formerly  procured  for  the  laboring  classes,  have 
either  diminished  greatly  or  ceased  altogether. 
When  wages  were  low  wars  procured  for  the 
workers  a  more  or  less  ephemeral  economic  ad- 


102  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

vantage,  since,  by  incorporating  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  laboring  men  in  the  a.rmy  and 
then  destroying  them,  the  amount  of  labor  seek- 
ing employment  was  diminished  and  wages  con- 
sequently rose.  This  helps  us  to  understand  why 
French  workmen  were  so  enthusiastic  in  their 
support  of  the  First  Empire,  which,  thanks  to 
its  incessant  wars,  actually  did  procure  an  in- 
crease in  wages;  in  the  same  fact  we  discover 
why  England 's  wars  against  Napoleon,  by  reduc- 
ing the  supply  of  labor,  raised  wages,  which, 
in  1815,  reached  a  new  and  comparatively  high 
level.  When  wages,  however,  a.re  relatively  high, 
normally,  this  advantage  does  not  accrue,  since 
the  injury  caused  the  workingman's  family  by 
the  enlistment,  or  the  death,  of  its  head  persists 
and  becomes  more  acute. 

Fourth.  Other  pacificatory  influences.  There 
are  other  forces  of  a  strictly  economic  character 
which  render  nations  more  and  more  capable 
and  desirous  of  preventing  wars.  For  example, 
public  credit  furnishes  them  with  a  means  for 
increasing  their  military  forces,  and  thereby  pre- 
serving them  from  attack  by  other  states.  It  is 
a.  well-known  fact  that,  had  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land not  been  established,  Great  Britain  would 
not  have  been  able  to  contract  her  first  public 
loan  and  that  she  would,  consequently,  have 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW   FULLY   RESTORED      103 

been  conquered  by  France  and  forced  to  restore 
James  II  (56).  Economic  relations,  moreover, 
render  nations  less  disposed  to  provoke  other 
states  to  war.  Long  ago  Kant  remarked  that 
commerce  tends  to  end  war  because  it  can  flour- 
ish only  in  the  midst  of  peace.  This,  however, 
is  not  always  true;  commerce,  as  we  have  seen, 
on  the  contrary,  is  frequently  the  cause  of  war. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  the  mercantile  na- 
tions are  the  less  belligerent  ones.  Paine  re- 
marked :  ' '  Commerce  diminishes  the  spirit  both 
of  patriotism  and  military  defense.  *  *  * 
The  city  of  London,  notwithstanding  its  num- 
bers, submits  to  continued  insults  with  the  pa- 
tience oi  a  coward.  The  rich  are  in  general 
slaves  to  fear  and  submit  to  courtly  power  with 
the  trembling  duplicity  of  a  spaniel"  (47). 
The  defeats  suffered  by  the  British  in  South 
Africa  were  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Boers,  their 
rivals,  were  an  agricultural  people  and  conse- 
quently more  warlike  (57).  The  increase  in 
manufacturing  profits  at  the  expense  of  rent 
contributes,  in  a  manner  no  less  efficacious,  to 
rendering  wars  less  frequent,  because  fixed  in- 
comes, relieving  their  beneficiaries  of  all  business 
cares,  impel  them  to  war;  revenue  derived  from 
manufacturing,  on  the  other  hand,  requiring 
the  close  attention  of  those  who  enjoy  it,  leaves 


104  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

them  but  little  time  to  embark  on  warlike 
enterprises. 

Still  other  phenomena  contribute  to  the  same 
results.  First — urbanism,  the  increasing  accu- 
mulation of  people  in  cities — which  reduces  the 
number  of  men  able  to  bear  arms.  For  example, 
it  is  calculated  that  in  Germany  the  rural  popu- 
lation furnishes  6.8-9  per  cent  of  the  soldiers, 
while  its  percentage  in  the  total  population  is 
much  less.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  lower 
birth  rate  and  the  greater  mortality  among  the 
population  of  the  cities  causes  a  decrease  in  the 
proportion  of  individuals  of  military  age;  sec- 
ond, the  piogressive  lessening  of  muscular  activ- 
ity in  manufacturing  work  which  causes  the 
greater  portion  of  the  population  to  give  up 
athletic  habits  and  to  cease  from  apotheosizing 
physical  strength ;  third,  neo-malthusianism  also 
exerts  a  pacificatory  influence  by  decreasing  the 
incentive  for  war,  which  is  always  caused  by 
an  excess  in  population,  especially  of  the  youth- 
ful or  more  bellicose  portion  of  the  nation. 

In  still  another  way  economic  relations  con- 
tribute to  the  maintenance  of  peace  among  na- 
tions, and  that  is  by  their  effect  upon  the  politi- 
cal conditions  of  states.  Above  all  else,  however, 
economic  relations  are  the  most  powerful  factor 
in  the  formation  of  nations,  that  is,  in  the  con- 


INTERNATIONAL!  LAW  FULLY   RESTORED      105 

stitution  of  political  aggregates  on  the  basis  of 
nationality.  In  fact,  the  establishment  of  Ger- 
man unity  was  due  to  economic  conditions,  just 
as  were  the  unification  and  liberation  of  Italy; 
while  the  Monroe  doctrine,  which  maintains  the 
independence  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  with 
respect  to  Europe,  is  simply  the  result  of  the 
economic  maturity  attained  by  the  new  countries 
which  rendered  them  absolutely  intolerant  of 
any  dependence  upon  the  countries  of  the  old 
world.  By  precluding  the  forcible  bringing  to- 
gether of  peoples  of  different  nationalities,  the 
formation  of  states  on  the  basis  of  nationality 
does  away  with  a  constant  source  of  rebellion 
and  warfare.  This,  however,  is  not  all.  Kant 
remarked  that  a  sine  qua  non  condition  for  the 
abolition  of  war  between  nations  was  that  they 
should  become  republics,  by  which  term  he  prop- 
erly understood  an  executive  power  limited  and 
controlled  by  a  national  representative  body 
possessing  the  legislative  function.  In  other 
words,  by  the  term  republic  Kant  meant  a  repre- 
sentative government.  The  development  of  eco- 
nomic relations,  therefore,  by  causing  the  uni- 
versal diffusion  of  political  forms  based  on 
representation,  contributes  strongly  to  the  main- 
tenance of  peace.  Parliamentary  bodies  display 
the  greatest  eagerness  for  peace,  regardless  of 


106  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

the  occasion.  Thus,  from  1815  to  1848,  the 
French  parliament,  composed  of  capitalists  and 
elected  by  capital,  always  advocated  peace  at 
any  price,  and  compelled  Louis  Philippe  to  ob- 
serve their  wishes.  When  the  German  govern- 
ment, in  1893,  demanded  an  increase  in  the 
allowance  for  military  purposes  it  encountered 
considerable  opposition  ajid  the  deputies  who 
favored  the  measure  represented  a  minority  of 
the  electors— 3,225,000  against  4,233,000.  A 
further  proof,  although  a  very  indirect  one,  of 
the  principle  enunciated  by  Kant  is  found  by 
comparing  the  names  given  by  the  different  na- 
tions to  their  warships.  While  the  vessels  be- 
longing to  monarchies  are  named  alter  sover- 
eigns, princes  and  legendary  warriors — for 
example,  the  Nibelungen  in  Germany ;  or  histori- 
cal characters:  V.  Pisajni,  Ferruccio,  Garibaldi, 
in  Italy;  or  after  violent  actions:  Repulse, 
Vengeance,  Revenge,  Implacable,  Vindictive  in 
England;  those  preferred  by  republics  a.re  the 
names  of  regions — for  example,  those  of  the  sev- 
eral states  of  the  United  States ;  or  those  of  the 
great  ideas  of  equality,  or  of  peace :  Patrie,  Lib- 
erte,  Democratic,  Justice,  Verite,  or  again,  those 
of  the  immortal  defenders  of  these  ideas :  Dan- 
ton,  Diderot,  Condorcet,  Vergniaud,  Voltaire, 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW   FULLY   RESTORED      107 

Mirabeau,   V.    Hugo,   Michelet,    Renan,    Edgai 
Quinet. 

Finally,  while  the  controlling  class,  for  the 
reasons  given,  intervenes  in  the  interest  of  peace, 
the  working  classes  also  intervene  in  its  favor, 
although  in  a  different  manner.  The  workers 
have  no  interest  in  war,  because  they  do  not  par- 
ticipate in  the  booty.  It  is  true  that  M.  Andre 
Colliez,  while  rightly  maintaining  that  "it  is  the 
antagonism  of  economic  interests  which  is  now 
the  principal  cause  of  war,"  hastens  to  add  that 
they  are  intended  not  only  to  enrich  the  capital- 
ists, but  also  the  workers.  In  fact,  he  adds,  when 
war  is  undertaken  to  secure  additional  markets 
for  the  products  of  the  national  industries,  it 
is  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  not  only  the 
interests  of  the  capitalists  but  also  those  of  the 
laboring  classes,  who  would  be  without  work  if 
there  were  no  outlets  for  the  wares  they  pro- 
duce (58).  However,  I  may  be  permitted  to 
remark  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  exterminate  the 
inhabitants  of  a  country  in  order  to  open  up 
new  markets  for  our  wares ;  it  would  be  sufficient 
to  establish  commercial  relations,  which  may  be 
done  by  peaceful  means.  The  truth  is  that  wars 
are  not  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  opening 
up  new  markets  for  the  national  industries,  but 
to  obtain  advantages  for  the  national  capitalist 


108  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

at  the  expense  of  the  foreign;  these  undertak- 
ings, therefore,  are  profitable  to  the  capitalists, 
but  not  at  all  to  the  working  class.  In  Germany, 
for  example,  the  War  of  1870  enriched  the  cap- 
italists, but  did  not  affect  wages,  which  did  not 
begin  to  rise  until  1875-1877,  and  then  owing  to 
reasons  entirely  foreign  to  the  war.  On  the 
other  hand,  as  we  have  already  seen,  wars  cause 
the  working  classes  very  great  injury.  Conse- 
quently the  more  intelligent  laborers  are  decid- 
edly opposed  to  them.  So  long  as  workingmen 
were  separated  and  powerless  their  aversion 
from  war  had  no  influence  on  the  policy  of 
states;  but  this  condition  of  affairs  suffered  a 
sudden  change  on  the  appearance  of  that  essen- 
tially modern  phenomenon,  the  labor  movement. 
There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  this  move- 
ment itself  may  cause  war.*  Thus,  American 
and  Australian  workmen  demand  a  law  exclud- 
ing Japanese  laborers  from  their  respective  coun- 
tries; and  the  state  of  California  has  just 
enacted  legislation  with  this  end  in  view;  now, 
if  the  United  States  should  promulgate  a  law 
for  this  purpose,  a  war  with  Japan  probably 
would  result,  and  if  it  did,  the  labor  movement 
would  be  directly  responsible  for  it.  Further — 

*Regarding  the  efforts  directed  toward  the  ex- 
clusion of  foreign  laborers  see  Prate's  excellent 
work:  Le  Protectionnisme  Ouvrier,  Paris  1892. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  FULLY   RESTORED      109 

since  unrestricted  immigration  brings  workmen 
of  totally  different  nationalities  together  in  the 
same  industry,  dissension  and  hatred  are  fre- 
quently aroused.  Thus,  in  France  for  a  long 
time  the  native  workmen  were  extremely  hostile 
to  the  Italians  and  maltreated  them  most  shame- 
fully— the  Aigues-Mortes  case,  for  example. 
Phenomena  of  this  description  certainly  are 
highly  unfavorable  to  international  peace. 

However,  these  dissensions  cannot  be  other- 
wise than  dangerous,  since  they  arise  from  an 
imperfect  idea  of  the  interest  of  the  individual 
or  of  that  of  the  class,  that  is,  from  the  adop- 
tion of  brutal  methods  for  the  defense  of  per- 
fectly legitimate  interests.  These  conflicts  be- 
tween workmen  of  different  nationalities  are 
merely  examples  of  the  more  general  phenom- 
enon of  the  conflict  between  the  higher  and  the 
lower  paid  workmen,  a  condition  of  affairs  which 
belonged  to  the  more  barbarous  periods  of  the 
labor  movement  and  which  tends  to  disappear  as 
it  progresses.  The  conflict  between  laborers  who 
receive  different  rates  of  pay  is  merely  due  to 
the  incompleteness  of  the  labor  movement,  which 
has  not  yet  succeeded  in  bringing  all  classes  of 
worltingmen  under  its  banner;  it  follows  that  a 
portion  of  the  workers,  the  undisciplined  or  ex- 
lege  part,  offers  its  labor  at  a  lower  price,  there- 


110  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

by  causing  disastrous  competition  with,  the  fed- 
erated workmen.  However,  with  the  extension 
and  generalization  of  the  labor  movement,  these 
undisciplined  portions  of  the  army  of  laborers 
gradually  join  the  ranks  of  the  regulars  and 
submit  to  the  collective  rules  which  govern  the 
terms  under  which  labor '  is  offered.  Conse- 
quently conflict  will  cease  to  be  possible  between 
workers  of  various  classes  or  of  diverse  nation- 
alities. Struggles  between  laborers  of  different 
nationalities,  therefore,  belong  to  that  relatively 
arrested  phase,  when  the  labor  movement  was 
confined  within  a  strictly  national  sphere;  the 
internationalization  of  the  labor  movement,  how- 
ever, will  make  it  impossible  for  the  workmen 
of  one  nation  to  compete  unfavorably  with  those 
of  another  and  it  will,  therefore,  preclude  any 
struggle  between  them;  moreover,  among  them 
will  arise  a  solidarity  which  will  constitute  the 
strongest  guarantee  for  international  peace. 

Labor  organizations  are  already  beginning  to 
display  an  international  activity.  Following  the 
International  Convention  of  Workingmen,  which 
held  its  first  meeting  in  London,  28th  Septem- 
ber, 1864,  numerous  international  federations  of 
workmen  were  formed — for  example :  that  of  the 
glove  makers  (1871),  tobacco  workers  (1871), 
earthenware  workers  (1873),  glass  blowers 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY   RESTORED       111 

(1886),  typographers  (1889),  wood  workers 
(1891),  miners  (1899),  weavers,  and  railway 
employees  (1890),  iron  workers  (1904),  hatters, 
furriers,  brewery  workers,  lithographers,  work- 
ers in  skins,  in  stone,  in  porcelain,  masons,  book- 
binders, hair-dressers  and  household  servants. 
Since  1901  there  has  existed  an  international 
association  of  Trades  Unions — a  syndicate  of 
syndicates.  It  held  a  convention  at  Stuttgart  in 
1902,  at  which  fifteen  different  countries  and 
five  million  workmen  were  represented  (59). 
Regardless  of  other  evidence,  these  associations 
reveal  the  spirit  of  solidarity  which  animates 
them  by  sending  substantial  assistance  to  work- 
ers of  other  trades  and  of  other  nationalities 
when  on  strike ;  there  was  a  notable  example  of 
this  in  1908,  when  the  striking  typographers  of 
Turin  were  enabled  to  hold  out  owing  to  the 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  francs  which  were  sent 
them  from  abroad  by  their  fellow  workers.  Is 
it  conceivable  that  workmen  who  have  received 
large  amounts  of  money  from  their  foreign  col- 
leagues will  afterwards  be  disposed  to  shoot  them 
down  in  battle?  Workingmen's  organizations  in 
recent  years  have  strongly  protested  against 
every  form  of  militarism  and  war.  Thus  the 
Congress  of  Socialists,  held  in  Stuttgart  in  1907, 
solemnly  proclaimed  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 


112  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

laboring  classes  of  every  country  to  work  un- 
ceasingly for  international  arbitration  (60). 

The  ever  increasing  cost  of  war,  the  growing 
uncertainty  of  its  profits,  the  disappearance  of 
the  characteristics  necessary  for  conducting  it, 
the  enhancing  hostility  towards  it — such  are  the 
causes  which  render  war  less  and  less  able  to 
accomplish  its  purpose,  that  is,  to  retard  the 
decline  in  the  revenue.  Consequently  the  furor 
bellicus  will  gradually  die  out  and  give  place 
to  a  feeling  of  utmost  repugnance  for  war.  Ac- 
cording to  Spencer,  this  will  mark  the  passage 
of  humanity  from  the  military  phase  of  society 
to  the  industrial.  Still  earlier,  an  Italian  wrote : 
' '  Manufacturing  and  commercial  peoples  are  re- 
luctant to  engage  in  war  and,  when  they  have 
ajiy  part  in  the  government,  they  refuse  to  risk 
their  peace  and  impair  their  fortunes  for  the 
sake  of  robbing  others  of  their  rights  or  to  em- 
bark on  warlike  enterprises.  Economic  progress 
tends  to  make  peace  the  rule  and  war  the  rare 
and  ephemeral  exception,  in  contrast  with  the 
benighted  ages  when  warfare  was  the  normal 
condition  of  nations,  and  peace  merely  a  brief 
respite"  (61). 

In  this  connection  we  must  note  the  differ- 
ence in  the  domain  of  law  between  Grotius,  the 
author  of  the  "De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads"  and 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY   RESTORED      113 

Heffter,  who  wrote  "Le  Droit  de  la  Paix  et  de 
la  Guerre,"  the  latter  maintaining  that  peace 
was  the  rule,  while  the  former  claimed  that  war 
was  the  normal  condition  of  humanity;  in  liter- 
ature Sir  "Walter  Scott  exalts  courage  and  con- 
siders the  race  first,  while  Dickens  extols  humil- 
ity, and  places  the  individual  first — thus  they 
are  reflections  of  the  military  and  of  the  in- 
dustrial phases  respectively. 

The  increasing  aversion  from  warfare  which 
manifests  itself  in  this  manner  as  due  to  its 
diminishing  efficacy  as  a  means  for  retarding  the 
fall  of  the  revenue,  engenders  a  series  of  meas- 
ures looking  toward  the  prevention  of  war  and 
its  attendant  disasters.  Here  we  discover  un- 
der the  pressure  of  economic  development,  the 
origin  of  those  numerous  institutions  and  pro- 
jects intended  to  abolish  war  between  nations. 

The  methods  employed  to  settle  international 
differences  peaceably,  and  prevent  wars,  assume 
various  forms  in  the  successive  historical  phases, 
that  is,  accordingly  as  society  is  founded  on 
slavery,  on  serfdom,  or  on  wages.  In  the  slave 
stage  of  society  it  is  community  of  race  that 
unites  different  peoples  and  which  consequently 
precludes  all  chance  of  war  among  them — as,  for 
example — the  Amphictyonic  League.  Or  in 
some  cases  a  preponderant  people  may  impose 


114  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

itself  on  its  neighbors  and  arrogate  to  itself  the 
right  to  adjust  their  differences — for  example — 
the  Italic  League  which  required  that  the  feder- 
ated states  refrain  from  settling  their  differ- 
ences by  an  appeal  to  arms  and,  instead,  have 
recourse  to  arbitration  by  the  sovereign  city  of 
Rome  (62).  This  league  was  due  largely  to  the 
unfavorable  condition  to  which  the  various 
Italian  states  were  reduced,  and  which  rendered 
them  incapable  of,  or  cautious  about,  engaging 
in  fratricidal  wars.  It  is  true  the  influence  of 
these  institutions  is  very  limited  for,  while  they 
insure  peace  among  the  members  of  the  federa- 
tion, instead  of  preventing  conflicts  between 
them  and  those  outside  the  union,  they  are  apt 
to  cause  them.  In  servile  or  feudal  society  it 
was,  on  the  contrary,  the  religious  authority  of 
the  Sovereign  Pontiff  which  united  the  differ- 
ent states,  constituting,  as  it  did,  a  sort  of 
moral  tribunal  to  which  they  entrusted  the  task 
of  settling  their  differences.  This,  however,  was 
a.  bond  entirely  spiritual  in  its  nature,  one  which 
was,  in  fact,  seldom  used  and  which  rarely  ac- 
complished its  end.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire 
— which  ought  to  have  served  as  a  central  au- 
thority for  securing  the  unification  of  Europe, 
possessed  an  influence  which  was  at  best 
Platonic.  Finally,  with  the  appearance  of  the 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  FULLY   RESTORED      115 

wage  system  of  society,  when  the  Supreme  Pon- 
tiff had  ceased  to  be  the  moral  support  of  all  the 
peoples  of  the  earth,  and  when  there  was  no 
longer  any  temporal  power  to  serve  as  a  con- 
necting link  between  all  the  states  of  Europe, 
efforts  to  assure  a  permanent  peace  began  to 
be  made  by  establishing  a  balance  of  power 
among  the  great  states  (45). 

We  have  already  remarked  that  the  develop- 
ment in  the  association  of  labor,  which  tends  to 
replace  the  numerous  small  states  with  a  few 
great  nations,  is  itself  a  factor  making  for  peace, 
since — it  is  clear — that  the  smaller  the  number 
of  co-existing  states,  the  fewer  will  be  the  oc- 
casions a.nd  the  chances  of  war.  Consequently 
the  evolution  of  the  city-state  into  the  small 
state,  the  medium  sized  state,  the  great  power, 
and  these  into  the  federation  of  states,  ought  to 
render  the  occasions  for  war  less  frequent. 
Again,  with  the  appearance  of  the  wage  system, 
the  possibility  of  war  is  further  greatly  reduced, 
since  it  tends  to  establish  the  balance  of  power 
among  the  several  states  or  among  the  co-exist- 
ing alliances.  The  theory  of  the  Italian  philoso- 
pher, Ardigo,  that  moral  conduct,  which  is  re- 
spect for  the  rights  of  others,  can  only  emerge 
when  there  is  a  balance  between  the  antagonistic 
forces,  which  automatically  renders  every  at- 


116  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

tempt  to  infringe  on  others  wholly  unreasonable, 
because  it  is  necessarily  powerless,  finds  here  a 
striking  application.  In  fact  when  the  world's 
stage  is  occupied  by  a  few  great  and  equally 
powerful  political  entities,  it  is  impossible  for 
any  one  of  them  to  oppress  any  of  the  others; 
consequently  none  is  disposed  to  enter  upon  any 
aggressive  action  against  its  rivals.  The  various 
states  hold  each  other  in  check,  rendering  it  im- 
possible for  an  armed  conflict  ever  to  occur  be- 
tween any  two  of  these  powers.  This  is  the 
idea  which  inspires  the  system  of  equilibrium 
among  the  European  nations  which,  by  the  en- 
trance of  the  new  world  into  international  pol- 
itics, becomes  a  universal  equilibrium  which 
tends  to  assure  peace  by  means  of  the  establish- 
ment of  states  of  equal  power.  This  system 
has  frequently  proved  itself  to  be  highly  effi- 
cacious. "The  equalization  of  the  powers  of 
the  great  states  has  been  excedingly  fortunate 
for  humanity.  It  constitutes  the  unshakable 
foundation  upon  which  the  edifice  of  federation 
must  arise"  (63). 

However,  these  various  methods,  no  matter 
how  efficacious  we  would  like  to  believe  them, 
are  restricted  and  exclusive  in  character,  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  their  influence  is  confined  to 
those  states  which  have  entered  into  mutual 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY    RESTORED      117 

agreements.  Moreover  they  are  always  exposed 
to  the  danger  of  failure  through  a  new  align- 
ment of  states.  Consequently,  with  the  progress 
of  the  wage  system  of  economy,  the  relations  and 
the  eventual  differences  between  the  most  di- 
verse and  the  most  widely  separated  states,  be- 
coming more  and  more  varied  and  complex,  in- 
stitutions are  demanded  for  the  prevention  of 
war  among  isolated  nations  and  independently 
of  any  disparity  in  their  strength;  this  is  the 
function  of  arbitral  institutions,  which — it  can- 
not be  denied — are  less  effectual  than  the 
methods  just  enumerated,  since  they  possess 
neither  a  material  nor  a  moral  sanction,  but  they 
are  superior  extensively  because  they  are  well- 
nigh  universal,  that  is,  they  are  available  to  all 
nations. 

Thus  the  slave  economy  creates  political 
nuclei  formed  of  peoples  of  the  same  race,  or 
held  together  by  the  hegemony  of  a  single  peo- 
ple, and  in  this  manner  engenders  a  peace  or- 
ganization— one,  however,  which  does  not  pre- 
clude conflict  between  them  and  those  states 
which  are  without  the  federation.  Serf  economy 
created  several  states  bound  together  by  re- 
ligious or  imperial  ties  which  are  their  sole,  and, 
at  best,  very  uncertain  guarantees  of  peace.  The 
wage  economy,  in  its  first  phase,  created  a  small 


118  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

number  of  large  states,  among  whom  it  sought 
to  establish  a  balance  of  power  and  thereby  as- 
sure peace ;  and  finally,  having  attained  greater 
maturity,  it  created  an  international  economy 
and  with  it  imposed  the  necessity  of  preventing 
wars  by  means  of  the  more  highly  developed 
and  more  decisive  methods  which  are  offered 
by  arbitral  institutions. 

As  early  as  14th  March,  1790,  the  National 
Assembly  of  France  decreed  the  abolition  of 
war,  while  23rd  April,  1795,  the  Abbe  Gre- 
goire  presented  to  the  Convention  a  Declaration 
of  the  Rights  of  Peoples  which  laid  down  the 
principle  of  a  legal  co-existence  of  nations.  This 
document  maintained  that  if  all  peoples  were 
free  there  would  be  no  more  wars.  Of  course 
at  that  time  this  was  a  wholly  Platonic  declara- 
tion, but  the  idea  has  developed  and  become 
universal.  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  of  20th  No- 
vember, 1815,  requires  that  the  contracting 
states  meet  in  convention  for  the  purpose  of 
assuring  the  peace  of  Europe.  In  1819  Metter- 
nich  suggested  that  some  city  be  selected  as 
capital  of  the  Holy  Alliance  where  plenipoten- 
tiaries might  permanently  sit  for  the  inter- 
change of  ideas  regarding  the  common  inter- 
ests of  states.  In  fact  several  meetings  of  sover- 
eigns and  diplomatists  have  taken  place:  at 


INTERNATIONAL   LAW   FULLY   RESTORED      119 

Aix-la-Chapelle  in  1818,  at  Troppau  in  1820,  a.t 
Laibach  in  1821,  and  at  Verona  in  1822.  And, 
further,  the  decisions  reached  were  not  left 
wholly  without  sanction  since  force  was  used 
with  respect  to  Spain  and  Naples.  When  the 
Congress  of  Troppa.u  decided  to  put  down  the 
revolution  in  Naples,  Austria  offered  her 
troops  for  the  purpose,  and  France  did  the  same 
to  carry  out  the  decision  of  the  Congress  of 
Verona  regarding  the  Spanish  revolution.  At 
the  Conference  of  Paris  in  1856  it  was  voted 
that  if  war  broke  out  between  two  states  the 
other  powers  should  be  obliged  to  tender  their 
friendly  offices  to  restore  peace.  In  1863  Napo- 
leon III  suggested  that  a  congress  be  called  to 
settle  certain  matters  which  were  causing  Eu- 
rope unrest.  A  general  treaty  of  arbitration 
was  signed  28th  April,  1890,  by  ten  of  the 
American  republics,  and  other  republics  of  the 
western  hemisphere  hastened  to  join  the  move- 
ment. From  1815  until  the  present  time  there 
have  been  more  than  one  hundred  and  twenty 
cases — many  of  them  important  ones — which 
have  been  settled  by  arbitration,  such  for  exam- 
ple as  the  Alabama  claims. 

These  attempts,  however,  are  merely  prepara- 
tory ;  they  are  simply  the  forerunners  of  a  more 
modern  and  more  energetic  movement  which  is 


120  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

taking  place  with,  hitherto  unknown  intensity, 
under  the  pressure  of  economic  relations.  In 
fact  the  more  the  cost  of  armaments  increases, 
the  more  perceptible  and  insistent  becomes  the 
negative  action  of  war,  which  causes  a  decrease 
in  revenue;  consequently  nothing  is  more 
natural  than  the  increasing  inability  of  the  rev- 
enue, itself  now  declining,  to  support  a  sys- 
tem, which  renders  a  further  and  progressive  de- 
cline inevitable.  This  disastrous  effect  will  be 
especially  felt  by  the  poorer  and  less  prosper- 
ous states.  Thus — it  was  not  owing  to  mere 
accident  that  the  principles  of  a  pacific  inter- 
national law  were  born  in  1628  of  the  Queen  of 
the  Seas,  Holland,  whose  decline  was  imminent; 
so  too  it  was  not  by  chance  that  the  principles 
of  international  law  directed  against  war  were 
proclaimed  in  1898  under  the  initiative  of  Rus- 
sia ;  it  was  because  at  that  time  she  had  reached 
a  degree  of  impoverishment  which  rendered 
armaments  and  wars  absolutely  disastrous  for 
her.  Any  one  who  took  the  trouble  to  exam- 
ine the  budgets  of  the  different  states  for  this 
period,  at  the  Credit  Lyonnais  of  Paris,  where 
they  are  carefully  recorded,  grouped  and  com- 
pared, would  find  that  Bussia's  budget  showed 
with  absolute  certainty  that  she  would  be  utter- 
ly defeated  in  any  war  she  undertook.  The  ex- 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  FULLY   RESTORED      121 

perience  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  amply 
proves  the  correctness  of  this  deduction.  It  will, 
therefore,  be  readily  seen  that  those  economic 
conditions,  which  demand  the  prevention  of  war, 
by  whatever  means  are  possible,  presented  them- 
selves at  that  time  in  Russia,  in  a  peculiarly 
striking  manner;  consequently  in  them  we  dis- 
cover the  origin  and  the  cause  of  her  initiative 
in  1898  with  regard  to  the  Peace  Conference. 

The  first  Peace  Conference,  which  assembled 
at  the  Hague  in  June,  1899,  was  probably  due 
to  the  fear,  which  several  of  the  nations  felt,  of 
being  surpassed  in  armaments  by  some  of  the 
others,  or  by  the  desire  to  paralyze  the  efforts  of 
their  rivals  in  the  military  field.  These  mate- 
rial considerations,  however,  do  not  detract  from 
the  high  social  significance  of  this  historic  con- 
ference as  an  indication  of  the  absolute  economic 
necessity  of  placing  a  limit  on  the  military 
policy  of  contemporary  nations. 

The  first  Conference  at  the  Hague,  however, 
did  not  endeavor  to  formulate  a  plan  for  bring- 
ing about  a  permanent  peace;  it(  merely  sought, 
to  prevent  a  further  expansion  in  armaments. 
The  proposition  not  to  increase  armaments  for 
a  period  of  five  years,  however,  met  with  vio- 
lent opposition  on  the  part  of  Germany,  who 
succeeded  in  causing  it  to  be  dropped.  The  pro- 


122  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

ject  for  obligatory  arbitration,  even  for  differ- 
ences of  a  special  character,  likewise  was  re- 
jected and  nothing  was  suggested  looking  to- 
wards the  prevention  of  international  wars  by 
means  of  any  sort  of  jural  organization.  How- 
ever it  would  be  unfair  to  say  that  the  conven- 
tion accomplished  nothing  towards  the  estab- 
lishment of  this  preventive  institution.  The 
signatory  powers  at  this  conference  did,  in  fact, 
agree  in  case  of  any  difference,  to  have  re- 
course to  the  mediation  of  friendly  nations. 
Parties  at  difference  on  special  questions  were 
advised  to  appoint  international  commissions  of 
investigation.  It  was  also  decided  to  establish 
a  permanent  court  of  arbitration  to  which  the 
nations  might  have  recourse.  It  is  true  that 
there  is  nothing  permanent  about  such  a  court 
except  its  name ;  moreover  the  nations  agreed  to 
submit  only  differences  of  a  secondary  order  to 
it;  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  they 
could  have  recourse  to  such  a  court  to  settle 
questions  affecting  the  integrity  or  independ- 
ence of  the  state;  it  is,  however,  none  the  less 
true  that  a.  great  many  armed  conflicts  might  be 
prevented  by  the  means  suggested  at  this  con- 
ference. Recent  treaties  between  England  and 
France,  and  between  France  and  Italy,  contain 
clauses  providing  for  arbitration  in  a  large  num- 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW   FULLY   RESTORED      123 

her  of  cases.  A  treaty  of  arbitration  between 
Italy  and  the  Argentine  Republic  has  been 
signed,  as  has  also  one  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  although  this  has  been  rejected 
by  the  Senate.* 

At  the  second  Hague  Convention,  held  in 
1907,  the  proposition  to  reduce  armaments  was 
again  presented  by  England  and  for  the  obvious 
reason  that,  having  a  very  powerful  navy,  she 
did  not  want  the  other  nations  to  surpass  her. 
Moreover,  scarcely  had  this  suggestion  been  re- 
jected— by  a  large  majority  of  the  nations  rep- 
resented at  the  conference — when  she  proceeded 
to  arm  herself  with  feverish  energy.  However, 
it  would  be  equally  incorrect  to  say  that  this 
second  conference  succeeded  in  accomplishing 
nothing  for  the  insurance  of  peace,  since  the 
signatory  powers  agreed  not  to  have  recourse  to 
force  to  recover  debts  due,  unless  the  debtor 
state  refused  to  arbitrate  the  question.  The 
establishment  of  a  permanent  court  of  inter- 
national arbitration  to  sit  at  the  Hague  was  ap- 
proved. Regarding  the  question  of  obligatory 


*The  Arbitration  Treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  signed  3rd  August,  1911, 
has  been  ratified  with  Amendments  by  the  United 
States  Senate,  but  has  not  been  ratified  and  promul- 
gated by  the  President.  [23rd  February,  1916.] — Tr. 


124  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

arbitration,  proposed  by  the  Italian  delegation, 
it  was  voted  to  postpone  all  action ;  the  proposi- 
tion to  establish  another  tribunal,  and  one  actu- 
ally permanent,  besides  the  Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration,  met  with  a  similar  fate. 

Although  this  nascent  institution  thus  far  has 
accomplished  but  little,  it  cannot  be  denied  a 
high  symptomatic  value,  since  it  is  an  indica- 
tion of  the  new  phase  upon  which  the  interna- 
tional jural  organization  has  entered.  In  fact 
it  shows  us  that,  in  world  politics,  the  violent 
methods  of  war  are  becoming  more  and  more 
harmful  by  reason  of  the  progress  of  economic 
evolution,  and  that,  owing  to  this  fact,  it  is 
gradually  dying  out  and  giving  place  to  arbi- 
tral institutions. 

The  form  of  international  law  which  we  now 
see  developing  presents  characteristics  substan- 
tially different  from,  in  fact  diametrically  op- 
posite to,  those  which  we  examined  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter.  In  fine — the  law  which  sought 
to  prevent  the  damages  inflicted  by  war  pre- 
supposed a  state  of  war,  that  is  to  say,  the 
suppression  or,  at  least,  the  suspension  of  the 
normal  law.  Its  function  therefore  could  only 
be  an  auxiliary  one — in  other  words,  it  was  an 
incomplete  jural  form.  On  the  other  hand  that 
form  of  international  law,  which  seeks  to  pre- 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  FULLY  RESTORED      125 

vent  war,  springs  from  conditions  of  peace,  and, 
for  this  very  reason  it  possesses  a  character  at 
once  normal,  comprehensive  and  universal. 


CHAPTER  V. 

LATER  TENDENCIES. 

If  the  evolution  which  has  taken  place  in  eco- 
nomic relations  up  to  the  present  time  and  that 
in  the  international  jural  relations  which  spring 
from  them,  enable  us  to  predict,  in  a  measure, 
what  their  future  development  will  be,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  see  that  with  further  advance  in  eco- 
nomic conditions  wars  will  become  more  and 
more  infrequent  and  will  finally  cease  alto- 
gether. 

Of  course  there  are  writers  who  do  not  sub- 
scribe to  this  opinion.  In  the  first  place  there 
are  the  bellicose  philosophers  and  sociologists 
who  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  war  will  al- 
ways be  necessary,  because  they  consider  it  to 
be  endowed  with  a  function  favorable  to  hu- 
man progress.  Thus  Heraclitus  conceived  war 
to  be  the  mother  of  all  things,  not  to  be  ban- 
ished from  among  gods  and  men;  since  the  liv- 
ing unity  creative  of  contradictions  is  not  ar- 
bitrary, war  is  likewise  the  most  perfect  har- 
mony ( ! )  which  holds  all  things  together. 
"War,"  says  Hegel,  "is  a  benefit  since  perpet- 
ual peace  leads  to  lethargy."  Proudhon,  who 
devoted  his  life  to  supporting  the  most  contra- 
dictory theses  also  wrote  an  apology  for  war  in 


LATER   TENDENCIES  127 

which  he  discovered  the  supreme  sanction  for 
the  theory  that  might  makes  right,  which  sim- 
ply assures  the  more  powerful  that  which  they 
deserve;  he  merely  adds  that  war,  right  in  it- 
self, is  economically  immoral  because  it  is  the 
result  of  pauperism  and  general  distress.  Con- 
sequently to  put  an  end  to  war  this  universal 
distress  must  be  banished,  or  in  other  words 
economic  equilibrium  must  be  restored  (27). 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  note  that  we  have 
here  one  of  those  networks  of  paradox  and  non- 
sense, in  which  this  bizarre  revolutionist  de- 
lighted. To  affirm  that  this  disease,  that  is, 
economic  disorder,  is  the  cause  of  the  degenera- 
tion of  the  modalities  of  war,  is  merely  equiv- 
alent to  saying  that,  this  disorder  once  removed, 
this  degeneration  will  cease  but  not,  however, 
that  it  will  put  an  end  to  wars.  Moreover  if 
war  is  so  sacred  and  commendable,  the  restora- 
tion of  the  economic  equilibrium  is  to  be  de- 
precated, since  it  would  abolish  war.  In  advo- 
cating, on  the  contrary,  a  condition  of  economic 
equilibrium,  which  would  preclude  war,  Proud- 
hon  effectively  disavows  all  his  former  apologies 
for  it  and  proves  that  he  was  indulging  in 
"cant,"  as  the  English  say,  pure  and  simple — 
in  other  words  he  was  supporting  for  the  sake 
of  effect  a  thesis  contrary  to  his  convictions. 


128  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

Even  more  temperate  writers  have,  however, 
not  hesitated  to  enter  the  lists  in  defence  of  war ; 
Dilthey  maintains  that  the  most  powerful  forces 
of  the  moral  world  are  hunger,  love  and  war. 
Simmel  regards  it  as  necessary ;  it  is  a  powerful 
factor  for  progress,  the  great  agent  of  social 
synthesis  and  of  cohesion  among  elements  which 
show  an  inclination  to  break  away  from  a  single 
aggregate  (64).  Finally,  more  recently,  Stein- 
metz  offers  an  apology  for  war  which  he  claims 
will  never  cease  and  which  he  regards  as  eter- 
nally necessary  for  the  human  species;  accord- 
ing to  him  it  is  the  creator  of  family  and  polit- 
ical groups,  of  solidarity,  and  of  technique;  it 
is  the  admirable  factor  of  all  progress;  it  is  the 
basis  of  morality  and  of  elevation  of  character 
(65).  To  refute  these  theories  we  have  before 
us  the  entire  history  of  humanity  which  shows 
us  that  wars  have  become  more  and  more  rare, 
and  that  throughout  the  long  period  of  peace 
which  the  world  is  now  enjoying  there  have 
been  none  of  those  disasters  or  calamities,  spir- 
itual and  material,  which  the  apostles  of  war 
prophesied  with  so  much  assurance;  but  on  the 
contrary  humanity  has  prospered  and  advanced 
as  it  never  did  before.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
mankind  has  been  much  better  off,  materially 


LATER  TENDENCIES  129 

and  spiritually,  since  it  banished,  or  reduced  to 
modest  proportions,  that  which  Seneca  calls  the 
"glorious  pleasure,"  that  is  war.  Other  writ- 
ers claim  that  war  is  necessary  to  remedy  the 
plethora  which  occurs  periodically  in  the  econ- 
omy of  nations,  just  as  bleeding  was  once  con- 
sidered necessary  to  reduce  an  excess  of  vigor 
in  the  human  organism.  This  analogy,  however, 
is  imbued  with  the  errors  inherent  in  the  art 
of  medicine  in  bygone  days,  and  which  have 
been  corrected  by  modern  physicians;  at  the 
present  time  the  school  of  Doctor  Sangrado  has 
no  disciples;  it  is  now  recognized  that  many  of 
the  phenomena  which  were  formerly  attributed 
to  a  plethoric  condition  are,  on  the  contrary, 
due  to  anaemia  which  requires  a  tonic  regime. 
Plethoric  conditions  should  always  be  treated 
by  building  up  the  organism  and  not  by  bleed- 
ing. It  is  the  same  with  economic  relations. 
Above  all  it  is  absurd  to  talk  of  economic  ple- 
thora in  connection  with  contemporaneous  so- 
ciety of  which  a  large  part  is  languishing  in  ab- 
ject misery.  Examined  more  closely,  what  we 
call  economic  plethora  is  in  reality  a  plethora 
of  the  capitalistic  class  in  whose  hands  wealth 
is  being  concentrated  to  an  excessive  and  ever 
increasing  extent.  It  is  certainly  to  this  cap- 
italistic plethora  that  are  due  the  vast  accumu- 


130  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

lations  of  capital,  the  decline  in  the  rate  of  profit 
and  the  tendency  to  engage  in  hazardous  spec- 
ulations, all  of  which  are  extremely  powerful 
factors  in  bringing  about  war.  However,  to  cor- 
rect this  plethora  war  is  not  needed;  it  would 
simply  be  necessary  to  adopt  a  series  of  meas- 
ures for  securing  a  more  even  distribution  of 
wealth,  and  to  withdraw  from  the  excessive  for- 
tunes of  the  rich  certain  portions  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  most  needy.  Moreover  that  which  con- 
stitutes the  chief  incentive  to  war  is  the  decline 
in  revenue  which,  although  it  may  be  found  as- 
sociated with  a.  progressive  concentration  of 
wealth  in  the  hands  of  the  few,  is  always  an  in- 
dication of  want  and  disease,  and  never  of 
plethora. 

The  chorus  of  war's  apologists  is  further 
swelled  by  certain  economists,  not  with  the  pon- 
tifical airs  of  the  supermen  of  philosophy,  but 
with  cold-blooded  calculations  of  balances,  and 
exact  deductions.  As  early  as  1854  Roscher  ob- 
served that  a  just  and  successful  war,  one  not 
too  prolonged,  possessed  great  dietetic  value,  as 
an  antidote  against  the  division  of  labor,  be- 
cause it  forced  a  considerable  number  of  men 
to  acquire  self-reliance  and  cease  leaning  on 
others  (66).  The  same  author  even  went  so  far 
as  to  announce  with  imperturbable  assurance  a 


LATER   TENDENCIES  131 

so-called  la.w  of  history  according  to  which  every 
generation  was  forced  to  pass  through  two  suc- 
cessive phases,  one  of  peace  and  one  of  war ;  thus 
it  was,  he  added,  that  we  had  peace  in  1717- 
1720,  1763-1793,  1815-1835,  and  war  during  the 
intervening  periods  (66).  Contemporary  his- 
tory, however,  refutes  this  factitious  law;  for 
from  1871  until  the  present  time,  a  period  longer 
than  a  generation,  we  have  had  peace.  More  re- 
cently Robinson  maintained  that  war  is  a  nec- 
essary result  of  the  progressive  decrease  in  the 
productivity  of  new  lands,  which  is  a  funda- 
mental and  persistent  phenomenon  of  produc- 
tion. In  fact,  as  soon  as  a.  certain  point  is 
reached  in  the  decrease  in  fertility  of  the  new 
lands  under  cultivation  an  agricultural  coun- 
try can  no  longer  produce  within  its  own  boun- 
daries the  food  necessary  for  its  support;  con- 
sequently it  must  either  make  war  to  secure  new 
territory,  or  become  a  manufacturing  country. 
In  the  second  case,  however,  a  bitter  rivalry  en- 
sues between  the  exporting  nations,  which  in  its 
turn  leads  to  war.  Consequently  in  both  cases 
war  is  inevitable,  and  it  is  chimerical  to  believe 
that  it  will  ever  disappear  (23). 

However,  this  view  to  me,  likewise,  seems  one- 
sided. Although,  considerable  influence  must  be 
attributed  to  the  law  of  diminishing  productiv- 


132  THE  ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OP   WAR 

ity  of  the  soil,  we  cannot  say,  that  this  pheno- 
menon is  the  sole  and  necessary  cause  of  war. 
On  the  contrary  we  have  already  had  occasion 
to  observe  that  war  is  the  effect  of  a  cause  much 
more  general,  namely:  the  decline  in  the  reve- 
nue; it  may,  of  course,  be  the  result  of  the  de- 
creasing productivity,  but  it  may  also  manifest 
itself,  independently  of  the  latter,  as  due  to  the 
effect  of  the  coercion  inherent  in  the  association 
of  labor.  Now,  if  the  forced  association  of  labor 
were  to  cease  and  be  replaced  by  the  free  asso- 
ciation, it  would,  evidently  destroy  the  principal 
cause  limiting  production  and  the  amount  of 
social  revenue.  Further — the  very  accelaration 
which  the  free  association  of  labor  imparts  to 
production  might  even  go  so  far  as  to  retard,  or 
entirely  stop,  the  decrease  in  the  productivity  of 
the  land;  and  this  would  preclude  the  hitherto 
inevitable  recurrence  of  wars. 

Fanno  (2)  likewise  regards  wars  as  unavoid- 
able, but  owing  to  an  entirely  different  reason. 
According  to  this  author,  the  increase  in  popu- 
lation tends  to  equalize  the  conditions  of  the 
tenure  and  of  the  productivity  of  lands  in  the 
different  countries  and  by  reason  of  this  to  les- 
sen the  differences  which  prevail  in  the  prices 
of  commodities  in  them,  and  finally  to  eliminate 
these  differences  altogether.  It  therefore  follows 


LATER   TENDENCIES  133 

that  the  field  of  international  commerce  will  be- 
come more  and  more  restricted  until  a  point  is 
finally  reached  when  each  country  will  import 
only  those  commodities  which  it  is  itself  unable 
to  produce.  Thus  international  economy  will 
ultimately  disappear  to  give  place  to  the  old 
national  economy,  with  its  selfish  ends  and  its 
ruinous  jealousies,  and  conflicts  and  wars  will 
again  follow.  On  the  other  hand  when  the  prices 
of  commodities  in  the  various  countries  have  be- 
come equalized  there  will  no  longer  exist  that 
superiority  in  the  conditions  of  productivity 
which  gave  the  older  nations  economic  and  po- 
litical dominion  over  the  newer  countries;  con- 
sequently there  will  be  no  economic  basis  for  the 
great  colonial  empires  which  will,  therefore,  be- 
gin to  disintegrate.  Simultaneously  with  the  de- 
cline of  the  older  countries,  now  falling  into  de- 
cadence, the  prosperity  of  the  new  and  hitherto 
subject  countries  will  increase  until  a  conflict  oc- 
curs between  them;  a  conflict  which  can  be 
settled  only  by  an  appeal  to  arms.  Thus  in  every 
historical  cycle,  when  the  territorial  extension 
and  the  colonial  power  of  the  different  countries 
cease  to  correspond  with  their  respective  eco- 
nomic powers,  a  vast,  universal  conflagration 
becomes  inevitable ;  and  this  will  be  the  state  of 
affairs  until  the  population  of  the  globe,  which 


134  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

is  rapidly  increasing,  reaches  a  common  level 
in  the  various  countries,  when  a  state  of  stable 
equilibrium  will  have  been  reached  which  will 
render  definitive  and  unchangeable  the  political 
divisions  of  the  world,  which  will  correspond 
with  a  similar  geographical  distribution  of  the 
population. 

Regarding  this  theory,  which  certainly  is  very 
reassuring  and  suggestive,  much  may  be  said. 
First  of  all,  Fanno's  opinion,  which  is  support- 
ed by  Barth  (67),  Kropotkin  (68)  and  others, 
to  wit:  that  the  economic  evolution  of  interna- 
tional trade  tends  to  cease,  appears  to  me  to  be, 
at  least,  questionable.  While  we  must  admit 
that  the  economic  development  of  new  countries 
tends  to  destroy  the  colonial  bond  which  unites 
them  with  the  old,  this  does  not  in  itself  imply 
the  cessation  of  commerce  between  them ;  on  the 
contrary  history  teaches  us  that  commerce  be- 
tween the  old  countries  and  the  new  develops 
faster  than  ever  after  the  colonial  bond  has  been 
severed.  If  it  be  true  that  the  increase  in  pop- 
ulation in  new  countries  would  end  by  making  it 
impossible  for  them  to  export  wheat,  thereby 
compelling  the  older  countries  to  produce  their 
own  food,  it  would,  at  most,  cause  the  disap- 
pearance of  that  particular  branch  of  interna- 
tional trade  which  consists  in  the  exchange  of 


LATER   TENDENCIES  135 

raw  materials  for  manufactured  products.  This, 
however,  does  not  constitute  the  entire  commerce 
even  between  the  old  and  the  new  countries ;  be- 
sides these  there  are  always  enormous  quanti- 
ties of  products,  upon  whose  prices  increase  in 
population  has  no  effect ;  consequently  commerce 
between  nations  is  likewise  unaffected  by  this 
gain  in  population.  Still  more — the  constant 
advance  in  technique,  causing,  as  it  does,  ex- 
treme diversity  in  manufacturing  processes, 
ought  further  to  increase  and  accentuate  the 
differences  between  the  prices  of  products  manu- 
factured in  the  various  countries,  and  thus  en- 
large the  field  of  international  commerce.  There- 
fore, far  from  having  a  disastrous  effect  on  the 
national  economy  there  would  be  an  increasing 
internationalization  in  economic  relations  whose 
influence  would  likewise  tend  to  maintain  prices. 
This,  moreover,  would  be  further  supported  by 
a  series  of  other  economic  factors,  much  more 
powerful  and  much  more  intense  than  commer- 
cial relations. 

Fanno's  apprehension  that  the  fall  of  the 
great  colonial  empires  would  necessarily  give 
rise  to  international  conflagrations  which  would 
result  in  a  new  political  division  of  the  world, 
on  the  basis  of  new  empires  and  new  annexa- 
tions, leading  in  turn  to  further  conflicts,  seems 


136  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

to  me  to  be  a  mere  flight  of  fancy.  Even  if  we 
admit  for  the  present  that  the  great  colonial  em- 
pires are  destined  to  disintegrate  and  give  rise 
to  international  wars;  these  wars  certainly 
would  lead,  not  to  the  formation  of  new  colonial 
empires ;  but,  on  the  contrary  to  the  political  in- 
dependence of  the  existing  colonies,  that  is  to 
say  they  would  contribute  to  the  triumph  in  the 
new  regions  of  the  principle  of  political  inde- 
pendence based  on  nationality,  which,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  is  a  strong  guarantee  for 
peace.  Moreover,  it  should  be  observed  that  ma- 
terial for  colonial  expansion  is  by  no  means  in- 
exhaustible, but  that,  sooner  or  later,  its  limits 
will  be  reached,  since  the  time  will  come  when 
there  will  be  no  more  new  lands  to  be  appro- 
priated by  the  older  countries.  A  moment, 
therefore,  will  arrive  when  the  old  colonial  em- 
pires will  disintegrate  without  giving  birth  to 
new  ones;  and  finally  the  colonial  bond,  which 
is  a  constant  source  of  trouble  and  international 
war,  will  be  broken. 

According  to  other  writers  it  is  commercial  re- 
lations themselves  which  will  become  the  cause 
of  wars.  For  example,  Marshall,  the  English 
economist,  believes  that  the  day  will  come  when 
only  a  few  countries  will  produce  raw  materials 
in  excess  of  the  quantities  they  use  in  their  do- 


LATER   TENDENCIES  137 

mestic  industries,  and  that,  consequently,  they 
will  sell  their  surplus  only  on  the  most  exacting 
terms,  thus  compelling  those  manufacturing 
countries  which  need  them  to  pay  heavily.  He 
adds  that  there  is,  in  this  very  fact,  a  latent 
cause  of  international  war  (69).  This,  however, 
is  only  possible  on  condition  that  the  states  pro- 
ducing the  raw  materials  enter  into  an  agree- 
ment for  the  express  purpose  of  exploiting  the 
purchasers.  Now,  in  spite  of  the  greatest  eco- 
nomic and  political  concentration  there  will  al- 
ways be  such  a  large  number  of  states  exporting 
raw  materials  that  any  combination  among  them 
would  be  wholly  impossible. 

Certain  writers  discover  other  influences  by 
means  of  which  commerce  will  occasion  wars  be- 
tween nations.  The  most  pressing  of  interna- 
tional questions,  remarks  a.  modern  author,  is 
that  of  the  open  door  in  the  Orient.  The  day 
may  come  when  the  development  of  the  west- 
ern part  of  the  United  States  will  provoke  a  war 
with  Japan.  The  rapid  increase  in  commercial 
importance  of  the  valley  of  the  Rhine  will  finally 
cause  the  Germans  to  resent  Holland's  owner- 
ship of  the  mouth  of  the  river;  by  reason  of 
which,  the  very  activity  of  the  Kaiser's  subjects 
serves  to  enrich  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp.  Here 
we  discover  another  possible  cause  of  war  (55). 


138  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OF   WAR 

It  is  indeed  true  that  the  complication  of  inter- 
national relations  will  give  rise  to  differences 
which  will  constantly  become  more  and  more 
numerous;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  these  dif- 
ferences will  be  resolved  peacefully  with  ever 
increasing  frequency,  because  the  supreme  in- 
terest of  all  states  consists  in  avoiding  war. 

There  is,  of  course,  no  doubt  that  armaments 
are  increasing  more  and  more,  and,  what  is 
worse,  this  is  not  balanced  by  a  corresponding 
development  in  the  productive  powers  of  labor ; 
this  circumstance  tends  to  create  a:nd  enhance 
the  economic  inequality  by  impairing  the  capital 
of  the  various  nations. 

In  addition,  while  the  expenses  of  armament 
in  time  of  peace  are  exceedingly  burdensome, 
and  are  constantly  increasing,  the  costs  of  a  fu- 
ture war  will  be  of  a  vastness  absolutely  incon- 
ceivable. It  has  been  estimated  that  the  six 
great  powers  of  Europe  and  Japan  could  in  time 
of  war  mobilize  at  least  6,960,000  men  (49)  ; 
that  the  costs  of  a  European  war  would  amount 
to  55,000,000,000  dollars,  that  is,  twice  the  an- 
nual savings  of  the  entire  world  and  that  the 
mobilization  of  the  armies  would  require  during 
the  first  six  weeks  over  2,000,000,000  dollars  in 
gold,  or  an  amount  equal  to  half  the  present 
stock  of  gold  coin  of  the  world  (70).  Insofar 


LATER  TENDENCIES  139 

as  Germany  alone  is  concerned  Riesser,  after 
the  most  conscientious  and  painstaking  study, 
reached  the  following  conclusions : 

1.  The  mobilization  of  troops  during  the  first 
six  weeks  would  cost  300,000,000  dollars. 

2.  Manufacturing,  commerce  and  agriculture 
would   need   250,000,000   dollars   additional   to 
provide  for  supplies,  transportation,  etc. 

3.  The  panic  and  general  uncertainty  would 
cause  a  further  demand  for  coin  of,  at  least, 
60,000,000  dollars. 

4.  The  costs  of  the  war  for  Germany  alone 
during  the  first  year  would  amount  to  1,625,000,- 
000  dollars  (71). 

In  these  calculations  the  indirect  expenses  occa- 
sioned by  the  war  are  disregarded,  such  for  ex- 
ample as  the  amounts  paid  the  reservists'  fam- 
ilies, pensions  to  the  invalids  and  widows,  dam- 
ages to  private  property  owners,  etc.  Thiinen 
observes  that  if  the  state  undertakes  to  pay  the 
family  of  each  soldier  killed  in  war  200  thalers, 
representing  the  cost  of  his  education,  and  to 
support  the  wounded  and  indemnify  the  sur- 
vivors of  the  war  for  the  impairment  of  their 
forces,  that  is  to  say  to  give  them  what  they 
would  be  able  to  earn  if  they  were  still  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  entire  strength  and  energy, 
wars  in  winter  would  become  wholly  impossible, 


140  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

and  in  every  case  they  would  be  infinitely  more 
costly  and  consequently  more  infrequent  (72). 
These  conditions  which,  at  the  time  of  the  great 
German  economist,  were  purely  fanciful,  have 
now  become  actualities,  and  the  cost  of  any  fu- 
ture war  consequently  will  be  enormously  in- 
creased. We  must  also  take  into  considera- 
tion the  vast  difficulty  in  providing  an  army 
with  food  and  munitions ;  and  likewise  the  finan- 
cial disasters,  truly  incalculable,  which  would 
result  from  a  conflict.  A  European  war  would 
cause  universal  bankruptcy,  it  would  lead  to  the 
abandonment  of  innumerable  enterprises,  and 
enforced  idleness,  already  such  a  burden  on  in- 
dustry, would  be  greatly  increased  (73).  Final- 
ly a  war  would  occasion  an  enormous  loss  in 
men.  The  war  of  1870  cost  Germany  only  44,890 
in  dead,  that  is  to  say  less  than  20  per  cent  of  the 
excess  of  births  over  deaths;  but  a  future  war 
would  inevitably  result  in  reducing  the  popula- 
tion of  the  globe  in  a.  frightful  measure. 

The  terrible  effects  of  wars  certainly  consti- 
tute a  powerful  force  for  preventing  them,  and 
there  is  still  another  factor,  not  less  potent, 
working  for  this  end,  namely:  the  ever-increas- 
ing equality  in  the  strength  of  the  various  states, 
due  either  to  the  process  of  gathering  small 
states  into  great  political  entities  possessing 


LATER  TENDENCIES  141 

equal  powers  or  to  the  further  establishment  of 
this  equality  by  means  of  alliances.  It  is  per- 
fectly clear  that  where  there  is  absolute  equality 
the  possibility  and  the  reason  for  a.  conflict  van- 
ish ;  and  it  is  owing  to  this  fact  that  the  creation 
of  great  political  entities  of  equal  strength  must 
lead  necessarily  to  the  cessation  of  international 
conflicts  (45). 

With  these  tendencies,  produced  by  the  very 
evolution  of  economic  relations,  theory  corre- 
sponds. Thus,  without  going  to  the  dust-cov- 
ered shelves  where  repose  the  Nouveau  Cynee  of 
Emeric  Cruce,  and  the  Memoirs  of  Sully,  or  the 
projects  for  perpetual  peace  of  Leibnitz  (1677), 
of  Fenelon  (1680),  of  the  Abbe  Saint-Pierre 
(1728),  of  Kant  (1795),  of  Saint-Simon  (1815), 
let  us  refer  only  to  Dohm,  who  held  that,  by 
increasing  the  imposingness  and  the  power  of 
armies,  we  might  arrive  at  a  state  -where  na- 
tions, instead  of  engaging  in  war,  would  send 
each  other  detailed  statements  of  their  land  and 
sea  forces  and  their  means  for  maintaining  them, 
and  that  this  would  suffice  to  deter  them  from 
any  military  adventure;  Bulwer,  in  his  novel, 
' '  The  Coming  Race, ' '  describes  mankind  as  hav- 
ing become  peaceful,  simply  because  war  had 
become  technically  impossible,  weapons  having 
become  so  destructive  that  the  contending  ar- 


142  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

mies  would  be  annihilated  at  the  first  discharge. 
Tolstoi  suggests  the  theory  of  non-resistance  to 
wrong,  which  is  an  echo  of  the  aversion  from 
war,  which  survives  all  else;  and  everywhere 
the  effort  is  being  made  to  replace  war  with 
arbitral  institutions  (74). 

A  fact  which  presents  itself  at  the  very  be- 
ginning for  our  consideration  is  the  profound 
analogy  which  exists  between  the  evolution  of 
economic  relations  and  that  of  the  contractual 
relations  which  connect  capital  and  labor  in 
economic  activities.  In  fact,  the  relations  be- 
tween capital  and  labor  are  passing  from  the 
violent  methods  of  the  strike  to  the  peaceful 
means  of  arbitration,  and  the  same  change  is 
taking  place,  or  is  about  to  take  place,  in  inter- 
national relations.  What  is  more  remarkable  is 
that  in  both  the  evolution  from  violence  to  arbi- 
tration is  due  to  motives  essentially  economic  in 
character.  In  fact,  the  cause  which,  in  the  do- 
main of  industrial  relations,  determines  the  evo- 
lution from  the  violent  methods  of  the  strike 
to  the  peaceful  means  of  arbitration,  is  the  in- 
creasing cost  of  sti'ikes  and  the  progressive 
augmentation  in  the  losses  which  thence  result 
to  both  classes,  workers  and  capitalists.  It  is 
the  same  in  the  field  of  international  relations; 
the  passage  from  violence  to  arbitration  is  pre- 


LATER  TENDENCIES  143 

cisely  due  to  the  progressive  increase  in  the 
expenses  occasioned  by  the  former. 

However,  while  there  is  no  doubt  that  many 
fundamental  analogies  exist  between  industrial 
and  international  arbitration,  it  is  none  the  less 
true  that  the  latter  encounters  peculiar  difficul- 
ties and  obstacles,  and  much  more  formidable 
ones  than  are  met  with  in  the  field  of  industrial 
relations. 

Let  us  carefully  examine  this  interesting 
question. 

In  the  industrial  sphere  the  arbitrated  deci- 
sion cannot  be  voluntarily  accepted  by  the  two 
contracting  parties  unless  it  brings  about  the 
same  result  which,  in  every  case,  the  adversaries 
would  have  reached  if  they  had  preferred  to 
have  recourse  to  a  contest  or  to  violence.  Let  us 
assume,  for  example,  that  the  workmen  of  one, 
or  of  several,  manufacturing  establishments  de- 
mand a  ten  per  cent  increase  in  wages  and  that, 
instead  of  going  on  a  strike,  they  agree  to  sub- 
mit the  question  to  arbitration.  What  ought 
the  arbitrators  to  do  in  the  case?  They  ought 
to  endeavor  to  ascertain  whether  the  workmen 
could  actually  obtain  this  increase  by  having  re- 
course to  a  strike;  and  if  they  decide  in  the 
affirmative,  they  should  allow  the  increase,  while 
the  employers  ought  to  agree  to  the  increase 


144  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

granted  by  the  arbitrators  because  they  know 
that  in  the  case  of  a  refusal  on  their  part,  the 
workmen  would  strike  and,  in  this  manner, 
would  obtain  precisely  the  increase  in  wages 
they  had  demanded.  Thus,  under  these  condi- 
tions, the  arbitrated  decision,  even  if  its  accept- 
ance was  not  obligatory  on  the  two  parties, 
would  have  the  force  of  law  and  would  be  vol- 
untarily accepted  by  both. 

However,  to  be  exact,  we  must  add  that  the 
workmen  would  accept  the  arbitrated  decision, 
even  when  it  granted  them  an  increase  in  wages 
slightly  less  than  that  which  they  might  have 
secured  by  fighting — or,  in  other  words,  when 
it  assured  to  them  the  net  gain  of  the  fight,  that 
is,  the  increase  in  wages  less  the  expenses  neces- 
sary to  obtain  it.  If  the  arbitrated  award  gave 
the  workmen  a  little  more  than  the  net  benefit, 
but  a  little  less  than  the  gross  gain  that  might 
be  obtained  by  striking,  it  would  actually  as- 
sure a  positive  gain  to  both  workmen  and  cap- 
italists; and  consequently  there  are  ample 
grounds  for  assuming  that  it  would  be  eagerly 
accepted  by  both. 

The  matter  would  be  entirely  different  if  the 
arbitrators  endeavored  to  make  it  a  question  of 
justice,  or  to  establish,  according  to  law  and 
equity,  what  increase  in  wages  ought  to  be 


LATER   TENDENCIES  145 

granted  the  workmen.  If  they  sought  this  end 
the  scale  of  wages  established  by  the  arbitrators 
might  not  at  all  accord  with  the  respective 
strength  of  the  workmen  and  the  employers ;  and 
it  might  be  much  higher  or  much  lower  than 
that  which  the  laborers  could  secure  by  coercion. 
In  this  case  the  arbitrators  could  not  count  on 
the  voluntary  acceptance  of  their  award  by 
either  the  workers  or  the  employers,  because,  if 
the  workers,  by  striking,  could  obtain  a  wage 
higher  than  that  established  by  the  arbitrators, 
they  certainly  would  strike  to  obtain  it;  if,  ori 
the  other  hand,  the  wages  awarded  by  the  arbi- 
trators were  higher  than  they  could  obtain  by 
striking,  it  is  certain  that  the  employers  would 
refuse  to  pay  the  men  the  amount  determined. 
Thus,  under  these  conditions,  the  arbitrated 
award  would  never  be  accepted  voluntarily  by 
the  parties  at  issue,  or,  in  other  words,  if  it 
were  accepted  at  all,  it  would  be  accepted  simply 
owing  to  the  fact  that  it  possessed  a  material 
sanction.  However,  the  difficulty  still  remains. 
In  case  the  arbitrated  wage  is  lower  than  that 
which  the  workmen  could  secure  by  having  re- 
course to  a  strike,  how  could  they  be  compelled 
to  accept  it?  There  is  nothing  to  prevent  labor- 
ers from  refusing  to  work  under  the  conditions 
established  by  the  arbitrators,  since  they  cannot 


146  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES    OP   WAR 

be  punished  for  declining  to  work,  an  act  per- 
fectly legitimate  in  itself.  If  an  effort  were 
made  to  punish  striking  workmen,  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  persons  would  have  to  be  thrown  into 
jail,  which  would  have  the  effect  of  placing  a 
further  enormous  burden  on  the  state  treasury, 
and  it  would  also  diminish  the  sum  total  of 
labor  offered  and,  consequently,  would  ulti- 
mately raise  wages.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
arbitrated  wage  were  higher  than  that  estab- 
lished normally  by  means  of  an  effective  strike, 
or  by  the  threat  of  a  strike,  nothing  could  pre- 
vent the  employers  from  refusing  to  pay  it  and 
from  closing  their  factories  until  the  workmen 
were  ready  to  accept  a  wage  lower  than  that 
fixed  by  the  arbitrators;  now,  by  increasing  the 
number  of  laborers  out  of  work,  wages  finally, 
instead  of  rising,  would  simply  decline.  Thus 
we  constantly  return  to  the  same  point;  when 
industrial  arbitration  arrives  at  a  result  which 
differs  from  that  which  would  be  the  product  of 
the  respective  strength  of  the  two  parties,  it  will 
not  be  voluntarily  accepted,  and  as  there  are  no 
means  for  assuring  its  execution,  it  will  become 
a  dead  letter. 

Hitherto  we  have  considered  the  question 
solely  from  the  wage  earner's  standpoint,  but 
it  would  not  be  difficult  to  demonstrate  that  the 


LATER  TENDENCIES  147 

conclusions  would  be  the  same  when  examined 
from  the  employers'  side.  If  the  arbitrators 
established  a  sca.le  of  wages  which  the  latter 
could  impose  by  having  recourse  to  a  lockout  or 
other  forcible  methods,  both  employers  and 
workers  would  accede  to  it;  but  if  they  granted 
a  higher  wage  the  manufacturers  would  refuse 
to  pay  it  and  would  declare  a  lockout;  if  they 
fixed  a  lower  wage  the  laborers  would  refuse 
to  work  and  would  declare  a  strike;  therefore, 
in  every  case  the  wage  established  by  the  arbi- 
trators would  be  rejected. 

This  is  the  view  held  by  the  most  distinguished 
economists  regarding  this  delicate  point.  There 
are,  indeed,  some  eclectics — among  them  Jas- 
trow — who  maintain  that  the  decisions  of  arbi- 
tral tribunals  should  not  be  based  entirely  on 
the  strength  and  the  interest  of  the  parties,  but 
also  on  their  rights  and,  in  addition,  on  the  sen- 
timent of  humanity.  This  writer  adds  that  a 
verdict  so  reached  might  be  heeded  and  that  one 
of  the  parties  might  be  persuaded  that  it  was  to 
its  interest  to  renounce  its  rights  instead  of  per- 
sisting in  its  efforts  to  cause  them  to  prevail 
(75).  However,  if  one  of  the  parties,  for  ex- 
ample, the  one  which  had  been  most  unfairly 
treated  by  the  arbitrators,  found  it  to  its  inter- 
est to  accept  their  decision,  it  is  equivalent  to 


148  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

saying  that  by  not  accepting  it,  or  by  engaging 
in  a  contest,  it  would  immediately  and  defini- 
tively obtain  less  than  what  the  arbitrators 
would  give  it,  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  arbi- 
trators would  give  it  the  maximum  which  its 
own  circumstances  would  enable  it  to  secure. 
Hence  we  are  forced  to  conclude,  with  Webb, 
that  the  arbitrators  cannot  award  the  workers 
any  more  than  the  employers  are  willing  to 
grant  them  (76),  and  with  Clark  (77),  that  the 
arbitrators  must  allow  the  wage  which  would  be 
established  if  the  workmen  had  recourse  to  a 
strike,  provided  it  was  not  accompanied  by  vio- 
lence with  respect  to  the  laborers  who  took  the 
place  of  the  strikers. 

The  case  is  essentially  the  same  when  a  differ- 
ence arises  between  nations.  Let  us  suppose 
that  a  quarrel  occurs  between  two  countries  and 
that,  before  engaging  in  actual  hostilities,  they 
have  recourse  to  an  arbitral  tribunal.  What 
does  the  tribunal  do  in  such  a  case?  It  esti- 
mates the  forces  of  the  two  adversaries;  it  con- 
siders the  result  which  in  all  probability  would 
be  attained  if  they  engaged  in  warfare,  and  it 
condemns  the  party,  which  would  be  defeated,  to 
satisfy  the  demands  of  the  other,  or  these  de- 
mands minus  a  sum  somewhat  less  than  the  ex- 
penses which  the  war  would  cause  the  victorious 


LATER   TENDENCIES  149 

nation.  Under  these  circumstances,  therefore, 
the  arbitrated  award  is  often  advantageous  to 
both  parties,  since  the  conqueror  gains  a  little 
more  and  the  conquered  loses  a  little  less  than 
would  have  been  the  case  had  they  gone  to  war. 
Therefore  there  is  good  reason  for  assuming  that 
both  nations  in  litigation  would  definitively  ac- 
cept the  verdict. 

It  is  a  fact  that  the  arbitral  awards  made  and 
accepted  up  to  the  present  time  have  been  based 
precisely  and  solely  on  these  considerations.  If 
we  study  the  judgments  of  the  Middle  Ages  we 
find  that  they  were  based  exclusively  on  these 
ideas,  which  secured  for  them  universal  accept- 
ance. In  the  decisions  of  the  Middle  Ages  no 
effort  was  made  to  cause  justice  to  triumph; 
the  sole  object  was  to  prevent  a  contest,  conse- 
quently it  was  of  the  first  importance  to  know 
how  many  men  would  be  ready  to  come  to  the 
support  of  the  opposing  parties.  All  the  parti- 
sans of  the  adversaries,  therefore,  were  required 
to  present  themselves  at  the  tribunal  to  show  the 
strength  of  each,  and  the  judges  decided  for  that 
contestant  who  brought  the  greater  number  of 
supporters,  that  is  to  say,  combatants,  with  him. 
Thus,  the  object  of  the  tribunal  was  not  to  dis- 
cover the  truth,  but  to  award  the  victory  to  the 


150  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OP  WAR 

more  powerful  party  without  the  shedding  of 
blood  (78). 

If  the  arbitrators,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
endeavored  to  resolve  the  question,  regardless 
of  the  respective  strength  of  the  adversaries,  or 
according  to  some  principle  of  abstract  justice, 
the  voluntary  acquiescence  of  the  two  parties 
would  by  no  means  have  been  likely  to  follow, 
because  the  nation  to  which  the  tribunal  of  arbi- 
tration awarded  less  than  it  could  secure  by 
war  would  not  hesitate  to  have  recourse  to  arms. 
Under  these  conditions,  therefore  it  would  be 
necessary  to  force  both  parties  to  acquiesce  in 
the  decision  which  could  be  accomplished  only 
by  an  agreement  by  all  the  neutral  nations  to 
support  it  by  force  of  arms  and  compel  the  state 
which  regarded  itself  as  unjustly  treated  by  the 
tribunal  to  submit  to  the  arbitrated  verdict. 
Consequently,  an  institution  whose  purpose  is 
the  abolition  of  war  could  render  itself  effective 
only  by  means  of  a  general  war  of  all  nations 
against  the  one  that  refused  to  abide  by  the 
verdict. 

We  therefore  find  ourselves  confronted  by  an 
exceedingly  discouraging  dilemma.  In  the  in- 
dustrial field,  as  in  the  international  sphere,  the 
arbitral  decision  can  be  effective,  that  is  to  say, 
it  will  be  respected,  only  on  condition  that  it 


LATER   TENDENCIES  151 

expresses  the  natural  result  of  the  relative 
strength  of  the  parties  at  variance,  indepen- 
dently of  all  idea  of  justice ;  if,  on  the  contrary, 
it  sought  to  disregard  the  factor  of  force,  and 
establish  a  principle  of  justice,  it  would  inevi- 
tably become  purely  theoretical  and  would  find 
no  practical  application.  However,  between  the 
two  spheres  of  arbitration,  the  industrial  and 
the  international,  there  are  some  notable  differ- 
ences. In  fact,  the  condition  of  primary  eco- 
nomic inferiority  in  which,  owing  to  the  fatal 
force  of  circumstances,  the  workers  find  them- 
selves, when  compared  with  the  employers, 
causes  the  decision,  which  expresses  the  respec- 
tive strength  of  the  two  parties,  between  whom 
an  industrial  difference  arises,  to  redound  to  the 
disadvantage  of  one  of  the  adversaries,  the  work- 
ers; on  the  other  hand,  international  arbitra- 
tion, being  compelled  to  decide  between  two 
hostile  parties  which  may  be  of  equal  strength, 
may  more  frequently  base  its  decisions  on  abso- 
lute equity.  Therefore,  international  arbitra- 
tion, in  this  respect,  is  more  favorably  situated 
than  is  industrial  arbitration. 

On  the  other  hand,  international  arbitration 
encounters  much  more  serious  difficulties  than 
does  industrial  arbitration,  owing  to  the  entirely 
different  character  of  the  conflicts  with  which  it 


152  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

has  to  deal.  Industrial  differences  usually  have 
nothing  to  do  with  questions  of  justice,  but 
simply  with  the  question  of  the  respective 
strength  of  the  parties,  because  there  is  no  prin- 
ciple of  justice  which  requires  that  a  certain 
wage  be  paid,  or  that  wages  should  be  higher  or 
lower.  The  natural  wage,  or  the  wage  which 
the  employers  ought  to  pay  at  a  given  time,  is 
simply  the  product  of  the  respective  forces  of 
the  two  opposing  parties  and,  owing  to  this  fact, 
in  this  order  of  investigations,  it  is  only  reason- 
able, and  necessary,  that  nothing  but  the  rela- 
tive strength  of  the  adversaries  should  be 
considered. 

In  the  field  of  international  conflicts,  how- 
ever, it  is  an  entirely  different  matter.  Here 
the  questions  which  arise  concern  interests  of 
supreme  importance  which  ought  to  be  resolved 
according  to  the  principles  of  the  highest  equity, 
independently  of  the  respective  strength  of  the 
two  adversaries.  There  is  a  principle  of  justice 
which  requires  that  a  region  forming  an  integral 
part  of  a  given,  nation  and  having  in  common 
with  the  other  portions  certain  traditions  and 
memories  and  a  common  language,  should  not  be 
forcibly  separated  from  it  and  joined  to  another 
nation.  Here,  therefore,  justice  imposes  the  duty 
of  deciding  the  question  in  a  determinate  man- 


LATER   TENDKNCIKS  153 

ner,  without  regard  to  the  respective  strength 
of  the  two  opposing  parties.  It  may  happen 
that  the  state  to  which  the  province  belongs  is 
so  weak  in  comparison  with  the  one  seeking  to 
annex  it  that  in  an  armed  struggle  between  the 
two  states  the  former  would  inevitably  be  de- 
feated. But  why  should  this  affect  the  ques- 
tion? Should  the  tribunal  of  arbitration,  for 
this  reason  and  disregarding  all  other  considera- 
tions, decide  that  the  province  should  be  an- 
nexed to  the  other  state,  basing  its  decision 
solely  on  the  relative  strength  of  the  adver- 
saries? It  is  perfectly  clear  that  in  doing  this 
the  tribunal  of  arbitration  would  fail  in  its  duty 
and  would  make  itself  simply  the  tool  of  vio- 
lence ;  it  would  degrade  itself  by  merely  imitat- 
ing what  the  Congresses  of  Laibach,  of  Verona 
and  of  Vienna  did,  legalizing  the  violence  and  ex- 
actions of  the  strong  at  the  expense  of  the  weak. 
This  certainly  is  not  the  conclusion  which  will 
meet  with  the  approval  of  those  who  subscribe 
to  Dante's  phrase:  "Justitia  in  duello  (bello) 
succumbere  nequit"  (79)  ;  or  who,  with  Proud- 
hon,  exalting  the  right  of  might,  maintain  that 
war  itself  is  the  supreme  arbiter  of  the  law  of 
peoples,  because  it  secures  for  the  stronger 
states  that  to  which  they  have  a  right  by  virtue 
of  their  very  strength  (27).  It  is,  however, 


154  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

impossible  for  me  to  acquiesce  in  their  view. 
While  I  believe  that  force  creates  an  absolute 
right  to  the  ownership  of  those  superior  results 
which  are  derived  from  its  proper  activity  in 
the  field  of  production,  I  do  not  think  that  it 
creates  the  right  to  appropriate  the  legitimate 
products  of  the  exertions  of  those  less  fortu- 
nately situated,  or  the  weaker.  I  believe  that 
when  the  stronger  takes  advantage  of  his 
strength  to  appropriate  the  fruits  of  another's 
labor,  he  is  guilty  of  an  injustice;  and  if  he 
seizes  these  fruits  by  means  of  war,  war  becomes 
the  sanction  of  injustice  and  his  antagonist  suc- 
cumbs through  injustice.  Now,  if  this  be  true, 
it  is  clear  that  an  arbitral  award  which  was 
confined  to  a  juridical  expression  of  the  result 
to  which  war  itself  would  lead,  would  in  innu- 
merable cases  be  the  height  of  injustice.  In 
other  words,  international  arbitration  cannot 
worthily  perform  its  functions  unless  it  entirely 
disregards  the  question  of  the  respective 
strength  of  the  adversaries  and  finds  its  inspirar 
tion  in  the  idea  of  a  higher  equity.  This,  how- 
ever, is  equivalent  to  saying,  as  I  have  above 
remarked,  that  either  universal  arbitration  will 
never  be  voluntarily  accepted  by  two  parties  at 
issue  or  that  it  must  be  rendered  effective  by 
means  of  force.  In  other  words,  international 


LATER   TENDENCIES  155 

arbitration,  whose  purpose  is  to  abolish  war,  can 
become  effective  only  by  means  of  war. 

Nevertheless,  although  this  vicious  circle  is 
unavoidable  and  is  also  one  of  extreme  gravity, 
it  is  none  the  less  true  that  economic  evolution 
will  gradually  achieve  the  abolition  of  war. 

We  have  seen  that  the  greater  the  progress  in 
economic  evolution,  the  more  the  cost  of  war 
increases;  consequently,  the  less  net  profit  it 
can  procure  for  the  more  powerful  states,  or,  in 
other  words,  for  the  victors;  consequently,  the 
more  the  arbitrators  can  reduce  the  demands  of 
the  stronger  nations  without  forcing  them  to 
refuse  to  acquiesce  in  the  verdict  of  the  tribunal. 
If,  for  example,  the  demands  of  the  stronger 
state  are  represented  by  1,000,  and  it  appears  to 
be  in  a  position  to  obtain  this  by  means  of  a  war, 
whose  cost  may  be  represented  by  100,  the  arbi- 
trators must  allow  him  900  -f-  d;  but  if  the  cost 
of  the  war  would  be  300,500,700,  the  arbitrators 
may  grant  him  700,500,300  -f  d  without  any 
fear  that  the  stronger  state  will  reject  the  ar- 
bitrated award.  Consequently,  the  greater  the 
costs  of  war,  the  smaller  becomes  the  concession 
which  must  be  made  to  force,  and  consequently 
the  slighter  will  be  the  violence  done  to  the 
principle  of  justice  by  the  tribunal  of  arbitra- 
tion. 


156  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

In  the  second  place,  the  greater  the  damages 
resulting  from  war,  the  more  probable  it  be- 
comes that  the  mere  menace  of  the  neutral  states 
will  be  sufficient  in  itself  to  induce  the  stronger 
to  submit  to  the  arbitrated  verdict. 

Finally,  the  more  burdensome  the  expenses 
of  war,  the  more  disposed  will  states — both 
strong  and  weak — become  to  renounce  belliger- 
ent methods  and  decide  by  common  consent  to 
submit  their  differences  to  arbitrators,  promis- 
ing to  accept  their  decision.  In  other  words,  it 
is  probable  that  the  stronger  nations  will  stop 
imposing  on  weaker  states,  and  that  the  latter, 
in  turn,  will  cease  their  efforts  to  take  advantage 
of  the  pacific  attitude  of  the  former  to  preserve 
advantages  to  which  they  are  not  entitled.  The 
former,  it  is  true,  might  have  recourse  to  force 
a.t  the  expense  of  the  latter,  but  they  would 
hesitate  to  do  so,  because  they  dread  the  exces- 
sive cost  of  war  and  its  attendant  disasters ;  the 
second,  trusting  to  the  inertia  of  the  former, 
might  endeavor  to  preserve  illegitimate  advan- 
tages, but  they  would  refrain  from  doing  so 
either  because  there  would  always  be  reason  to 
fear  that  the  stronger  states  might  again  have 
recourse  to  arms  against  them  or  because  the 
neutral  states  might  not  care  to  take  the  trouble 
to  force  them  to  obey  the  verdict  of  the  tribunal. 


LATER   TENDENCIES  157 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  an  arbitral  decision  based  on  an  idea  of 
justice  ajid  neglecting  all  consideration  of  the 
respective  strength  of  the  parties  to  the  quarrel, 
would  not,  even  in  the  absence  of  material  force, 
discover  some  sanction  for  its  verdict.  So,  too, 
in  the  sphere  of  industrial  arbitration,  it  is 
far  from  certain  that  means  will  never  be  found 
to  proceed  against  recalcitrant  workers  or  ob- 
stinate employers.  Of  course,  it  is  inconceivable 
that  the  former  could  be  forced  to  work  and 
produce  under  conditions  established  by  the  ar- 
bitrators ;  but  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  author- 
ities could  fine  them  or  take  away  certain  of 
their  rights,  and  that  the  monopolistic  privileges 
of  the  latter  might  be  curtailed.  This  is  pre- 
cisely the  sanction  which  Clark  suggests  be  em- 
bodied in  the  arbitral  codes  for  regulating  indus- 
tries. In  fact,  he  proposes  that  the  state,  as 
soon  as  an  industrial  difference  arises,  assure 
the  workers,  hitherto  employed,  the  right  to  their 
positions,  that  is,  that  it  forbid  outside  laborers 
from  taking  their  situations,  provided  the  old 
workers  remain  in  their  places  while  the  dis- 
cussion is  in  progress.  If,  however,  the  old 
workers  do  not  accept  the  judgment  handed 
down,  they  shall  definitely  give  up  their  work, 
and  their  places  may  be  filled  by  other  laborers, 


158  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

whom  the  state  must  protect.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  employers  refuse  to  accede  to  the  ver- 
dict, the  state  shall  deprive  them  of  such  monop- 
olistic privileges  as  they  enjoy,  for  example, 
abolish  the  duties  protecting  their  industry, 
transfer  their  clientele  to  other  industries,  or, 
finally,  impose  differential  duties,  or  fines,  on 
obstinate  ones  (77).  Similar  methods  could  be 
adopted  in  connect?6n  with  international  arbi- 
tration. Thus,  Richet  (80)  suggests,  when  a  dif- 
ference arises  between  nations,  that  measures  be 
taken  to  secure  a  friendly  adjustment  and, 
should  one  of  the  parties  refuse  to  submit  to 
the  verdict,  that  neutral  states  be  given  the  right 
to  suspend  their  commercial  treaties  with  it,  or 
prevent  it  from  securing  any  loans  within  their 
domains.  In  addition,  when  a  difference  arises, 
the  nations  at  variance  might  be  required  to 
deposit  a  sum  of  money  to  be  forfeited  by  the 
state  that  refused  to  accept  the  verdict.  These 
suggestions  were  adopted  by  the  Congress  of 
Milan  of  1907,  which  moreover,  proposed,  in 
Article  28,  that  if  the  states  in  litigation  neglect 
to  address  themselves  to  the  Hague  Tribunal,  the 
latter,  on  the  motion  of  five  of  its  members, 
shall  have  the  right  to  assume  jurisdiction  in 
the  case  of  its  own  initiative. 

All    systems    of    arbitration,    however,    seem 


LATER   TENDENCIES  159 

timid  and  inadequate  to  certain  thinkers,  who 
demand  more  stable  and  more  efficacious  insti- 
tutions. Thus,  Lorimer  (Revue  de  Droit  Inter- 
national, 1871,  p.  I-II),  and  Fiore  (Droit  Inter- 
national Codifie,  Article  833  and  following),  sug- 
gest the  establishment  of  an  international  parlia- 
ment in  which  each  state  shall  have  representa- 
tion in  proportion  to  its  importance.  Each 
nation,  moreover,  is  to  furnish  a  certain  contin- 
gent of  men  to  constitute  an  armed  force  to 
secure  respect  for  the  decisions  of  the  interna- 
tional parliament.  Professor  Stanley  Jevons 
(81)  believed  that  by  the  year  2000  we  would 
have  an  international  parliament  for  the  peace- 
ful settlement  of  questions  pending  between 
states,  a  body  which  would  consist  of  a  senate 
having  political  powers  and  electing  its  presi- 
dent, who  would  choose  his  ministers,  and  an 
executive  and  a  judicial  branch. 

Further,  in  1907,  H.  Lepert  developed  a  new 
project  for  securing  justice  among  the  nations, 
one  of  much  wider  scope  than  arbitration.  A 
simple  tribunal  of  arbitration  does  not  appeal  to 
him,  either  because  it  lacks  the  power  to  carry 
out  its  decisions  or  because,  uniting  in  itself 
both  legislative  and  judicial  functions,  it  might 
be  influenced  by  the  interests  of  the  nations  it 
represented.  Arbitration,  he  maintains,  can  ren- 


160  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

der  no  appreciable  service,  because  it  can  take 
into  consideration  only  a  small  class  of  conflicts, 
and  these  only  by  virtue  of  special  conventions. 
According  to  him,  a  legislative  power  should  be 
established  to  elaborate  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  international  law,  a  judicial  power  to 
apply  these  theoretical  principles  to  actual 
cases,  and  an  executive  power  to  secure  obedi- 
ence to  the  laws  and  to  the  decisions  reached  and 
promulgated  by  the  two  former  powers.  The 
project  is  defined  in  48  articles,  which  might  be 
described  as  the  protocols  of  the  constitution  of 
the  new  relations  among  nations,  and  which 
should  provide,  moreover,  for  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  present  military  forces  into  a  police 
force  to  assure  the  observance  of  the  decisions  of 
the  assembly  by  nations  disposed  to  be  rebellious. 
In  this  we  would  have  an  international  jural 
organization  such  as  Terence  Mamiani  foresaw 
half  a  century  ago,  when  he  wrote :  ' '  And  even 
in  this  respect  the  last  stage  of  perfection  will 
become  like  its  beginning.  In  prehistoric  times 
the  human  species  saw  the  notables  of  the  tribe 
gather  in  council  and  discuss  the  common  affairs, 
all  with  equal  force,  dignity  and  authority.  And 
we  see  in  the  final  years  of  the  world — if  in 
fancy  we  can  reach  that  distant  age — new  coun- 
cils of  the  nations  discussing  and  establishing 


LATER  TENDENCIES  161 

in  common,  and  with  equal  authority,  that  which 
appears  to  be  salutary  and  glorious  for  the  civil- 
ized world"  (82).  However,  while  Mamiani  ex- 
cludes the  idea  of  an  international  tribunal  hav- 
ing plenary  powers  and  does  not  believe — in  this 
respect  differing  from  Montesquieu — that  inter- 
national law  can  ever  become  civil  la.w,  since  it 
can  never  be  accompanied  by  the  necessary  sanc- 
tions, modern  theorists  dream  of  a  veritable 
international  tribunal  which  will  be  able  to  give 
the  force  of  law  and  material  sanctions  to  its 
decisions.  By  this  theory,  which  differentiates 
the  writer  of  the  past  generation  from  modern 
authors,  we  can  arrive  at  an  appreciation  of  the 
great  progress  made  in  the  last  fifty  years  by  the 
peace  idea,  under  the  impulsion  of  the  inevitable 
evolution  of  economic  relations. 

Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  what  has  been  ac- 
complished, I  am  not  inclined  to  maintain  that 
this  modern  movement  will  result  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  inviolable  peace.  It  is  difficult 
to  believe  that  nations  would  submit  to  a  deci- 
sion that  would  violate  their  most  vital  interests. 
While  differences  of  a  secondary  order  may  be 
resolved  by  means  of  arbitrated  decisions,  or  by 
those  of  an  international  tribunal,  it  would  be 
absurd  to  assume  that  international  questions  of 
the  first  importance  could  be  settled  by  tribu- 


162  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES    OP   WAR 

nals,  because  here  we  are  not  concerned  with 
jural  controversies  at  all,  but  with  vital  ques- 
tions affecting  the  very  existence  and  the 
strength  of  nations,  which,  precisely  on  account 
of  this  fact,  will  never  entrust  the  final  decision 
to  arbitration  (65),  (83),  (84).  There  is, 
moreover,  another  feature  to  be  considered:  if 
— as  we  have  seen  at  the  beginning  of  this  study 
— war  is  the  inevitable  result  of  a  decline  in  the 
revenue,  a.  decrease  necessarily  brought  about  by 
the  forced  association  of  labor,  it  is  evident 
that  it  cannot  be  definitively  abolished  until 
this  forced  association  of  labor  ceases,  that  is, 
until  the  free  association  is  established.  So  long 
as  this  final  form  of  society  remains  unrealized, 
we  shall  have — it  is  true — a.  progressive  decrease 
in  the  number  of  wars  in  correlation  with  the 
progressive  decrease  in  the  periods  showing  a 
decline  in  the  revenue,  brought  about  by  the 
ever-increasing  technical  efficacy  of  the  methods 
of  the  forced  association  of  labor ;  but  to  believe 
in  a  definitive  abolition  of  war  while  present 
economic  conditions  obtain  would  be  utterly 
vain  and  illusory. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

[SUPPLEMENTAL.] 

THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR. 

The  extraordinary  events  which  have  taken 
place  during  the  last  three  years  furnish  a  strik- 
ing confirmation  of  the  correctness  of  the  pre- 
ceding views.  The  dependence  of  our  most  re- 
cent wars  upon  causes  essentially  economic  will 
be  recognized  henceforth  by  all  scientific  minds. 
It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  on  the  breaking  out 
of  the  Balkan  war  of  1912  political  idealists 
proclaimed  to  the  four  winds  of  heaven  that  the 
peoples  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  were  impelled 
by  the  most  holy  political  and  religious  idealism 
to  make  war  upon  the  unspeakable  Turk.  But, 
unfortunately,  the  objective  verification  of  the 
facts  only  served  promptly  to  place  them  in 
their  true  light.  The  "Economist"  of  12th  July, 
1912,  published  an  article  showing  that  for  a 
long  time  French,  German  and  English  capital- 
ists, greedy  for  excessive  profits,  had  lent  vast 
sums  to  the  various  Balkan  states  upon  the  ex- 
press condition  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
money  advanced  should  be  expended  for  arma- 
ments to  be  furnished  by  certain  firms  of  Paris, 


164  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

Berlin  and  London.  Now,  it  was  precisely  this 
enhancement  of  armament  among  the  Balkan 
states,  due  to  the  bankers  and  commercial 
houses  of  the  rest  of  Europe,  which  rendered 
their  military  operations  possible.  The  possi- 
bility of  the  war  was  actually  created  by  these 
transactions ;  and,  furthermore,  it  was  economic 
interests,  pure  and  simple,  which  transformed 
this  possibility  into  a  reality;  it  was  economic 
necessity  which  brought  the  Balkan  states, 
hitherto  bitter  enemies,  into  a  close  ajliance  and 
caused  them  to  engage  in  a  war  that  knew  no 
mercy.  The  necessity  of  uniting  their  railways 
made  them  put  aside  their  desire  to  destroy  each 
other;  the  railway  induced  them  to  embark  on 
the  crusade  against  the  Moslem,  Serbian  pork, 
Bulgarian  wheat  and  Greek  commerce  were  the 
factors  underlying  the  great,  and  so-called 
religious,  movement  (85).  Serbia  itself,  which 
at  the  first  glance  seemed  to  be  most  fervently 
animated  by  the  religious  spirit,  fought,  in  reali- 
ty, solely  for  the  port  of  St.  John  of  Medua 
which  her  commerce  had  for  a  long  time  coveted. 
Moreover,  Christian  brotherhood  and  hatred  of 
the  Crescent  actually  had  so  little  to  do  with  the 
real  causes  of  this  war  that  one  of  the  Christian 
allies  suddenly  went  over  to  the  Turk  in  order 
to  put  a  quietus  on  its  former  brother  in  arms. 


THE   LESSONS   OP  THE   GREAT   WAR  165 

Never  before  in  the  long  course  of  history  had 
idealism  suffered  such  a  discouraging  rebuff. 

However,  in  the  Balkan  war,  as  well  as  in  all 
previous  wars,  the  economic  factor  was  concealed 
under  idealistic  appearances  which  might  in- 
deed deceive  us,  but  all  pretense  of  idealism  is 
absent  from  the  present  war,  which  at  the  very 
beginning  proclaimed  itself  as  the  inevitable  re- 
sult of  the  clash  of  economic  interests.  For  a 
long  time  economists  had  been  sounding  the 
alarm  on  the  economic  decadence  of  England. 
In  August,  1913,  Mr.  Ellis  Barker  wrote:  "Great 
Britain's  economic  position  in  the  world  is 
steadily  deteriorating. ' '  England  is  several  dec- 
ades behind  the  United  States  in  the  methods 
of  production  and  henceforth  she  will  also  be  ex- 
celled by  Germany  (86).  At  the  same  time  the 
latter  nation  is  extending  her  colonial  domain, 
which  is  already  five  times  as  great  in  area  as 
the  mother  country,  while  she  dreams  of  estab- 
lishing an  empire  in  the  orient.  It  is,  therefore, 
perfectly  natural  that  England  should  be  jealous 
of  German  competition  and  should  look  forward 
to  destroying  it.  The  French,  who  can  find  no 
employment  at  home  for  their  vast  capital,  be- 
cause the  decline  in  the  birth  rate  destroys  all 
industrial  initiative  in  the  fathers,  give  them- 
selves over  to  the  founding  of  colonies,  and  con- 


166  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES  OP  WAR 

sequently  they  immediately  find  themselves  in 
collision  with  Teutonic  expansion.  Finally, 
Russian  industry,  thrown  back  from  Corea  and 
Manchuria  by  the  Japanese  victories,  seeks  to 
expand  in  the  Balkans  and  extend  its  empire 
to  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic. 

Great  Britain,  jealous  of  the  economic  ex- 
pansion of  Germany  and  eager  to  put  a  stop 
to  it,  takes  advantage  of  the  ambitions  of  France 
and  Russia  and  unites  with  them  in  a  formidable 
alliance — hence  arises  the  Triple  Entente.  As  a 
recent  writer  observes,  at  the  bottom  of  all  this, 
"there  are  merely  certain  opportunities  for  ex- 
pansion valued  by  the  restless  finance  of  one 
power  or  the  other.  It  is  the  economic  motive, 
which  underlies  the  struggle  for  a  balance  of 
power"  (87). 

In  this  we  have  in  reality  the  diplomatic 
preparations  for  the  war,  although  its  breaking 
out  is  still  in  the  future ;  and  but  little  thought  is 
necessary  to  persuade  us  that  England  and 
France  would  never  go  beyond  these  prelimi- 
nary steps.  In  fact,  in  England,  and  also  in 
France,  the  helm  of  state  is  controlled  by  the 
industrial  capitalists,  who  are  natural  enemies 
of  all  warlike  enterprises  or  anything  which 
goes  beyond  peaceful  expansion;  while  the  per- 
petual conflict  between  the  two  fundamental 


THE  LESSONS   OF   THE   GREAT   WAR  167 

classes,  that  of  the  manufacturers  and  that  of 
landed  proprietors,  furthers  the  development  of 
parliamentary  institutions,  which  always  serve 
as  checks  on  war  and  acts  of  violence. 

But  in  central  and  eastern  Europe  we  find  a 
different  sta.te  of  affairs.  There,  in  fact,  politics 
is  directed  solely  by  the  great  landed  interests 
associated  witk  the  bankers — that  is,  by  a  class 
essentially  warlike.  A  note  despatched  from 
Berlin  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  30th  July,  1913,  and 
published  in  the  Yellow  Book  of  1914,  proves 
that  in  Germany  the  classes  opposed  to  war  were 
the  manufacturers,  the  merchants,  the  small 
financiers,  who  were  carrying  on  their  business 
on  foreign  capital  and  who  would  therefore  be 
ruined  by  a  war,  and  also  the  nobility  of  Silesia, 
who  were  chiefly  engaged  in  industrial  enter- 
prises ;  and  that  these  elements  merely  served  as 
a  sort  of  political  counterpoise,  having  little  posi- 
tive influence  upon  the  progress  of  affairs,  and 
that  their  voices  were  drowned  by  those  of  the 
great  landed  proprietors  (represented  in  the 
Reichstag  by  the  Conservatives)  and  by  the 
great  stock  companies,  the  banks  and  the  manu- 
facturers of  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  who  did 
everything  in  their  power  to  bring  about  the 
conflagration  (88).  The  same  is  true  with  re- 
spect to  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia.  More- 


168  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

over,  in  all  these  countries  the  unquestioned 
power  of  a  single  economic  class,  that  of  the 
great  landed  proprietors,  constitutes  the  basis  of 
a  complete  autocratic  political  system,  and  there- 
fore by  its  very  nature  is  disposed  to  military 
enterprises.  Therefore  it  is  not  difficult  to  un- 
derstand that,  to  these  warlike  forces  lying  in 
wait  in  central  and  eastern  Europe,  and  eager 
to  spring  forth,  the  formation  of  the  Triple  En- 
tente was  a  powerful  incentive  for  them  to 
break  loose;  and,  while  the  states  of  the  west 
were  entering  into  diplomatic  alliances  and  were 
making  peaceful  preparations,  it  was  the  states 
of  the  central  portion  and  of  the  east  of  Europe 
who  might  be  most  seriously  affected  by  these 
more  or  less  innocent  preparations. 

These  are  truths  which  can  no  longer  be  dis- 
puted— not  even  by  those  who  at  first  had  at- 
tempted to  deny  them.  For  example,  the  London 
"Economist,"  which  for  some  time  could  dis- 
cover in  the  war  only  the  effect  of  causes  wholly 
political,  finally  explicitly  recognized  (20th  No- 
vember, 1915)  that  the  desire  to  find  a  lucra- 
tive employment  for  capital  in  new  countries 
was  the  real  underlying  cause  of  the  horrible 
conflagration.  Even  the  most  fanatical  idealists 
have  at  last  been  forced  to  accept  this  view. 
For  example,  one  of  them,  who  is  never  at  a 


THE  LESSONS   OF   THE  GREAT   WAR  169 

loss  for  words  in  disparagement  of  the  "deliri- 
um" of  historic  materialism,  recognizes  that 
England's  jealousy  of  all  commerce  throughout 
the  world  and  her  own  maritime  supremacy  ren- 
dered a  clash  between  herself  and  Germany  in- 
evitable (89).  Another  writer,  after  the  usual 
compliments  to  the  limited  mentality  of  the  ex- 
pounders of  the  materialistic  conception  of  his- 
tory, squarely  affirms  that  this  conflict  repre- 
sents the  acute  and  violent  phase  of  the  previous 
protracted  economic  rivalry  between  England 
and  Germany,  which  began  when  the  latter,  with 
her  industries  and  her  colonies,  commenced  to 
threaten  the  former  in  the  commercial  empire 
of  the  world  (90).  An  American  economist,  Mr. 
Irving  Fisher,  likewise  discovers  the  causes  of 
the  present  war  in  economic  conditions  (91).  In 
Switzerland,  M.  Millioud  (92),  and  in  France, 
M.  Herriot,  regard  the  war  as  a  result  of  German 
over-production  seeking  new  outlets  (an  expla- 
nation tainted  with  the  old  sophism  of  excess- 
production).  Finally,  even  the  amiable  Pope 
Pius  X,  a  few  days  before  his  death,  stated  that 
the  sole  cause  of  the  present  war  was  to  be 
sought  in  the  measureless  desire  for  wealth  and 
the  anti-social  passions  of  the  controlling 
classes. 

The  very  facts,  however,  which  have  presented 


170  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

themselves  to  our  view  during  the  course  of  the 
war  furnish  a  final  demonstration  of  this  theory. 
In  fact,  immediately  upon  the  breaking  out  of 
the  Homeric  struggle  England  annexed  the  Ger- 
man colonies,  organized  her  allies  in  a  commer- 
cial fight  against  Teutonic  wares  and  put  forth 
every  effort  to  supplant  Germany  in  her  export 
trade — the  author  himself  noticed  a  little  proof 
of  this  the  other  day  when  purchasing  some  co- 
balt blue ;  instead  of  the  Prussian  brand,  which 
it  had  hitherto  borne,  it  had  an  English  mark. 
Moreover,  everyone  knows  that  from  the  first 
year  of  the  war  the  increase  in  English  tonnage 
through  the  Suez  Canal  was  exactly  equal  to 
the  total  loss  in  German  tonnage.  Germany,  in 
turn,  took  advantage  of  her  victories  to  seize  the 
iron  and  coal  mines  of  Lorraine  and  to  open  a 
way  to  Bagdad  to  assure  her  the  economic  domi- 
nation of  the  orient.  Now,  these  effects  of  the 
war  clearly  disclose  the  causes  which  produced 
it,  since  they  are  only  the  logical  development 
of  a  programme  of  which  the  war  is  merely  the 
beginning ;  are  simply  the  harvest  from  the  seed 
the  war  has  sown. 

Moreover,  by  an  entirely  different  series  of 
facts,  the  present  war  confirms  the  views  I  have 
advanced.  I  have  said  war  leads  directly  to 
the  destruction  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  it  is 


THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR     171 

a  fact  that  this  negation  of  law  has  never  before 
been  so  absolute  as  during  the  present  war.  In 
this  conflict  we  have  not  only  witnessed  the  vio- 
lation of  the  territory  of  a  neutral  state,  but  for 
the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  world  we  have 
heard  the  minister  of  a  great  nation  announce  in 
the  national  assembly  that  treaties  are  merely 
scraps  of  paper,  to  be  torn  up  when  interest 
prompted.  Articles  44  and  46  of  the  Hague 
Convention,  adopted  without  discussion,  im- 
posed respect  for  the  honor  and  rights  of  the 
family  and  for  the  life  of  individuals  and  for  pri- 
vate property,  and,  after  all  this,  unarmed  citi- 
zens have  been  shot,  women  violated,  art  treas- 
ures destroyed  and  merchantmen  of  belligerents 
and  even  of  neutrals  sunk.  Trampling  on  the 
remains  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Convention  of 
1868  and  of  the  Hague  of  1899-1907,  forbidding 
the  use  of  needlessly  cruel  weapons,  prisoners 
have  been  subjected  to  torture,  asphyxiating 
gases  have  been  used,  Red  Cross  trains,  physi- 
cians, Sisters  of  Charity  and  the  wounded  have 
been  fired  on.  In  fine,  the  crimes  of  this  deplor- 
able war  show  in  the  most  unmistakable  way 
that  the  warring  nations  have  returned  to  a 
state  of  savagery,  or  that  the  rules  of  interna- 
tional law  have  taken  flight  from  the  blood- 
stained earth  and  found  refuge  in  the  void,  like 


172  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

those  electric  phenomena  which  occur  in  the 
midst  of  a  perfectly  calm  atmosphere  and  which 
suddenly  cease  in  an  environment  of  tempest 
and  storm. 

However,  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  several 
of  the  opinions  propounded  in  the  preceding 
chapters  seem  to  be  refuted  by  recent  events. 
In  substance,  I  stated  that  our  economic  system 
included  several  factors  averse  to  war,  which 
would  hinder  its  outbreak.  And  right  in  the 
midst  of  this  economic  complex  and  at  the  mo- 
ment of  its  most  perfect  blossoming  we  see  the 
greatest  and  most  terrible  war  the  world  has 
ever  known  break  out !  Does  this  not  constitute 
a  most  disheartening  contradiction  between  our 
theory  and  reality? 

Not  at  all.  In  fact,  we  have  explicitly  stated 
that  all  the  anti-bellicose  influences  contained  in 
the  present  economic  system  could  only  render 
wars  less  frequent.  That  they  really  have  had 
this  effect  no  one  can  doubt,  in  view  of  the  long 
period  of  peace  which  Europe  enjoyed  from 
1871  to  1914 — an  extraordinary  fact  which  has 
had  no  precedent  in  the  history  of  the  world 
and  which  by  itself  is  an  indication  of  the 
strength  of  the  anti-war  forces  latent  in  the 
present  economic  complex.  But  their  power, 
however  strong  we  would  like  to  regard  it,  is 


THE  LESSONS   OF   THE   GREAT   WAR  173 

not  sufficient  completely  to  abolish  wars,  since 
this  end  itself  is  a  natural  and  necessary  deriva- 
tive of  the  coercive  association  of  labor,  which 
has  marked  social  economy  since  the  earliest  his- 
torical epochs. 

It  is  no  less  true,  however,  that  this  war 
has  refuted  many  of  the  forecasts  of  recognized 
writers  whose  works  had  been  highly  suggestive 
to  the  author  of  the  present  volume.  In  1899 
the  Russian  manufacturer,  De  Block,  published 
a  book  in  which  he  seeks  to  frighten  Germany 
with  a  terrible  picture  of  the  fearful  disasters 
a  war  with  Russia  would  inflict  on  her,  but 
which,  however,  is  in  many  ways  prophetic.  He 
foresaw  that  the  future  war  would  involve  most 
of  Europe;  that  it  would  be  provoked  by  an 
attack  of  Austria-Hungary  on  Serbia ;  that  Ger- 
many would  invade  Belgium;  tha.t  the  war 
would  last  several  years,  and  its  battles  many 
days;  that  no  victory  would  be  possible  unless 
munitions  should  entirely  fail  one  of  the  armies. 
Further,  his  work  prophesied  that  the  next  war 
would  occasion  an  expense  six  or  eight  times 
as  much  as  any  other  war  had  caused,  and  which 
for  the  European  states,  exclusive  of  England, 
would  amount  to  $20,000,000  a  day ;  he  predicted 
that  the  war  would  give  rise  to  the  most  dis- 
tressing economic  crises,  would  ruin  agriculture, 


174  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP  WAR 

would  cause  a  great  rise  in  the  price  of  wheat 
and  a  decline  in  the  value  of  all  securities,  and 
thereby  the  utter  impossibility  of  bearing  new 
debts ;  that  it  would  lead  to  the  necessity  of  enor- 
mous issues  of  paper  money,  to  an  incredible 
number  of  failures,  and  to  a  decrease  in  wages ; 
that  Germany  would  have  great  difficulty  in 
provisioning  her  troops  on  the  frontiers ;  that  she 
would  in  vain  attempt  to  import  wheat  from 
Egypt  by  the  Suez  Canal  and  Italy;  that  she 
would  have  to  fast  102  days  in  the  year;  in 
short,  that  the  effect  of  the  war  would  be  so 
ruinous  to  a)l  the  states  that  it  would  end  in  a 
few  months.  Schaffle,  the  German  economist, 
believed  that  a  war  between  France  and  Ger- 
many would  not  last  more  than  nine  months, 
and  Lord  Charles  Beresford  maintained  that 
Great  Britain,  in  case  of  war,  would  not  be  able 
to  provision  herself. 

Now — we  must  admit — that  all  these  dire  pre- 
dictions have  been  given  the  lie  by  the  experi- 
ence of  the  last  two  years.  In  fact,  the  expenses 
of  the  war  have  already  far  exceeded  the  most 
pessimistic  predictions.  The  belligerent  powers 
are  now  spending  about  $100,000,000  a  day  and 
their  debt  now  amounts  to  $27,500,000,000 ;  their 
military  expenditures  to  $35,000,000,000,  (?) 
and  in  Great  Britain  alone  they  are  three  times 


THE  LESSONS  OF   THE  GREAT   WAR  175 

as  great  as  the  yearly  savings ;  the  destruction  of 
wealth  caused  the  belligerent  nations  by  the  war 
has  now  reached  the  fabulous  sum  of  $67,000,- 
000,000 ;  in  other  words,  it  exceeds  by  $12,000,- 
000,000  the  preventive  suggested  in  Chapter  V. 
And  as  a  matter  of  fact,  these  colossal  expendi- 
tures do  not  seem  to  have  given  the  world  even 
a  suggestion  of  the  terrible  disasters  which  the 
prophets  of  cosmopolitan  finance  ha.d  been  so 
ready  to  announce.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  war- 
ring countries,  even  in  those  menaced  or  in- 
vaded by  the  war,  there  is  not  a  symptom  of 
exhaustion  or  death,  and  life  in  them  pursues 
its  normal  course,  free  from  disconcerting 
shocks.  Now,  what  does  all  this  mean? 

It  means  precisely  this :  That  the  forty-three 
years  of  undisturbed  peace  which  the  very  pro- 
cess of  economic  relations  secured  for  the  Eu- 
ropean world  have  enormously  increased  her 
savings  and  her  wealth  and  thereby  have  vastly 
extended  the  limits  of  the  work  of  destruction. 
Now,  as  always,  it  is  peace  that  has  fostered  war ; 
it  is  the  long  period  of  tranquillity  which  creates 
the  reserve  which  war  lavishly  destroys — just 
as  the  bear  of  the  Alps  in  winter  consumes  the 
enormous  capital  of  fat  he  has  taken  on  in 
summer. 

Those,  however,  who  conclude  from  this  fact 


176  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF  WAR 

that  the  nations  of  Europe  may  thoughtlessly  ex- 
pend their  wealth,  regardless  of  the  future,  show 
that  they  possess  no  very  clear  idea  of  the  gravi- 
ty of  the  situation.  In  fact,  it  is  not  merely 
their  revenue ;  it  is  not  simply  the  excess  of  the 
wage-fund  over  the  minimum  of  wages — to  which 
England's  entire  loss  was  confined  during  the 
Napoleonic  wars — but  it  is  a  considerable  part 
of  their  capital  and  of  their  labor  which  is  swept 
a.way  in  the  cataclysm;  while  numberless 
ships  are  sunk,  warehouses  of  grain,  and  oil  wells 
are  destroyed  by  fire;  powder  mills  are  blown 
up,  and  towns  are  sacked  or  reduced  to  ashes. 
This  vast  destruction  of  productive  forces 
threatens  in  the  most  serious  manner  the  eco- 
nomic equilibrium  of  nations  and  confronts  them 
with  a  future  of  exhaustion  and  ruin. 

Moreover,  in  still  another  way  recent  facts 
seem  to  refute  my  theory.  I  stated  that  the  pro- 
letarian movement  was  a  powerful  factor,  mak- 
ing for  universal  peace,  but  we  have  seen  the 
German  socialists  enthusiastically  voting  the 
military  credits  asked  by  their  government,  at 
the  same  time  showing  themselves  the  most  eager 
supporters  of  the  war  and  of  conquest. 

But  here  again  the  refutation  of  the  theory 
advanced  is  merely  one  in  appearance.  For  a 
long  time  the  socialist  party  in  Germany — the 


THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GREAT  V;AR        177 

same,  moreover,  as  in  other  countries — has  been 
anything  but  an  expression  of  the  wishes  and  of 
the  interests  of  the  proletariat ;  it  has  become  the 
fief  of  certain  party  leaders,  directors,  secre- 
taries, chancellors,  minister  and  politicians;  in 
other  words,  of  a  dissatisfied  clique  of  the  bour- 
geoisie, who  are  adepts  in  securing  snug  in- 
comes for  themselves  at  the  expense  of  their 
flocks  and  who  direct  the  la.bor  movement  \vith 
a  cast  of  mind  wholly  capitalistic. 

Truly,  the  arguments  by  which  these  gentle- 
men justify  their  support  of  the  war  exhibit  in 
the  most  striking  manner  their  bourgeois  men- 
tality. In  fact,  they  maintain  that  the  war,  by 
reducing  the  amount  of  labor  available,  will 
finally  bring  about  a  rise  in  wages;  that  a  war 
from  which  Germany  issues  victorious  would  in- 
crease her  wealth  and  thereby  improve  the  con- 
dition of  the  laboring  class;  finally,  that  the 
direction  of  world  socialism  is  the  peculiar  func- 
tion of  German  workingmen  and  that  a  German 
victory  consequently  would  bring  with  it  a 
strengthening  of  international  socialism. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  for  me  to  reiterate,  in 
opposition  to  these  views,  that  the  war,  by  rea- 
son of  the  enormous  destruction  of  capital  which 
it  occasions,  will  end  by  reducing  wages  and 
increasing  idleness;  that  the  increase  in  the 


178  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF    WAR 

wealth  of  the  victorious  nation  will  not  benefit 
its  working  classes  in  the  slightest  degree,  but 
simply  a.  small  clique  of  bankers  and  merchants ; 
that  the  war,  by  separating  the  workers  of  the 
hostile  parties  into  two  groups  who  hate  and 
murder  each  other,  will  attack  the  international 
proletarian  movement  at  the  root.  However, 
what  we  ought  to  establish  is  that  the  arguments 
which  the  socialist  leaders  of  Germany  advance 
are  all  taken  from  the  old  stock  of  perfectly  fa- 
miliar trade-unionism,  whose  sole  purpose  was  to 
increase  the  rate  of  wages,  and  therefore  have 
nothing  in  common  with  the  real  essence  of  the 
proletarian  agitation,  which  does  not  concern  it- 
self at  all  with  the  prosaic  and  immediate  aim 
of  securing  fat  wages,  but  seeks  to  assure  the 
laborer,  even — if  necessary — at  the  cost  of  suf- 
fering and  privations,  a  more  noble  destiny. 

But  with  all  this  I  have  not  yet  mentioned  the 
most  serious  obstacle  which  recent  events  seem 
to  oppose  to  my  theory.  In  fact,  I  must  confess : 
this  equilibrium  of  states,  and  these  arbitral  in- 
stitutions to  which  we  ascribe  a  positive  and 
constant  influence/  to  prevent  wars,  suddenly 
revealed  themselves  as  utterly  unable  to  prevent 
the  great  conflagration. 

This,  however,  does  not  prove  that  pacific  in- 
stitutions are  foolish;  it  merely  proves  that  if 


THE  LESSONS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR     179 

we  want  them  actually  to  accomplish  anything 
important  they  must  be  organized  in  a  more 
efficient  manner  and,  above  all,  they  must  be 
endowed  with  a  progressive  power.  In  fact,  just 
BO  far  as  they  accelerate  capitalistic  accumula- 
tion and  wealth,  pacific  institutions  result  in 
hastening  the  decline  in  revenue  which  is  itself 
a  powerful  factor  in  bringing  about  war.  In 
this  sense  it  is  not  a  paradox  to  say  that  peace 
engenders  war,  because  it  causes  and  accelerates 
the  capitalistic  plethora  from  which  war  results. 
Therefore,  if  we  demand  that  pacific  institutions 
shall  always  prevent  war  they  must  be  dynamic 
and  not  static;  in  other  words,  they  must  be 
endowed  with  a  uniformly  accelerated  energy, 
so  that  they  may  successfully  re-act  against  the 
ever-increasing  forces  which  tend  to  provoke 
war. 

Now,  it  is  precisely  this  which  has  been  over- 
looked. Scholars  who  have  devoted  their  talents 
and  their  studies  to  the  peace  movement  have 
sought  to  accomplish  their  purpose  by  build- 
ing up  mechanical  schemes  whose  absolute  per- 
fection was  immediately  proclaimed,  but  which 
were  impracticable.  While  admitting  that  these 
devices  might  be  able  to  control  the  bellicose 
forces  at  the  instant  they  were  conceived  and 
placed  in  operation,  they  would  necessarily  be- 


180  THE  ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OP   WAR 

come  impotent  when  confronted  by  forces  which 
were  constantly  becoming  more  powerful  and 
which  they  themselves  would  set  free.  The  very 
peace  which  they  would  at  first  bring  to  human- 
ity would  carry  the  germs — ever  becoming  more 
numerous  and  more  powerful — of  war,  against 
which  these  rigid  institutions  soon  would  become 
incapable  of  offering  any  resistance. 

In  the  second  place,  we  must  understand  that 
institutions  for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  to  be 
really  efficacious,  must  not  be  limited  to  mutual 
contracts  between  states,  but  that  they  require 
a  preliminary  and  profound  transformation  in 
the  internal  organization  of  each  state.  This  is 
another  fact  which  our  pacific  thinkers  have 
made  the  mistake  of  ignoring,  but  one  which  had 
been  clearly  announced  by  earlier  writers.  In 
this  connection  we  need  recall  only  the  greatest 
among  them,  Immanuel  Kant,  who,  as  everyone 
knows,  to  secure  universal  peace,  did  not  confine 
himself  to  suggesting  a  fcedus  pacificum,  a  fed- 
eration of  nations,  but  who  proposed  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  any  international  organization  three 
reforms  in  the  internal  order  of  things:  the 
abolition  of  the  power  to  contract  public  debts, 
which  makes  it  only  too  easy  for  states  to  obtain 
the  financial  means  required  for  war,  without 
any  popular  control;  the  transfer  of  the  right 


THE   LESSONS   OF   THE   GREAT    WAR  181 

to  declare  war  from  the  sovereign  to  the  people ; 
and  finally,  the  creation  of  democratic  institu- 
tions. Now,  leaving  aside  the  first  reform,  which 
would  be  very  difficult  to  bring  about,  the  second 
is  perfectly  just  and  possible,  while  it  is  espe- 
cially the  third  that  contains  a  material  truth — 
although  by  democratic  organization  we  under- 
stand something  very  different  from  Kant 's  con- 
ception. According  to  him,  a  republic  is  a  form 
of  representative  government  anti-democratic  in 
the  sense  that  it  places  the  power  not  in  the 
masses  but  in  those  whom  they  elect.  According 
to  our  views,  however,  the  true  republic  is  that 
political  form  which  concedes  the  govern- 
ment of  the  state  to  the  totality  of  the  citizens 
and  does  not  make  this  power  an  appanage  of  a 
small  minority;  and  I  am  inclined  to  think  that 
all  projects  for  perpetual  peace  will  be  unreal- 
izable Utopias  until  the  artificial  democracy,  by 
which  we  are  ruled,  is  replaced  by  a  true  democ- 
racy, by  an  actual  government  by  the  people. 
Since  the  outbreak  of  this  terrible  melee  I  have 
been  haunted  by  the  idea  that  if  the  helms  of 
the  various  ships  of  state  had  actually  been  in 
the  hands  of  the  people,  and  also  if  the  sceptre 
had  passed  to  the  costermongers,  to  the  peasants, 
to  the  market  women,  we  would  have  been  spared 
this  brutal  carnage.  Therefore,  if  it  is  the 


182  THE   ECONOMIC   CAUSES   OF   WAR 

world's  desire  that  this  war  shall  constitute  the 
last  blood-smeared  page  of  history,  the  power 
must,  at  whatever  the  cost,  be  wrenched  from  the 
hands  of  this  so-called  ruling  caste,  who,  alone 
are  responsible  for  our  catastrophes,  and  the 
control  of  the  public  state  handed  over  to  the 
anonymous  classes  who  constitute  our  social  sub- 
soil and  whose  powerful  and  youthful  forces  are 
alone  capable  of  bringing  peace  and  happiness 
to  war-worn  humanity. 


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184  THE   ECONOMIC    CAUSES   OF   WAR 

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